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Ruijie RG-BCR600W CVE-2025-56107

HIGH
OS Command Injection (CWE-78)
2025-12-11 cve@mitre.org
8.8
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: mitre
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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain

  1. Access
    Reach authenticated web UI (PR:L)
  2. Delivery
    Send crafted POST to submit_wifi
  3. Exploit
    Inject shell command via unsanitized parameter
  4. Execution
    Router executes command as root
  5. Impact
    Full device compromise / pivot

Vulnerability Assessment

Weakness
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization OS command sanitization, avoid shell exec
MITRE ATT&CK

2 techniques across 1 tactic: Execution

The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up.

Exploitation Conditions

Exploitation requires reaching the RG-BCR600W web management interface and holding a low-privilege authenticated session (CVSS PR:L), then sending a crafted POST request to the submit_wifi action handled by /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/common_quick_config.lua, which passes attacker-controlled input into an OS command. Limiting factors: valid credentials (or access to an authenticated session) to the admin panel are required, so exploitation is gated by whether the management interface is network-reachable by the attacker and whether default or weak credentials allow obtaining the needed low-privilege account; no user interaction is required (UI:N) and complexity is low (AC:L). Practical risk is highest where the web UI is exposed to the internet or an untrusted LAN segment.

Impact

This is a credible, above-average priority for operators of the affected device, though not a mass-exploitation emergency. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N) describes a network-reachable, low-complexity command injection requiring only low-privilege authentication, yielding full C:H/I:H/A:H impact - consistent with OS command execution (CWE-78) on an embedded router, almost certainly as root given the LuCI/OpenWrt-style Lua controller path. Supporting signals diverge in magnitude: a public technical report exists on GitHub (raising practical exploitability), but there is NO CISA KEV listing and the EPSS score is only 2.25% (83rd percentile) - moderate relative ranking but low absolute probability, suggesting no observed widespread automated exploitation yet. The PR:L requirement is the main mitigating factor: an attacker needs valid (even unprivileged) credentials or a reachable, authenticated session to the web management interface, so exposure hinges heavily on whether the admin UI is internet-facing and whether default/weak credentials are in use - a very common weakness on SOHO routers that can effectively erode the PR:L barrier. No SSVC decision data was provided in the input. Net: a genuine high-severity flaw whose real-world risk is concentrated on devices with exposed or weakly-protected management interfaces rather than a broad, wormable threat.

Exploit ScenarioDerived

An attacker with low-privilege access to the RG-BCR600W web management interface (or using default/guessed credentials on an internet-exposed panel) sends a crafted POST request to the submit_wifi handler in common_quick_config.lua, injecting shell metacharacters into an unsanitized parameter. The device executes the attacker's commands at the privilege of the web backend (typically root on such routers), granting full control. A public technical write-up documenting the vulnerable endpoint and request is available on GitHub, lowering the bar to reproduce it.

This Week Schedule remediation this week. Why: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9).
No patch listed yet 2.3% exploitation probability (EPSS)

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AnalysisAIv1 – Oct 14, 2026

OS command injection in the Ruijie RG-BCR600W router firmware allows an attacker who holds a low-privilege authenticated session on the web management interface to run arbitrary operating-system commands by sending a crafted POST request to the submit_wifi action handled by /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/common_quick_config.lua. Successful exploitation yields full compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the device (CVSS 3.1 base 8.8, AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H), so the practical risk is highest where the admin panel is reachable from the internet or an untrusted LAN segment and where default or weak credentials remain in place. EPSS sits at roughly 2.25% (83rd percentile), indicating elevated relative attention but not a mass-exploitation event, and no public exploit identified at time of analysis; this is a credible above-average priority for operators of the affected hardware rather than an emergency.

RemediationAI

No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis, so operators must rely on compensating controls until Ruijie publishes fixed firmware; consult the vendor support channel and the public report at https://github.com/flegoity/Ruijie-Multiple-Devices-Vulnerability-Reports-for-CVE/blob/main/CVE-2025-56107.md for updates. Immediately remove the RG-BCR600W management interface from WAN exposure and confine administrative access to a dedicated, firewalled management VLAN or an allowlist of trusted source addresses, accepting the operational cost that remote administration then requires VPN or jump-host access. Rotate all administrator credentials away from defaults and enforce strong, unique passwords, and audit for unnecessary low-privilege accounts, since the assessed vector (PR:L) shows a low-privilege session is sufficient - this reduces but does not eliminate exposure where any valid account can be obtained. Where the device must remain reachable, place a reverse proxy or WAF in front of the LuCI interface and reject POST requests targeting the submit_wifi action that contain shell metacharacters, understanding that signature-based filtering degrades as request encoding varies and may not catch every payload form. Finally, enable and forward device logs and IDS/IPS alerts for anomalous command execution or unusual outbound connections from the router, which can detect exploitation attempts but does not prevent them, and plan hardware replacement or isolation if a firmware fix does not materialize.

