What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-33655?

CVE-2026-33655 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.7 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.4%.

How to fix or mitigate CVE-2026-33655?

Within 24 hours: Audit all QuantumNous API Gateway deployments and implement network segmentation limiting outbound connectivity. Within 7 days: Upgrade all instances to v0.12.0-alpha.1 or later. Within 30 days: Review gateway logs for notification URL modifications and audit egress traffic to internal IP ranges and cloud metadata services (169.254.169.254).

CVE-2026-33655

HIGH

Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) (CWE-918)

2026-07-07 https://github.com/QuantumNous/new-api

GHSA-6qcr-qxgr-m7fv

SSRF

7.7

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: https://github.com/QuantumNous/new-api

Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/QuantumNous/new-api) PRIMARY

7.7 HIGH

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/QuantumNous/new-api) · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/QuantumNous/new-api

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

None

Scope

Changed

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

None

Availability

None

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

Jul 07, 2026 - 13:34 vuln.today

CVE Published

Jul 07, 2026 - 13:01 github-advisory

HIGH 7.7

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

The default SSRF protection configuration did not apply IP filtering to hostnames. With ApplyIPFilterForDomain disabled by default, URL validation checked domain allow/block rules but did not resolve a hostname and validate the resolved IP address. Authenticated users could configure notification URLs for Webhook, Bark, or Gotify notifications and point a hostname at an internal or metadata IP address.

Impact

A regular authenticated user could cause the server to send notification requests to internal HTTP services reachable from the deployment network. Depending on the target environment, this could expose sensitive internal data through timing, errors, or response-dependent behavior. The issue is rated High.

Affected versions

Versions before v0.12.0-alpha.1 are affected. The previous affected range of <= v0.11.4-alpha.4 was too narrow because the unsafe default remained present until the v0.12.0-alpha.1 fix.

Patches

This issue is fixed in v0.12.0-alpha.1. The default fetch setting now sets ApplyIPFilterForDomain: true, causing hostname destinations to be resolved and checked against the configured IP filtering rules during URL validation.

This patch addresses the unresolved-hostname bypass for the affected notification URL paths. It does not mark the separate DNS rebinding advisory as fixed, because connection-time IP enforcement is tracked separately.

Workarounds

If upgrading immediately is not possible, explicitly enable ApplyIPFilterForDomain, restrict notification URL domains with an allowlist, disable user-configurable notification URLs where practical, and enforce outbound network filtering at the host or network layer.

Resources

Fixed by commit 20399d3c8fcb4e3649d53163eb11940fd6763743.
Relevant code paths: setting/system_setting/fetch_setting.go, common/ssrf_protection.go, service/webhook.go, and service/user_notify.go.

AnalysisAI

Server-side request forgery in QuantumNous New API (an open-source LLM API gateway/proxy) lets any authenticated low-privilege user coerce the server into making HTTP requests to internal or cloud-metadata IP addresses via notification URL configuration. Because the default SSRF protection (ApplyIPFilterForDomain disabled) validated only the literal hostname against domain allow/block lists and never resolved and re-checked the destination IP, a user could set Webhook, Bark, or Gotify notification URLs whose hostname points at internal services. …