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Cloudflare quiche CVE-2026-12523

| EUVDEUVD-2026-43748 HIGH
Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (CWE-400)
2026-07-14 cloudflare
7.5
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: cloudflare
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Severity by source

Vendor (cloudflare) PRIMARY
7.5 HIGH
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
vuln.today AI
7.5 HIGH

Network-reachable HTTP/3 endpoint, no authentication or interaction, low complexity; memory exhaustion yields availability-only impact, so C:N/I:N/A:H.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (cloudflare).

CVSS VectorVendor: cloudflare

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Patch available
Jul 14, 2026 - 18:20 EUVD
Analysis Generated
Jul 14, 2026 - 16:32 vuln.today
CVE Published
Jul 14, 2026 - 15:51 cve.org
HIGH 7.5

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

Cloudflare quiche's HTTP/3 layer was discovered to be vulnerable to resource exhaustion (i.e., memory) by means of specially crafted HTTP/3 frames.

Impact

HTTP/3 defines multiple frame types to support HTTP message exchanges and connection management. Each frame has a length and a payload whose length depends on the frame type. quiche was found to be vulnerable when parsing some frame types to pre-allocating memory based on the declared length. An attacker would not need to send the number of declared bytes to trigger this issue.

In addition, quiche was found to not apply QPACK decompression limits correctly. This could allow an attacker to send specially crafted HEADERS frames that would cause more memory commitment than otherwise advertised by MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE (configured by set_max_field_section_size()).

Mitigation:

*

Users are requested to upgrade to quiche 0.29.3 which is the earliest version containing the fix for this issue.

Credits: Disclosed responsibly by Sébastien Féry

AnalysisAI

Remote memory exhaustion in Cloudflare quiche's HTTP/3 layer allows unauthenticated attackers to crash or degrade QUIC servers by sending specially crafted HTTP/3 frames that trigger over-allocation. Two distinct defects are involved: frame parsers pre-allocate buffers based on an attacker-declared length field without requiring the bytes to actually be sent, and QPACK decompression fails to enforce the configured MAX_FIELD_SECTION_SIZE limit, so crafted HEADERS frames commit far more memory than advertised. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; impact is availability-only (CVSS 7.5) with no confidentiality or integrity effect.

Technical ContextAI

quiche is Cloudflare's Rust implementation of the QUIC transport and HTTP/3 protocols. HTTP/3 frames carry an explicit length prefix followed by a type-dependent payload; a robust parser must treat that declared length as untrusted and allocate incrementally as data actually arrives. Here the parser instead pre-sizes buffers from the declared length, embodying the CWE-770 / CWE-400 class of uncontrolled resource allocation (the input lists CWE as N/A, so this classification is inferred). The second defect is in QPACK, HTTP/3's header-compression scheme: set_max_field_section_size() is meant to cap the decompressed size of a header block, but the limit is not correctly applied, so a small compressed HEADERS frame can expand to consume disproportionate memory. The affected component per CPE is cpe:2.3:a:cloudflare:quiche across all versions prior to the fix.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade quiche to 0.29.3, the earliest release containing the fix for both the frame pre-allocation and the QPACK limit-enforcement defects, and rebuild/redeploy any downstream application that vendors quiche. Follow the advisory at https://github.com/cloudflare/quiche/security/advisories/GHSA-4fgf-9xrr-88gf. Where an immediate upgrade is not possible, compensating controls include placing the HTTP/3 endpoint behind a QUIC-aware proxy or load balancer that enforces strict per-connection and per-stream memory and rate limits, tightening connection-level resource caps and lowering set_max_field_section_size() (noting this only partially helps because the flaw is that the limit is not correctly enforced), or temporarily disabling HTTP/3 and falling back to HTTP/2 over TCP - the trade-off being loss of QUIC's latency benefits and 0-RTT for clients. Constrain exposure by restricting UDP/443 reachability to trusted networks where operationally feasible.

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CVE-2026-12523 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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