SoftIron HyperCloud CVE-2026-116755

Exploitation requires all of: valid credentials, access to the HyperCloud management plane (the vendor explicitly states that merely owning a virtual machine is NOT sufficient), attacker-controlled template content such as the VM DESCRIPTION field, and a VM lifecycle operation (deploy, migrate, or network setup) that actually reaches the affected hypervisor host. The flaw is in the Orchestrator component delivering that content to hosts via a here-document whose terminator is not quoted. Limiting factors that reduce real-world risk: the attacker must already be an authenticated management-plane user (PR:L), reach the management plane over an adjacent network rather than remotely (AV:A), and a qualifying lifecycle operation must occur (UI:R). Only versions 1.0 through 2.6.17 are affected; 2.6.18 fixes it, and the vendor presents upgrading as the remediation.

This is a genuine but access-gated privilege-escalation-to-host-takeover issue, not an internet-facing mass-exploitation threat. The CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.4 (AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) reflects full confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact (arbitrary OS command execution as the privileged orchestration user on hypervisor hosts) but is held down by three real barriers: adjacent-network rather than remote reach (AV:A), required authentication (PR:L), and required user interaction (UI:R, i.e. a VM lifecycle operation must occur). The vuln.today decision label is 'this_week', consistent with a serious issue that is not an active-exploitation emergency. No EPSS score is present in the input, so exploitation probability cannot be quantified. KEV status is not indicated, so there is no public evidence of active exploitation, and no proof-of-concept or exploit reference is present - only a vendor advisory landing page. An SSVC decision set (automatable, exploitation, technical impact) was not supplied, so those dimensions cannot be weighed. Net: treat as a priority internal patch (full host compromise and tenant-isolation break are possible), but the multiple prerequisites make it targeted/insider-leaning rather than widespread.

An authenticated user with access to the HyperCloud management plane crafts a virtual machine template whose DESCRIPTION field contains shell metacharacters or a here-document terminator sequence. When a VM lifecycle operation (deploy, migrate, or network setup) propagates that template content to a hypervisor host through an unquoted here-document, the injected content is expanded and executed, running arbitrary OS commands on the host as the privileged orchestration user. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; the only listed reference is the SoftIron vendor advisory.