RAGFlow CVE-2026-51892

Requires a valid authenticated account on the target RAGFlow 0.24.0 instance (PR:L) and network reachability to its API; once authenticated, the attacker invokes the /v1/document/get/<doc_id> endpoint with a document identifier they do not own, and the missing authorization check returns the document regardless of ownership. Limiting factors: authentication is mandatory (this is not unauthenticated), so an account or valid session must first be obtained, and realistic impact depends on the instance being multi-tenant or holding documents of other users; a single-user or isolated deployment exposes little. No user interaction and no special non-default configuration are required beyond having the document-retrieval API in use.

This is a moderate-severity confidentiality issue, not a top-tier emergency. The provided CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N, base 6.5) indicates a network-reachable, low-complexity flaw requiring only low-privilege authentication (PR:L), yielding high confidentiality impact but no integrity or availability impact - consistent with a broken-access-control / IDOR pattern (CWE-284) on the /v1/document/get/<doc_id> endpoint. Exploitation-probability signals are low: EPSS is 0.15% (4th percentile), there is no CISA KEV listing, and no SSVC decision record was provided. These low signals partially conflict with the fact that a public gist and two GitHub issue reports are referenced, which suggests the flaw is publicly documented and likely has proof-of-concept detail available - public documentation can precede any rise in EPSS. The realistic priority is driven less by raw CVSS and more by exposure: for multi-tenant or internet-exposed RAGFlow deployments holding sensitive ingested documents, this is a meaningful data-exposure risk; for single-user or internal-only instances it is low. Note that the attack requires a valid (low-privilege) account per the PR:L metric, which limits mass unauthenticated scanning.

An attacker who holds a valid low-privilege RAGFlow account (or has obtained any authenticated session) calls /v1/document/get/<doc_id> while iterating or guessing document identifiers, retrieving documents belonging to other users or tenants that they are not authorized to see. A public gist and GitHub issue reports are referenced, indicating proof-of-concept detail is likely available, and the low attack complexity (AC:L) makes the request trivial to reproduce once authenticated.