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Linux CVE-2024-47741

HIGH
Race Condition (CWE-362)
2024-10-21 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
7.0
CVSS 3.1 · NVD
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Severity by source

NVD PRIMARY
7.0 HIGH
AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorNVD

Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
High
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Lifecycle Timeline

1
CVE Published
Oct 21, 2024 - 13:15 nvd
HIGH 7.0

DescriptionNVD

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: fix race setting file private on concurrent lseek using same fd

When doing concurrent lseek(2) system calls against the same file descriptor, using multiple threads belonging to the same process, we have a short time window where a race happens and can result in a memory leak.

The race happens like this:

  1. A program opens a file descriptor for a file and then spawns two

threads (with the pthreads library for example), lets call them task A and task B;

  1. Task A calls lseek with SEEK_DATA or SEEK_HOLE and ends up at

file.c:find_desired_extent() while holding a read lock on the inode;

  1. At the start of find_desired_extent(), it extracts the file's

private_data pointer into a local variable named 'private', which has a value of NULL;

  1. Task B also calls lseek with SEEK_DATA or SEEK_HOLE, locks the inode

in shared mode and enters file.c:find_desired_extent(), where it also extracts file->private_data into its local variable 'private', which has a NULL value;

  1. Because it saw a NULL file private, task A allocates a private

structure and assigns to the file structure;

  1. Task B also saw a NULL file private so it also allocates its own file

private and then assigns it to the same file structure, since both tasks are using the same file descriptor.

At this point we leak the private structure allocated by task A.

Besides the memory leak, there's also the detail that both tasks end up using the same cached state record in the private structure (struct btrfs_file_private::llseek_cached_state), which can result in a use-after-free problem since one task can free it while the other is still using it (only one task took a reference count on it). Also, sharing the cached state is not a good idea since it could result in incorrect results in the future - right now it should not be a problem because it end ups being used only in extent-io-tree.c:count_range_bits() where we do range validation before using the cached state.

Fix this by protecting the private assignment and check of a file while holding the inode's spinlock and keep track of the task that allocated the private, so that it's used only by that task in order to prevent user-after-free issues with the cached state record as well as potentially using it incorrectly in the future.

AnalysisAI

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix race setting file private on concurrent lseek using same fd When doing concurrent lseek(2) system calls against the same. Rated high severity (CVSS 7.0).

Technical ContextAI

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-362. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix race setting file private on concurrent lseek using same fd When doing concurrent lseek(2) system calls against the same file descriptor, using multiple threads belonging to the same process, we have a short time window where a race happens and can result in a memory leak. The race happens like this: 1) A program opens a file descriptor for a file and then spawns two threads (with the pthreads library for example), lets call them task A and task B; 2) Task A calls lseek with SEEK_DATA or SEEK_HOLE and ends up at file.c:find_desired_extent() while holding a read lock on the inode; 3) At the start of find_desired_extent(), it extracts the file's private_data pointer into a local variable named 'private', which has a value of NULL; 4) Task B also calls lseek with SEEK_DATA or SEEK_HOLE, locks the inode in shared mode and enters file.c:find_desired_extent(), where it also extracts file->private_data into its local variable 'private', which has a NULL value; 5) Because it saw a NULL file private, task A allocates a private structure and assigns to the file structure; 6) Task B also saw a NULL file private so it also allocates its own file private and then assigns it to the same file structure, since both tasks are using the same file descriptor. At this point we leak the private structure allocated by task A. Besides the memory leak, there's also the detail that both tasks end up using the same cached state record in the private structure (struct btrfs_file_private::llseek_cached_state), which can result in a use-after-free problem since one task can free it while the other is still using it (only one task took a reference count on it). Also, sharing the cached state is not a good idea since it could result in incorrect results in the future - right now it should not be a problem because it end ups being used only in extent-io-tree.c:count_range_bits() where we do range validation before using the cached state. Fix this by protecting the private assignment and check of a file while holding the inode's spinlock and keep track of the task that allocated the private, so that it's used only by that task in order to prevent user-after-free issues with the cached state record as well as potentially using it incorrectly in the future. Affected products include: Linux Linux Kernel.

RemediationAI

A vendor patch is available. Apply the latest security update as soon as possible. Apply vendor patches when available. Implement network segmentation and monitoring as interim mitigations.

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CVE-2024-47741 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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