RaTeX ratex-parser CVE-2026-53531
MEDIUMSeverity by source
Network-reachable via untrusted LaTeX input with no authentication or preconditions; sole impact is reliable full-process crash (A:H); no confidentiality or integrity effect.
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
RaTeX’s recursive-descent parser recurses one (or more) native stack frame per nesting level at {, \left, \sqrt{, ^{, etc, with no maximum depth limit. A short, ~10 KB input of nested groups overflows the 8 MB main-thread stack and aborts the process. With panic = "abort" (Cargo.toml:48), and because a Rust stack overflow is always a fatal SIGABRT regardless of panic strategy this is an unrecoverable, whole-process denial of service reachable from a single untrusted LaTeX string.
Details
The mutual recursion has no depth guard (crates/ratex-parser/src/parser.rs):
parse_expression (:113) -> parse_atom (:281/285) -> parse_group (:451)
^ |
| on '{' (:459) recurse |
+--------------------------+\left adds another recursive edge: handle_left → parse_expression (crates/ratex-parser/src/functions/left_right.rs:47). The only counters present are unrelated to depth: leftright_depth (a \right-matching counter, parser.rs:24) and the macro expander’s max_expand = 1000 (macro_expander.rs:64), which does not gate brace / \left recursion (those tokens never pass through expand_once). There is no recursion_limit/depth parameter on parse_group, parse_expression, or parse_atom.
PoC
<img width="1097" height="158" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/29b837a2-c455-4cb6-a055-514b31c999c6" />
$ python3 -c 'import sys;sys.stdout.write("{"*200000+"x"+"}"*200000)' | ./target/release/parse
thread 'main' has overflowed its stack
fatal runtime error: stack overflow, aborting
Aborted (core dumped)
# exit 134(Other nesting forms work equally, e.g. \left(×N, \sqrt{×N, ^{×N.)
Impact
A single small request crashes the whole RaTeX process. In a typical server-side math-rendering service this is a reliable, unauthenticated DoS; on smaller worker-thread stacks (e.g. a 512 KB async runtime thread) only a few hundred bytes of nesting are required.
AnalysisAI
Unbounded recursive descent in the RaTeX Rust crate ratex-parser crashes the entire host process when fed deeply nested LaTeX input. The mutual recursion across parse_expression, parse_atom, and parse_group in crates/ratex-parser/src/parser.rs carries no depth guard, so roughly 200,000 nested braces (~400 KB of input, or far less on async worker threads with 512 KB stacks) exhausts the native OS stack and triggers a fatal SIGABRT from which the process cannot recover. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | No special conditions are required for exploitation against default deployments that expose LaTeX input to untrusted users - any service forwarding user-supplied LaTeX to ratex-parser is vulnerable without additional configuration. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | No CVSS vector or EPSS score is present in the available data; all metric assessments below are independently derived from the description and PoC. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An unauthenticated attacker sends a single HTTP request containing a LaTeX string composed of 200,000 opening brace characters followed by a token and 200,000 closing braces to a server-side math rendering endpoint backed by ratex-parser. The parser's recursive descent allocates one native stack frame per nesting level; at ~200,000 levels the 8 MB main-thread stack is exhausted, SIGABRT is delivered, and the entire rendering service process terminates. … |
| Remediation | No patched version of ratex-parser is confirmed in the advisory data at time of analysis. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
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Same weakness CWE-400 – Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
View allSame technique Denial Of Service
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-4w5h-hx6r-28q7