Coolify CVE-2026-34599

Requires an authenticated Coolify account with at least the lowest-privilege team 'member' role (PR:L), and network reachability to the Coolify dashboard's Livewire endpoint. The concrete trigger is the GetLogs Livewire component's $container public property, which lacks the #[Locked] attribute and is interpolated unsanitized into 'docker logs' / 'docker service logs' shell commands - the attacker modifies $container via the Livewire wire protocol. Limiting factors: exploitation is not possible for fully anonymous/unauthenticated users, so single-operator instances with no additional accounts have little exposure; the realistic risk concentrates in multi-tenant or shared deployments where untrusted users hold member roles.

The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, base 8.8) is internally consistent with the description: network reachable, low complexity, low privilege (the 'member' role), no user interaction, and full confidentiality/integrity/availability loss via root command execution. The main gating factor is PR:L - the attacker must already be an authenticated team member, so this is primarily a threat in multi-tenant or shared Coolify instances rather than single-operator setups. No EPSS score, SSVC decision, or POC was supplied, and the CVE is not KEV-listed, so real-world exploitation is unproven; the risk is driven by ease of exploitation once a low-privilege account exists, not by observed attacks. One notable nuance: the impact lands on separately managed servers as root, which arguably warrants a scope change (S:C), yet the published vector uses S:U - defenders should treat the practical blast radius as the entire managed fleet regardless.

A low-privilege user who has been invited to a Coolify team (or an attacker who compromised such an account) opens the container log view, then uses browser tooling or a crafted Livewire wire request to set the $container property to a value containing shell metacharacters (e.g. a container name followed by '; <command>'). Coolify interpolates it into the 'docker logs' command and runs it as root on the managed server, giving the attacker full control of that host. No user interaction or elevated role is required beyond basic team membership; no public POC is currently identified.