CrowdSec AppSec CVE-2026-44982
HIGHCVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionNVD
Summary
The CrowdSec AppSec component fails to read the HTTP request body for any request whose Content-Length is not positive - most notably HTTP/1.1 requests using Transfer-Encoding: chunked and HTTP/2 requests sent without a content-length header. Coraza is then evaluated against an empty body, so every WAF rule targeting REQUEST_BODY, BODY_ARGS, ARGS_POST, JSON, or XML silently fails to match.
An unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the entire AppSec body-inspection pipeline by changing a single framing header on an otherwise-malicious request. The bypassed request is forwarded as allow and produces no WAF log entry.
Affected versions
github.com/crowdsecurity/crowdsec- all releases up to and including v1.7.7.
Affected component
pkg/appsec/request.go, function NewParsedRequestFromRequest.
Root cause
func NewParsedRequestFromRequest(r *http.Request, logger *log.Entry) (ParsedRequest, error) {
var err error
contentLength := max(r.ContentLength, 0)
body := make([]byte, contentLength)
if r.Body != nil {
_, err = io.ReadFull(r.Body, body)
if err != nil {
return ParsedRequest{}, fmt.Errorf("unable to read body: %s", err)
}
r.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewBuffer(body))
}
...
}Go's net/http server sets r.ContentLength = -1 when the request uses Transfer-Encoding: chunked with no Content-Length header, or when an HTTP/2 request omits the content-length pseudo-header (DATA-frame-only body). With ContentLength == -1:
max(-1, 0)evaluates to0.make([]byte, 0)allocates a zero-length slice.io.ReadFullon a zero-length buffer needs zero bytes and returns immediately without touchingr.Body.- The empty buffer is written back onto the request and onto the cloned request constructed later in the same function.
Every downstream consumer then sees an empty body. In the AppSec runner, WriteRequestBody is skipped because the parsed body has zero length, and ProcessRequestBody runs against nothing.
Impact
Every body-scanning rule is bypassed for any request whose framing makes Content-Length non-positive. In default CrowdSec deployments using the standard AppSec collections, the bypass affects any rule with zones containing BODY_ARGS, JSON, XML, REQUEST_BODY, or ARGS_POST.
No configuration option mitigates the issue - the defect is in the request parser, not in any ruleset. Bypassed requests do not produce a WAF log entry, so operators have no signal that rules are being skipped.
Header-only and URI-only rules are unaffected.
Workarounds
No complete workaround is available.
AnalysisAI
Web application firewall body-inspection bypass in CrowdSec (the AppSec component, versions 1.5.0 through 1.7.7) lets unauthenticated remote attackers slip malicious payloads past every body-scanning WAF rule. When a request uses HTTP/1.1 'Transfer-Encoding: chunked' or HTTP/2 without a content-length, the parser treats the body as empty, so rules matching REQUEST_BODY, BODY_ARGS, ARGS_POST, JSON, or XML silently fail and the request is forwarded as 'allow' with no WAF log entry. …
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RemediationAI
24 hours: Inventory CrowdSec AppSec deployments and identify affected versions (1.5.0-1.7.7); enable request filtering at upstream reverse proxy or load balancer to reject or normalize Transfer-Encoding: chunked headers. 7 days: Deploy HTTP/2-to-HTTP/1.1 conversion and automatic Content-Length header normalization at network edge; create detection rules for suspicious query-parameter patterns as compensation for body inspection failures. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-rw47-hm26-6wr7