Summarize CVE-2026-45222

The vulnerability requires the following specific conditions: (1) a local user account on the Unix-like system (AV:L, PR:L from CVSS vector), (2) the target user must have installed and run Summarize at least once to generate the ~/.summarize/daemon.json configuration file, and (3) the daemon configuration file must exist and contain unexpired bearer tokens or API credentials. The vulnerability does NOT occur on Windows systems or filesystems that lack POSIX mode support, where the chmod operations are ignored without creating a security exposure. Non-default configurations (e.g., restrictive umask on the system, prior manual permission tightening) may prevent the world-readable state, but this is not a reliable mitigation since most systems use default umask (0o022) resulting in 0o644 file permissions. The attacker needs only read permission, not write or execute, limiting the damage to confidentiality and potential unauthorized use of credentials, not system compromise.

CVSS 6.1 with attack vector Local (AV:L), low complexity (AC:L), and low privileges required (PR:L) indicates a realistic local threat. The score appropriately reflects the confidentiality impact (High) and minor integrity impact (Low) - an attacker can read credentials and potentially modify the daemon configuration, but cannot execute code or escalate privileges directly. EPSS data is not provided, but the vulnerability is easily exploitable once a local user account exists on the system. The real-world risk depends heavily on deployment context: in shared hosting, CI/CD systems, or multi-tenant containers where local users coexist, this is a significant credential exposure risk. In single-user desktop environments, risk is lower but not negligible if the system is already compromised at a local level. The patch is vendor-available and straightforward, reducing technical remediation barriers. KEV status unknown - no active exploitation confirmed in provided data, but the vulnerability is trivial to exploit if conditions are met (existence of daemon.json + local user access), suggesting low barrier to opportunistic exploitation.

A local user on a shared system (e.g., CI/CD runner, shared hosting environment) observes that another user's Summarize daemon is running. The attacker reads ~/.summarize/daemon.json from the other user's home directory, which is world-readable due to default permissions. They extract the daemon bearer token and stored OpenAI API key (or other provider credentials), then use the token to communicate with the running daemon or consume the provider API quota under the victim's account without authorization.