Affects your stack

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Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.

Technical ContextAI · show details

The affected firmware exposes a web management interface built on a Lua/LuCI-style controller layer (as indicated by the path /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/common_quick_config.lua), and the vulnerability class is CWE-78, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command. The root cause is that user-supplied input reaching the submit_wifi request handler is passed into an operating-system command invocation without adequate sanitization or escaping, so shell metacharacters embedded in the crafted POST body are interpreted by the underlying OS rather than treated as inert data. The CPE cpe:2.3:o:ruijie:rg-bcr600w_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* identifies the RG-BCR600W firmware as the affected component, with no specific patched version enumerated in the available source data. Because the injection point is a normal authenticated management function rather than a pre-authentication service, the attack surface is the same web UI that administrators use for Wi-Fi quick configuration, and exploitation requires only low-privilege credentials plus network reachability to that interface, with no user interaction required.

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Severity by source

Vendor (mitre) PRIMARY 8.8 HIGH
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
vuln.today AI 8.8 HIGH

Network-reachable web endpoint (AV:N, AC:L) requires a low-privilege authenticated session (PR:L); command injection runs as root giving full C/I/A on the device, scope unchanged.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (mitre).

CVSS VectorVendor: mitre

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

DescriptionCVE.org

OS Command Injection vulnerability in Ruijie RG-BCR RG-BCR600W allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted POST request to the submit_wifi in file /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/common_quick_config.lua.

Executive ViewAI

Why It Matters

Ruijie RG-BCR600W routers contain an operating-system command injection vulnerability (CVE-2025-56107) that allows anyone holding even a low-privilege login to the web management interface to seize full control of the device. Because these units typically sit at the network edge, a compromised router can be used to intercept or redirect traffic, tamper with routing and Wi-Fi configuration, and act as a staging point into the broader environment. Leadership should note that no vendor patch is available yet and that exposure is concentrated in deployments where the admin panel is reachable from the internet or an untrusted segment and default or weak credentials remain in place.

Business Impact: High
Compensating Controls

No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: remove internet-facing exposure of the web management interface and restrict administrative access to a hardened, isolated management VLAN with strict allow-lists; enforce strong, unique administrator credentials and eliminate default accounts; audit and minimize accounts holding web-UI access, since exploitation requires only a low-privilege authenticated session; enable centralized logging and alerting for management-interface POST requests (including the submit_wifi action) and for configuration changes; segment affected routers so that a compromise cannot pivot to production networks; and plan hardware replacement with a vendor-supported platform if remediation timelines are unacceptable.

Threat Intelligence Overview

EPSS Score
2.3%
Top 17% exploitable
Prevalence
Low
niche SOHO/SMB cloud router from Ruijie, limited global deployment footprint
Data Quality
4 sources
Confidence: Medium

How this decision was reached

The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.

SignalValue
Severity HIGH
CISA KEV No
Public POC No
EPSS 2.3%
Patch available No
Active threat No
Deciding rule
HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9)
What every action level means
Emergency Immediate action required. Criteria: CRITICAL + in CISA KEV (actively exploited) without patch, OR CRITICAL + EPSS > 30% without patch, OR CRITICAL + active threat signals without patch.
Act Now Prioritize within 24-48h. Criteria: in KEV with patch available, OR CRITICAL + public POC, OR HIGH + EPSS > 10%, OR CRITICAL + active threat, OR any CRITICAL severity.
This Week Schedule remediation this week. Criteria: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9). Patch within normal change window.
This Month Plan within 30 days. Criteria: MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9), lower exploitation probability. Include in regular patch cycle.
Monitor Track and reassess. Criteria: LOW severity (CVSS 0.1-3.9), minimal exploitation risk. No immediate action needed.

SSVC AssessmentENISA

SSVC Decision· derived
Scheduled
Exploitation· derived
None
System Exposure· derived
Open
Automatable· derived
No
Human Impact
High

Priority Score

46
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: +2
CVSS: +44
PoC: 0
Weaponized: 0
Threat intel: 0
Gov advisory: 0

Attack Technique

OS command injection occurs when an application passes unsanitized user input directly into system shell commands.

Affected Products (CPE)CVE.org

cpe:2.3:o:ruijie:rg-bcr600w_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

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