Ruijie RG-BCR600W
CVE-2025-56082
HIGH
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessAuthenticate to router web UI
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DeliverySend crafted POST to check_changes
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ExploitInject shell metacharacters into command
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ExecutionExecute arbitrary OS commands on device
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ImpactFull device takeover and network pivot
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A05:2025 - Injection
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization OS command sanitization, avoid shell exec
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 1 tactic: Execution The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires valid authenticated access to the RG-BCR600W web management interface (CVSS PR:L): the attacker must reach the LuCI-based admin controller and invoke the check_changes action in /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/common.lua via a crafted POST request whose parameters are passed into an OS command without sanitization. The key limiting factor is this authentication requirement - the attack is not viable against a device where the management interface is unreachable and credentials are strong. Practical risk rises sharply where the web UI is exposed to untrusted networks or where default/weak credentials are in use, which is common for SOHO/branch-class routers. No user interaction is required once authenticated (UI:N). |
| Impact | This is a genuine high-priority issue but not a top-tier emergency. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N, C:H/I:H/A:H, score 8.8) describes a remotely reachable, low-complexity OS command injection that yields full compromise of the device, but it requires authentication (PR:L) rather than being fully unauthenticated - this is the single biggest limiting factor and tempers the raw score. Supporting signals are moderate: EPSS is 2.38% (84th percentile), which is elevated relative to the average CVE and consistent with a disclosed, technically documented flaw, but well short of values seen for mass-exploited bugs. The CVE is NOT on CISA KEV, so there is no evidence of active exploitation, and the input contains no explicit POC=YES flag, so no public exploit identified at time of analysis - though the referenced GitHub advisory and OneDrive attachments contain detailed technical write-ups that would substantially ease weaponization. No SSVC decision data was provided. Signals are broadly consistent (mid-high CVSS, moderate EPSS, no KEV), with the main nuance being that authentication is required, meaning realistic risk concentrates on devices with weak, default, or reused credentials, or where an attacker already has a foothold/low-privilege account. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker with valid low-privilege web-interface credentials (or default/guessable credentials) to a Ruijie RG-BCR600W router sends a crafted POST request to the check_changes handler in common.lua, injecting shell metacharacters that the device executes as OS commands. This grants command execution on the router, enabling full device takeover and pivoting into the internal network. No public exploit is confirmed in the input, but a detailed technical advisory is publicly referenced. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 14, 2026
Authenticated OS command injection in the Ruijie RG-BCR600W branch/SOHO router allows a remote attacker who already holds valid management credentials to execute arbitrary operating-system commands on the device by sending a crafted POST request to the check_changes action handled by /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/common.lua. Successful exploitation yields full compromise of confidentiality, integrity and availability of the router (CVSS 3.1 base 8.8, AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N). The attack is not viable against devices whose LuCI web management interface is unreachable or protected by strong credentials, but risk rises sharply where the UI is exposed to untrusted networks or still uses default/weak logins; EPSS is 2.38% (84th percentile) and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, with no CISA KEV listing.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch has been identified at time of analysis, so the primary action is to contact Ruijie support and monitor the vendor's security advisory channel for a fixed RG-BCR600W firmware build, then upgrade to that exact release once published (do not rely on unverified third-party firmware). Until then, apply specific compensating controls: disable remote/WAN-side management so the LuCI web interface is only reachable from a trusted LAN segment (trade-off: administrators lose out-of-band remote access and must VPN in or manage locally), place the router behind a firewall that blocks inbound TCP 80/443 to its management UI from untrusted networks, and replace any default or shared admin credentials with unique strong passphrases and, where the firmware supports it, restrict admin accounts or source-IP allowlists (trade-off: weak/default credentials remove the PR:L barrier entirely, so this materially reduces exposure). Continuously review device logs for anomalous POST requests to the admin/check_changes endpoint and unusual child processes, and segment the router from sensitive internal networks so that a compromised unit cannot be used as a pivot. Consult the researcher advisory at https://github.com/flegoity/Ruijie-Multiple-Devices-Vulnerability-Reports-for-CVE/blob/main/CVE-2025-56082.md for reproduction details and any interim vendor guidance.
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Technical ContextAI · show details
The affected device runs a LuCI-based (OpenWrt web framework) management stack written in Lua, exposing a controller at /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/common.lua. The check_changes action accepts parameters from an HTTP POST request and passes them into a shell/OS command without sanitization or argument escaping, the classic CWE-78 improper neutralization of special elements used in an OS command. Because the vulnerable code path sits in the admin controller, reaching it requires an authenticated management session (CVSS PR:L), but once invoked the injected payload inherits the privileges of the LuCI/web daemon on the underlying firmware, typically allowing full read/write of the device configuration, credential material and potentially the ability to pivot into the attached network. The CPE cpe:2.3:o:ruijie:rg-bcr600w_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:* records the firmware image with no version qualifier, indicating the flaw is tracked at the product/firmware level rather than against a specific release, so treat all observed RG-BCR600W firmware builds as potentially affected until Ruijie confirms the fixed build.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Network-reachable web handler (AV:N) with no special complexity (AC:L); a low-privilege authenticated session is required (PR:L), and command injection yields full device compromise (C:H/I:H/A:H).
Primary rating from Vendor (mitre).
CVSS VectorVendor: mitre
DescriptionCVE.org
OS Command Injection vulnerability in Ruijie RG-BCR RG-BCR600W allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted POST request to the check_changes in file /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/common.lua.
Executive ViewAI
Branch and small-office networks running the Ruijie RG-BCR600W router are exposed to a high-severity command injection flaw that lets anyone holding valid management credentials take full control of the device, compromising all data passing through it. Because these devices often sit at the network edge with web management reachable from untrusted networks and default credentials unchanged, a single compromised login could turn a branch router into a pivot point into the wider corporate environment. Leadership should treat this as an operational risk to branch connectivity and network integrity, and treat the absence of a vendor patch as a reason to act on network-level mitigations immediately rather than wait.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: remove LuCI web management interface exposure to untrusted networks (WAN/remote access), restrict administration to a dedicated management VLAN or VPN with strict ACLs, replace default credentials with strong unique passwords, disable unused management services, monitor and alert on suspicious POST requests to the check_changes action in /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/common.lua, and segment branch routers so a compromise cannot pivot into core networks.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
OS command injection occurs when an application passes unsanitized user input directly into system shell commands.
Affected Products (CPE)CVE.org
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NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
GitHub
Exploit-DB