Ansible AWX CVE-2026-12726

Three specific conditions must be satisfied simultaneously: (1) The targeted job template must be configured with GitHub pull_request webhook integration AND have a GitHub Personal Access Token set as the webhook credential - templates using other credential types or no PAT are not affected. (2) The attacker must possess the job template's webhook_key (the HMAC signing secret used to authenticate incoming webhooks) - this is the primary access control barrier and the prerequisite that drives AC:H in the CVSS vector; without it, forged webhooks are rejected. (3) The AWX controller must be able to make outbound network connections to the attacker's specified callback URL - deployments with strict egress filtering that permits only api.github.com are not exploitable via this path. Exploitation is further limited to the job template's execution lifecycle: the PAT is only transmitted when AWX posts a status update after job completion or status change, so the attacker must trigger or await a job run following webhook injection. Authentication on the AWX platform itself is not required beyond possession of the webhook_key.

The vendor-assigned CVSS 3.1 score of 6.3 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N) classifies this as Medium severity, but the real-world risk is meaningfully higher for organizations relying on broad-scoped GitHub PATs. AC:H reflects the genuine prerequisite of possessing the webhook_key signing secret, which is the primary access control barrier. PR:L acknowledges that the attacker must hold this credential-equivalent key. The scope change (S:C) and high confidentiality impact (C:H) capture the critical downstream consequence: a stolen PAT grants the attacker persistent access to GitHub repositories entirely outside the AWX environment. EPSS data was not provided in the available intelligence, and this CVE is not currently listed in the CISA KEV catalog, indicating no confirmed active exploitation at time of analysis. No POC exploit code has been publicly identified. The realistic priority is elevated specifically for deployments where the configured PAT has broad organizational or cross-repository permissions - in those environments, a single webhook credential theft translates to widespread GitHub access. Egress filtering on the AWX controller is a meaningful compensating control that directly breaks the attack chain.

An attacker who has obtained the webhook_key for a targeted AWX job template - through credential disclosure, insider access, or prior system compromise - crafts a GitHub pull_request webhook JSON payload with the statuses_url field set to an attacker-controlled HTTPS listener. The payload is HMAC-signed using the webhook_key and submitted to the AWX webhook receiver endpoint. When AWX processes the forged webhook and the associated job subsequently completes, AWX POSTs the job status update - bearing the configured GitHub PAT as an Authorization: Bearer header - to the attacker's endpoint, completing the credential theft with no further interaction required.