Kong Operator CVE-2026-16543

Requires an attacker to hold namespace-scoped Kubernetes RBAC permission to create Secret objects in at least one namespace watched by the embedded KIC, and the deployment must use Kong Operator's embedded KIC configured to collect CA-certificate Secrets via label selector across all watched namespaces without ingress-class or namespace restriction (the vulnerable default behavior described). The attacker must set the user-supplied CA-certificate ID field to a value that duplicates an existing CA-certificate ID. Limiting factors: exploitation needs valid (even if low-privileged) authenticated access to the Kubernetes API in a watched namespace - it is not anonymous internet exploitation; impact is availability-only (no data read or write); and clusters that scope KIC to specific namespaces/ingress classes or that restrict CA-cert Secret creation via RBAC are not exposed.

The reported CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H, score 7.1) is internally consistent with the description: network-reachable Kubernetes API, low complexity, low privileges (a legitimate namespace tenant), no user interaction, and an availability-only impact with no confidentiality or integrity loss. This is a genuine multi-tenant integrity-of-service concern rather than an inflated high-CVSS issue - the blast radius (all ingress changes cluster-wide) is disproportionate to the low privilege required, which is the core of the finding. However, it is a denial-of-service/availability issue only: no data exposure or code execution. No EPSS score, KEV entry, or POC was provided, so exploitation-in-the-wild likelihood cannot be quantified; the low PR and low AC make opportunistic abuse by any hostile or compromised tenant plausible, but impact is limited to disrupting new ingress configuration propagation. One nuance to verify: the reported vector marks VA:H on the vulnerable system with subsequent-system metrics at N, yet the real-world effect is cluster-wide - defenders should treat the practical availability impact as broader than a single namespace.

A developer or attacker who controls a single application namespace - with only the ability to create Secrets there - crafts a CA-certificate Secret carrying the label KIC selects on and sets its user-supplied CA-certificate ID to collide with an ID already in use elsewhere in the cluster. KIC ingests it globally, Kong Gateway then rejects the entire configuration document as invalid, and all subsequent ingress/route changes across every namespace stop applying. No exploit code is publicly identified, but the low complexity (AC:L) and low privilege (PR:L) make this trivial for any tenant with namespace Secret rights.