Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Network-reachable endpoint needs any valid operator key (PR:L) with low complexity; impact is cross-tenant data disclosure only, so C:H with I:N/A:N.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/juev/nebula-mesh
Lifecycle Timeline
5DescriptionCVE.org
internal/api/audit.go:12 - handleGetAuditLog does no admin check. The route is bearer-auth gated only; any operator API key returns the full audit log via store.ListAuditEntries (up to limit=1000). This includes cross-tenant actor names, host/CA/operator IDs, action timestamps, and masked-IP entries from rate-limit refusals - enough surface for a tenant to enumerate the server's activity, infer staffing patterns, or identify high-value targets.
Affected
All released versions up to v0.3.1.
Reproducer
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer <any-operator-key>" \
https://server/api/v1/audit-log?limit=1000Suggested fix
Two options, either acceptable:
if !actorIsAdmin(ctx) { 403 }- strictest; matches the "operator management is admin-only" stance.- Scope to actor: filter
store.ListAuditEntriesbyactor.Usernameplus a subquery of CA IDs the actor owns. Operators see their own audit entries plus entries against their CA's resources.
Recommend option 1 unless the UI needs per-operator audit views.
Suggested patch
Verified locally: go vet, go test -race -count=1 ./..., golangci-lint v2.12 all clean.
diff --git a/internal/api/audit.go b/internal/api/audit.go
index 3236631..57b57ce 100644
--- a/internal/api/audit.go
+++ b/internal/api/audit.go
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@ import (
const defaultAuditLimit = 100
func (s *Server) handleGetAuditLog(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+ if !actorIsAdmin(r.Context()) {
+ writeError(w, http.StatusForbidden, "audit log access requires the admin role")
+ return
+ }
filter := store.AuditFilter{
Action: r.URL.Query().Get("action"),
Limit: defaultAuditLimit,
diff --git a/internal/api/audit_admin_test.go b/internal/api/audit_admin_test.go
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47e1ca4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/internal/api/audit_admin_test.go
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+ "context"
+ "crypto/sha256"
+ "encoding/hex"
+ "net/http"
+ "net/http/httptest"
+ "testing"
+
+ "github.com/google/uuid"
+ "github.com/juev/nebula-mesh/internal/models"
+)
+
+// TestHandleGetAuditLog_NonAdminForbidden confirms a non-admin operator
+// API key cannot read the audit log. The legacy config-key path stays
+// admin and is covered by the happy-path test elsewhere.
+func TestHandleGetAuditLog_NonAdminForbidden(t *testing.T) {
+ srv, _ := newTestServer(t)
+
+ nonAdminKey := uuid.New().String()
+ keyHash := sha256.Sum256([]byte(nonAdminKey))
+ if err := srv.store.CreateOperator(context.Background(), &models.Operator{
+ ID: uuid.New().String(), Username: "non-admin", PasswordHash: "x",
+ Role: "user", Status: models.OperatorStatusActive,
+ }); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ op, err := srv.store.GetOperatorByUsername(context.Background(), "non-admin")
+ if err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+ if err := srv.store.CreateOperatorAPIKey(context.Background(), &models.OperatorAPIKey{
+ ID: uuid.New().String(), OperatorID: op.ID, KeyHash: hex.EncodeToString(keyHash[:]),
+ }); err != nil {
+ t.Fatal(err)
+ }
+
+ req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/audit-log", nil)
+ req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+nonAdminKey)
+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+ srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+ if rec.Code != http.StatusForbidden {
+ t.Errorf("non-admin audit-log status = %d, want 403", rec.Code)
+ }
+}
+
+// TestHandleGetAuditLog_LegacyKeyAllowed confirms the legacy config-key
+// path still reaches the handler (preserves backward compatibility).
+func TestHandleGetAuditLog_LegacyKeyAllowed(t *testing.T) {
+ srv, _ := newTestServer(t)
+
+ req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/audit-log", nil)
+ req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+testAPIKey)
+ rec := httptest.NewRecorder()
+ srv.ServeHTTP(rec, req)
+
+ if rec.Code == http.StatusForbidden {
+ t.Errorf("legacy key rejected with 403; want pass-through")
+ }
+}AnalysisAI
Broken authorization in nebula-mesh (Go, all versions up to and including v0.3.1) lets any authenticated operator read the entire server-wide audit log. The GET /api/v1/audit-log endpoint (handleGetAuditLog in internal/api/audit.go) is protected only by bearer-token authentication and omits the admin role check, so a low-privileged operator key returns up to 1000 cross-tenant entries including actor names, host/CA/operator IDs, timestamps, and masked-IP records. A working one-line curl reproducer is published in the GHSA advisory (publicly available exploit code exists); it is not in CISA KEV and EPSS is low at 0.04%.
Technical ContextAI
nebula-mesh is a self-hosted control-plane server for managing Nebula overlay-mesh certificate authorities, hosts, and operators, written in Go (module github.com/juev/nebula-mesh, CPE pkg:go/github.com_juev_nebula-mesh). The flaw is a CWE-285 Improper Authorization defect: the multi-tenant model treats operator management as admin-only, and audit data spans all tenants, but the audit-log route enforces only authentication (bearerAuth middleware) and never calls actorIsAdmin. store.ListAuditEntries therefore returns unscoped results to any caller holding a valid operator API key, disclosing data across CA/tenant boundaries.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade to nebula-mesh v0.3.2, which adds an actorIsAdmin check to handleGetAuditLog and returns 403 to non-admin operators (fix commit https://github.com/forgekeep/nebula-mesh/commit/8baaace54c2a23e7c351b3efab5a31ab07b125dc; advisory GHSA-qm33-p5p9-f8vg). If you cannot upgrade immediately, restrict who holds operator API keys and rotate or revoke keys issued to untrusted tenants, since any valid operator key triggers the disclosure. As a network compensating control, place the /api/v1/audit-log route behind a reverse-proxy ACL that permits only admin source IPs, accepting that this breaks any legitimate per-operator audit access; alternatively apply the vendor's option-2 approach of scoping ListAuditEntries to the actor's own username and owned CA IDs if per-operator audit views are required.
Same weakness CWE-285 – Improper Authorization
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: Important| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.5 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.6 | Affected |
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-49942
GHSA-qm33-p5p9-f8vg