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axios CVE-2026-44492

HIGH
Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (CWE-918)
2026-05-29 https://github.com/axios/axios GHSA-pjwm-pj3p-43mv
8.6
CVSS 3.1
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CVSS VectorNVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Source Code Evidence Fetched
May 29, 2026 - 16:22 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
May 29, 2026 - 16:22 vuln.today
CVE Published
May 29, 2026 - 15:59 nvd
HIGH 8.6

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact
† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth
  • 273 npm packages depend on axios (189 direct, 84 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 1.0.0.

DescriptionNVD

Summary

shouldBypassProxy, introduced in v1.15.0 to fix CVE-2025-62718, does not normalise IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses. When NO_PROXY lists an IPv4 address such as 127.0.0.1 or 169.254.169.254, a request URL using the IPv4-mapped IPv6 form (::ffff:7f00:1, ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe) still routes through the configured proxy. Node.js resolves these addresses to the underlying IPv4 host, so the request reaches the internal service via the proxy rather than being blocked.

Details

lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js (v1.15.0):

javascript
  const LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES = new Set(['localhost', '127.0.0.1', '::1']);
  const isLoopback = (host) => LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES.has(host);

  // normalizeNoProxyHost strips brackets and trailing dots, but not ::ffff: prefix
  return hostname === entryHost || (isLoopback(hostname) && isLoopback(entryHost));

The WHATWG URL parser canonicalises http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/ to hostname [::ffff:7f00:1]. After bracket-stripping: ::ffff:7f00:1. This string does not match 127.0.0.1 in NO_PROXY and is not in LOOPBACK_ADDRESSES, so shouldBypassProxy returns false and the proxy is used. proxy-from-env (called before shouldBypassProxy) has the same gap - it does not equate ::ffff:7f00:1 with 127.0.0.1 - so neither layer catches the bypass.

PoC

javascript

// NO_PROXY=127.0.0.1,localhost,::1  HTTP_PROXY=http://attacker:8080
import shouldBypassProxy from 'axios/lib/helpers/shouldBypassProxy.js';

// All three should return true (bypass proxy). Only the first two do.
console.log(shouldBypassProxy('http://127.0.0.1/'));          // true  [OK]
console.log(shouldBypassProxy('http://[::1]/'));               // true  [OK]
console.log(shouldBypassProxy('http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]/')); // false <- bypass
console.log(shouldBypassProxy('http://[::ffff:7f00:1]/'));     // false <- bypass

Node.js routes ::ffff:7f00:1 to 127.0.0.1:

// net.connect({ host: '::ffff:7f00:1', port: 80 }) reaches a service
// bound to 127.0.0.1:80 - confirmed on Node.js v24, Linux and macOS.

Cloud metadata SSRF: ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe = ::ffff:169.254.169.254. If NO_PROXY=169.254.169.254 is set to block IMDS access, a request to http://[::ffff:a9fe:a9fe]/latest/meta-data/ bypasses it. #### Fix

Canonicalise IPv4-mapped IPv6 in normalizeNoProxyHost before any comparison:

javascript
const ipv4MappedDotted = /^::ffff:(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})$/i;
const ipv4MappedHex    = /^::ffff:([0-9a-f]{1,4}):([0-9a-f]{1,4})$/i;

function hexToIPv4(a, b) {
  const hi = parseInt(a, 16), lo = parseInt(b, 16);
  return `${hi >> 8}.${hi & 0xff}.${lo >> 8}.${lo & 0xff}`;
}

const normalizeNoProxyHost = (hostname) => {
  if (!hostname) return hostname;
  if (hostname[0] === '[' && hostname.at(-1) === ']')
    hostname = hostname.slice(1, -1);
  hostname = hostname.replace(/\.+$/, '').toLowerCase();

  let m;
  if ((m = hostname.match(ipv4MappedDotted))) return m[1];
  if ((m = hostname.match(ipv4MappedHex)))    return hexToIPv4(m[1], m[2]);
  return hostname;
};

Impact

Any application that sets NO_PROXY to exclude internal or metadata endpoints and uses an HTTP/HTTPS proxy can have those exclusions bypassed by a URL using IPv4-mapped IPv6 notation. The attacker must control the request URL. In cloud environments with instance metadata services, this can lead to credential exfiltration.

AnalysisAI

Server-Side Request Forgery in axios versions <1.16.0 and <=0.31.1 allows remote attackers who control a request URL to bypass NO_PROXY allowlists by using IPv4-mapped IPv6 notation (e.g., ::ffff:7f00:1 for 127.0.0.1, or ::ffff:a9fe:a9fe for the 169.254.169.254 cloud metadata endpoint). The flaw is an incomplete fix for CVE-2025-62718: shouldBypassProxy normalizes brackets and trailing dots but never canonicalises the ::ffff: prefix, so loopback and metadata exclusions silently fail and traffic is routed through an attacker-controlled HTTP/HTTPS proxy. …

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RemediationAI

Within 24 hours: Identify all applications using axios versions <1.16.0 and <=0.31.1; assess which internal systems and cloud metadata endpoints are accessible from affected servers. Within 7 days: Implement network-level access controls restricting outbound connections to internal systems and metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254); enable proxy traffic logging and monitoring. …

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CVE-2026-44492 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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