Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessIdentify service parsing ASE via ImageMagick
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DeliverySubmit crafted ASE image
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ExploitTrigger unchecked resource allocation in decoder
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ExecutionProcess crash or resource exhaustion
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ImpactService availability degraded
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A06:2025 - Insecure Design
ASVS 5.0
V2 - Validation and Business Logic Resource allocation limits
MITRE ATT&CK
1 technique across 1 tactic: Impact The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires the target to decode an attacker-supplied ASE (Adobe Swatch Exchange) image through ImageMagick prior to version 7.1.2-32 - i.e., the application must accept and process ASE input via a vulnerable build. The CVSS vector is PR:N/UI:N (unauthenticated), so no credentials are needed where such an upload/convert path is network-exposed; the limiting factors are that the application must actually invoke ImageMagick's ASE coder on untrusted data and must be running an unpatched version. Impact is confined to availability (process crash or long-running operation); there is no confidentiality or integrity effect and no cross-component scope change. |
| Impact | This is a moderate-severity, availability-only denial-of-service issue (CWE-770, uncontrolled resource consumption) in ImageMagick's ASE decoder, and the signals are internally consistent rather than conflicting. The vendor CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L, 5.3) correctly limits impact to availability with no confidentiality or integrity exposure; the underlying fix (replacing an in-place ResizeQuantumMemory with a bounded AcquireQuantumMemory plus guarded memcpy in ReadASELayerChunk) confirms the root cause is a memory/resource-handling flaw triggered by a crafted ASE file, not a code-execution primitive. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or POC was provided in the input, so there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no evidence of active exploitation. The practical risk is real but bounded: an attacker can crash a worker process or force a long-running operation, which matters for image-processing services that accept untrusted uploads, but the 'network' attack vector is contingent on the target application actually parsing attacker-supplied ASE input. Net assessment: a legitimate patch-management priority for high-throughput or multi-tenant image pipelines, but not a critical, drop-everything issue given the availability-only, scope-unchanged nature. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker submits a specially crafted ASE (Adobe Swatch Exchange) image to an application or web service that uses ImageMagick to decode or convert uploaded files. Missing validation and resource checks in the ASE layer-chunk parser cause excessive memory handling or a long-running operation, crashing the worker or tying up server resources (a classic DoS). No public exploit code is identified in the provided data, so exploitation would require an attacker to craft the malformed ASE file themselves. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 07, 2026
Denial of service in ImageMagick's Adobe Swatch Exchange (ASE) decoder allows a crafted ASE file to crash the process or trigger a long-running, resource-draining operation in all builds prior to 7.1.2-32. The flaw is reachable by unauthenticated remote attackers (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N) wherever an application passes untrusted image data to ImageMagick with the ASE coder enabled, but impact is limited to availability (C:N/I:N/A:L) with no confidentiality or integrity effect. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and the issue is not in CISA KEV; a vendor patch exists in 7.1.2-32, so the practical risk is moderate and primarily relevant to image-processing services, upload pipelines, and thumbnailers that accept arbitrary files.
RemediationAI
Upgrade to ImageMagick 7.1.2-32 or later, which is the vendor-released fix (Vendor-released patch: 7.1.2-32) and is available from the GitHub release page at https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/releases/tag/7.1.2-32; the underlying changes are the commits https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/0691546106f4c7e8857da9f21a0e4a8f41915388 and https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/5ecd5b047cee7ccfe4e14a733a0755c7b2a90c7d, and full details are in advisory GHSA-gwj6-pm7x-3r63. Where patching cannot happen immediately, the most direct compensating control is to stop the ASE coder from being reachable: add an ImageMagick policy.xml entry denying the ASE coder (e.g. a policy with domain="coder" rights="none" for ASE), which eliminates the attack path entirely but will cause any legitimate ASE swatch conversion to fail with an authorization error - the trade-off is functional loss for a format that most server-side pipelines do not need. Alternatively, apply resource limits via policy.xml (memory, map, width, height, area, and especially time limits) so a malicious file aborts instead of hanging; note that time limits can cut off legitimately large, slow conversions and should be tuned against real workloads. Finally, if ASE input is not a business requirement, reject .ase files at the upload/front-door layer and run decodes with a per-process wall-clock timeout and memory cap (for example under a container with cgroup limits or timeout), so a crash or runaway allocation is contained rather than taking down the parent service; these controls reduce severity but do not remove the underlying defect the way the 7.1.2-32 upgrade does.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
The affected component is the ASE coder in ImageMagick (coders/ase.c), which parses Adobe Swatch Exchange files - a palette/swatch format that, like PSD, can contain multiple layers. The root cause is classified as CWE-770 (Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling): the layer-reading routine ReadASELayerChunk grows an internal AsepriteLayer array in response to attacker-controlled layer counts without validating or bounding the requested amount. The upstream fix is instructive about the failure mode - it replaces ResizeQuantumMemory() with AcquireQuantumMemory() and adds an explicit memcpy of the previously held entries followed by releasing the old buffer, indicating the vulnerable path mishandled the reallocation/growth bookkeeping under crafted input and lacked the resource checks that would cap consumption. Because decoding an image is a routine, automatable operation, the ASE coder is exposed through normal convert/decode pipelines rather than through any privileged interface; CPE cpe:2.3:a:imagemagick:imagemagick:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* confirms the whole pre-7.1.2-32 product line is affected. The consequences are a NULL/aborted processing path (crash) or an unusually long allocation/processing loop (resource exhaustion) on the host running the decode.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Crafted ASE file processed by a network-facing service with no auth or interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N); impact is limited availability loss only (A:L), no C/I, scope unchanged.
Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).
CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
ImageMagick is free and open-source software used for editing and manipulating digital images. Prior to 7.1.2-32, missing validation and resource checks in the ASE decoder allow a crafted ASE image to cause a crash or a long-running operation. This issue is fixed in version 7.1.2-32.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Denial of Service attacks render applications or systems unavailable by overwhelming resources or triggering failure conditions.
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EUVD-2026-94388
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
GitHub
Exploit-DB