What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-41014?

CVE-2026-41014 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 4.3 (Medium). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.0%.

Is there a patch available for CVE-2026-41014?

Yes, a patch is available for CVE-2026-41014. Update the affected software to the latest version immediately.

Apache Airflow CVE-2026-41014

EUVD-2026-33595 MEDIUM

Missing Authorization (CWE-862)

2026-05-31

GHSA-x2x7-p37c-43cr

Open Redirect Apache Authentication Bypass

4.3

CVSS 3.1 · NVD

Severity by source

NVD PRIMARY

4.3 MEDIUM

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorNVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

Low

Integrity

None

Availability

None

Lifecycle Timeline

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Jun 02, 2026 - 17:26 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Jun 02, 2026 - 17:26 vuln.today

CVSS changed

Jun 02, 2026 - 17:22 NVD

4.3 (MEDIUM)

Patch available

Jun 01, 2026 - 10:01 EUVD

CVE Published

May 31, 2026 - 12:45 nvd

MEDIUM 4.3

CVE Published

May 31, 2026 - 12:45 nvd

UNKNOWN (no severity yet)

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact

† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth

10 pypi packages depend on apache-airflow (1 direct, 9 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 3.2.0.

Description PRE-NVD

Disclosed via oss-security. NVD scoring and full description are pending.

AnalysisAI

Per-DAG RBAC bypass in Apache Airflow 3.2.0-3.2.1 allows authenticated users with restricted DAG permissions to read partitioned DAG run metadata for DAGs outside their authorized scope via the /ui/partitioned_dag_runs endpoint. The route enforced asset-level access control via requires_access_asset but omitted the parallel DAG-level check (requires_access_dag) and result-set filtering by readable DAG IDs, creating a gap in the multi-layer authorization model. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; EPSS is 0.01% (4th percentile), indicating very low exploitation probability consistent with the authenticated, information-disclosure-only impact.

Technical ContextAI

Apache Airflow's FastAPI-based UI API exposes the /ui/partitioned_dag_runs endpoint, which queries the AssetPartitionDagRun table to return partitioned DAG run records keyed by target_dag_id. The route applied requires_access_asset(method='GET') to gate on asset-level permissions but failed to also invoke requires_access_dag(method='GET') or inject a ReadableDagsFilterDep to scope the SQL query to the caller's authorized DAG IDs. CWE-862 (Missing Authorization) directly describes this root cause: a code path performs a data-access operation without verifying that the caller holds the necessary authorization for the resources returned. The PR #65344 fix adds both a route-level Depends(requires_access_dag(method='GET')) dependency and a query-time WHERE filter (AssetPartitionDagRun.target_dag_id.in_(readable_dag_ids)) to close both the access-check and data-leakage gaps simultaneously. The affected component is in airflow-core/src/airflow/api_fastapi/core_api/routes/ui/partitioned_dag_runs.py.

RemediationAI

Upgrade to Apache Airflow 3.2.2 or later, which includes the authorization fix from GitHub PR #65344 that adds DAG-level access enforcement and result-set filtering to the /ui/partitioned_dag_runs endpoint. The Apache advisory thread at https://lists.apache.org/thread/12nbzwwby7g883w2j13gn7ny1545xob9 provides official guidance. If immediate upgrade is blocked, a targeted compensating control is to restrict access to the /ui/partitioned_dag_runs path at the reverse-proxy or API gateway layer to only users or roles that have full DAG visibility - trade-off is that legitimate UI features relying on this endpoint (partitioned asset timetable views) will be unavailable to restricted users. Alternatively, flattening DAG permissions so all authenticated users share the same access level eliminates the exploitable boundary but defeats the purpose of per-DAG RBAC. Generic network perimeter controls do not address the root authorization gap and should not be substituted for patching.