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Linux CVE-2025-68264

2025-12-16 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67

Lifecycle Timeline

1
CVE Published
Dec 16, 2025 - 15:15 cve.org
UNKNOWN (no severity yet)

DescriptionCVE.org

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: refresh inline data size before write operations

The cached ei->i_inline_size can become stale between the initial size check and when ext4_update_inline_data()/ext4_create_inline_data() use it. Although ext4_get_max_inline_size() reads the correct value at the time of the check, concurrent xattr operations can modify i_inline_size before ext4_write_lock_xattr() is acquired.

This causes ext4_update_inline_data() and ext4_create_inline_data() to work with stale capacity values, leading to a BUG_ON() crash in ext4_write_inline_data():

kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inline.c:1331! BUG_ON(pos + len > EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_size);

The race window:

  1. ext4_get_max_inline_size() reads i_inline_size = 60 (correct)
  2. Size check passes for 50-byte write
  3. [Another thread adds xattr, i_inline_size changes to 40]
  4. ext4_write_lock_xattr() acquires lock
  5. ext4_update_inline_data() uses stale i_inline_size = 60
  6. Attempts to write 50 bytes but only 40 bytes actually available
  7. BUG_ON() triggers

Fix this by recalculating i_inline_size via ext4_find_inline_data_nolock() immediately after acquiring xattr_sem. This ensures ext4_update_inline_data() and ext4_create_inline_data() work with current values that are protected from concurrent modifications.

This is similar to commit a54c4613dac1 ("ext4: fix race writing to an inline_data file while its xattrs are changing") which fixed i_inline_off staleness. This patch addresses the related i_inline_size staleness issue.

Analysis

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ext4: refresh inline data size before write operations

The cached ei->i_inline_size can become stale between the initial size check and when ext4_update_inline_data()/ext4_create_inline_data() use it. Although ext4_get_max_inline_size() reads the correct value at the time of the check, concurrent xattr operations can modify i_inline_size before ext4_write_lock_xattr() is acquired.

This causes ext4_update_inline_data() and ext4_create_inline_data() to work with stale capacity values, leading to a BUG_ON() crash in ext4_write_inline_data():

kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inline.c:1331! BUG_ON(pos + len > EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_size);

The race window:

  1. ext4_get_max_inline_size() reads i_inline_size = 60 (correct)
  2. Size check passes for 50-byte write
  3. [Another thread adds xattr, i_inline_size changes to 40]
  4. ext4_write_lock_xattr() acquires lock
  5. ext4_update_inline_data() uses stale i_inline_size = 60
  6. Attempts to write 50 bytes but only 40 bytes actually available
  7. BUG_ON() triggers

Fix this by recalculating i_inline_size via ext4_find_inline_data_nolock() immediately after acquiring xattr_sem. This ensures ext4_update_inline_data() and ext4_create_inline_data() work with current values that are protected from concurrent modifications.

This is similar to commit a54c4613dac1 ("ext4: fix race writing to an inline_data file while its xattrs are changing") which fixed i_inline_off staleness. This patch addresses the related i_inline_size staleness issue.

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CVE-2025-68264 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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