SurrealDB CVE-2025-71392

Exploitation requires an authenticated SurrealDB System User holding the OWNER or EDITOR role who can create tables or fields with attacker-chosen names containing SurrealQL (PR:L). The payload is inert until a second, limiting condition is met: a higher-privileged user must run the CLI export and then the import operation on that data (UI:P - user interaction by the victim operator), at which point the injected SurrealQL executes with the importer's privileges. A parallel condition applies to applications built on SurrealDB that let their end users define custom table or field names, which exposes a universal second-order injection even when query parameters are sanitized. Limiting factors: the attacker needs prior authenticated privileged-role access, cannot fire the payload themselves, and depends on a privileged victim performing an export/import cycle on the tainted data - a single-operator install that never imports attacker-influenced backups is not practically exploitable.

The vendor CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H, base 9.4) captures the real profile well: network-reachable, low complexity, but gated by two meaningful conditions - the attacker must already hold OWNER or EDITOR on a System User (PR:L), and a higher-privileged user must be induced to import the tainted backup (UI:P). The high subsequent-system impacts (SC/SI/SA:H) correctly reflect the co-tenancy angle where one tenant's payload compromises a shared backend. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or public POC was provided, so exploitation probability signals are absent; this is not evidence of low risk but of a recently-disclosed, audit-found bug with no observed in-the-wild activity yet. The dependence on a privileged import action makes this more of a targeted/insider or multi-tenant escalation primitive than a mass-exploitable remote flaw - priority is high for multi-tenant or backup-driven SurrealDB deployments, lower for single-operator installs that never import untrusted exports. No conflicting signals were found; the main gap is the missing EPSS/POC telemetry.

In a multi-tenant SurrealDB deployment, an attacker holding an EDITOR role creates a table or field whose name embeds SurrealQL statements. When an administrator later exports the database and re-imports the backup - a routine backup/restore or migration workflow - the injected SurrealQL executes with the administrator's privileges, granting the attacker root-level control of the instance. No public POC has been identified, but the low attack complexity and the commonality of backup/restore operations make the required user interaction realistic.