Atlassian CVE-2026-42864
CRITICALCVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionNVD
Impact
The POST /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot endpoint (CreateJiraBotView) is reachable without authentication (permission_classes = [permissions.AllowAny]). Its attachments payload is fetched server-side via httpx.get() with no URL validation, then uploaded as an attachment on the Jira ticket that gets created.
An unauthenticated caller able to reach the ingress can coerce the pod into fetching arbitrary URLs - including the cloud metadata endpoint at http://169.254.169.254/ - and exfiltrate the response as a Jira attachment.
On EC2/EKS deployments that do not enforce IMDSv2, this allows theft of the temporary AWS credentials attached to the pod's IAM role. The docstring on the view claims a Bearer token is required, but the code does not enforce it.
Affected code paths:
src/firefighter/raid/views/__init__.py-CreateJiraBotViewsrc/firefighter/raid/serializers.py-LandbotIssueRequestSerializer.attachmentssrc/firefighter/raid/client.py-RaidJiraClient.add_attachments_to_issue
Patches
Fixed in firefighter-incident 0.0.54:
CreateJiraBotViewnow enforcesBearerTokenAuthentication+IsAuthenticated.attachmentsURLs are validated: http(s) scheme only, max 10 URLs, rejection
of any host resolving to a private, loopback, link-local, reserved, multicast or unspecified IP (IPv4 and IPv6).
- Fixes an unrelated
KeyError('attachments')surfaced during regression testing.
Users should upgrade to 0.0.54 or later.
Workarounds
Until upgrade is possible, any one of the following blocks end-to-end exploitation:
- Restrict ingress access to
/api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_botto trusted
networks only (VPN, internal load balancer).
- Rotate or revoke the Jira API token configured as
RAID_JIRA_API_PASSWORD;
this breaks jira.create_issue() before the vulnerable attachment fetch is reached (legitimate traffic is also blocked - emergency mitigation only).
- Enforce IMDSv2 with
HttpPutResponseHopLimit=1on EC2/EKS nodes. This does
not fix the SSRF itself but neutralises the IAM-credential-theft path.
Resources
- CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery
- CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function
AnalysisAI
Server-side request forgery combined with missing authentication in firefighter-incident Python package allows unauthenticated remote attackers to exfiltrate AWS IAM credentials from cloud metadata endpoints. The /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot endpoint accepts arbitrary URLs in the attachments parameter, fetches them server-side without validation, and uploads responses as Jira attachments — enabling SSRF against internal services including http://169.254.169.254/ (AWS EC2 Instance Metadata Service). …
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RemediationAI
Within 24 hours: Identify all deployments of firefighter-incident package and confirm current version; immediately restrict network access to the /api/v2/firefighter/raid/jira_bot endpoint via WAF or firewall rules. Within 7 days: Apply vendor patch to version 0.0.54 or later across all affected systems; validate patch deployment and confirm authentication enforcement on the vulnerable endpoint. …
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