Lorex 2K Camera CVE-2026-15680
HIGHSeverity by source
AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Adjacent-network reach (AV:A) and no auth (PR:N) match the flaw; format-string exploitation is non-trivial (AC:H); code exec as root yields full C:H/I:H/A:H with scope unchanged.
Primary rating from Vendor (zdi).
CVSS VectorVendor: zdi
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Lorex 2K Indoor Wi-Fi Security Camera CDeviceOperator Format String Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Lorex 2K Indoor Wi-Fi Security Cameras. Authentication is not required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the parsing of JSON requests in the sonia binary. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it as a format specifier. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-25884.
AnalysisAI
Remote code execution in the Lorex 2K Indoor Wi-Fi Security Camera lets a network-adjacent, unauthenticated attacker run arbitrary code as root by abusing a CWE-134 format string flaw in the camera's 'sonia' binary. A user-supplied string within a JSON request is passed directly into a format specifier by the CDeviceOperator component, giving full device takeover. Discovered and reported through ZDI (ZDI-26-398 / ZDI-CAN-25884); no public exploit identified at time of analysis.
Technical ContextAI
The vulnerability lives in the 'sonia' service binary that handles JSON request parsing on Lorex 2K Indoor Wi-Fi cameras - a Linux-based embedded IoT device where privileged services commonly run as root. The root cause is CWE-134 (Use of Externally-Controlled Format String): attacker-controlled input from a JSON field is handed to a C printf-family function (e.g. printf/sprintf/syslog) as the format argument rather than as data. Format specifiers such as %n, %x, and %s then let an attacker read from and write to process memory, which can be chained into control-flow hijacking and arbitrary code execution. The affected CPE is cpe:2.3:a:lorex:2k_indoor_wi-fi_security_camera, and the CDeviceOperator handler is the specific code path exercised.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis; the provided data contains only the ZDI advisory (https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-398/) with no fixed firmware version, so check Lorex's support portal for firmware updates for the 2K Indoor Wi-Fi camera and apply them once published. Because the attack requires network-adjacent access, the strongest compensating control is network isolation: place the camera on a dedicated VLAN or IoT SSID with no lateral reachability to trusted hosts and no inbound access from untrusted Wi-Fi clients (trade-off: legitimate app/NVR access must be explicitly allowed through the segment). Restrict who can associate to the same Wi-Fi network the camera uses (strong WPA2/WPA3, no guest bridging) and block the camera's management/streaming ports from all but authorized controllers, accepting that this may break third-party integrations. Disabling remote/cloud access and monitoring the camera's service ports for anomalous JSON traffic further reduces exposure until a firmware fix is available.
Same weakness CWE-134 – Use of Externally-Controlled Format String
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today