Skip to main content

Linux Kernel CVE-2024-38306

MEDIUM
Race Condition (CWE-362)
2024-06-25 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
4.7
CVSS 3.1 · NVD
Share

Severity by source

NVD PRIMARY
4.7 MEDIUM
AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorNVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
High
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High

Lifecycle Timeline

1
CVE Published
Jun 25, 2024 - 15:15 nvd
MEDIUM 4.7

DescriptionNVD

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

btrfs: protect folio::private when attaching extent buffer folios

[BUG] Since v6.8 there are rare kernel crashes reported by various people, the common factor is bad page status error messages like this:

BUG: Bad page state in process kswapd0 pfn:d6e840 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:000000007512f4f2 index:0x2796c2c7c pfn:0xd6e840 aops:btree_aops ino:1 flags: 0x17ffffe0000008(uptodate|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3fffff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 0017ffffe0000008 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff88826d0be4c0 raw: 00000002796c2c7c 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: non-NULL mapping

[CAUSE] Commit 09e6cef19c9f ("btrfs: refactor alloc_extent_buffer() to allocate-then-attach method") changes the sequence when allocating a new extent buffer.

Previously we always called grab_extent_buffer() under mapping->i_private_lock, to ensure the safety on modification on folio::private (which is a pointer to extent buffer for regular sectorsize).

This can lead to the following race:

Thread A is trying to allocate an extent buffer at bytenr X, with 4 4K pages, meanwhile thread B is trying to release the page at X + 4K (the second page of the extent buffer at X).

Thread A | Thread B -----------------------------------+-------------------------------------

| btree_release_folio() | | This is for the page at X + 4K, | | Not page X. | | alloc_extent_buffer() | |- release_extent_buffer()

|- filemap_add_folio() for the | | |- atomic_dec_and_test(eb->refs) | page at bytenr X (the first | | | | page). | | | | Which returned -EEXIST. | | | | | | | |- filemap_lock_folio() | | | | Returned the first page locked. | | | | | | | |- grab_extent_buffer() | | | | |- atomic_inc_not_zero() | | | | | Returned false | | | | |- folio_detach_private() | | |- folio_detach_private() for X | |- folio_test_private() | | |- folio_test_private() | Returned true | | | Returned true |- folio_put() | |- folio_put() Now there are two puts on the same folio at folio X, leading to refcount underflow of the folio X, and eventually causing the BUG_ON() on the page->mapping.

The condition is not that easy to hit:

  • The release must be triggered for the middle page of an eb

If the release is on the same first page of an eb, page lock would kick in and prevent the race.

  • folio_detach_private() has a very small race window

It's only between folio_test_private() and folio_clear_private().

That's exactly when mapping->i_private_lock is used to prevent such race, and commit 09e6cef19c9f ("btrfs: refactor alloc_extent_buffer() to allocate-then-attach method") screwed that up.

At that time, I thought the page lock would kick in as filemap_release_folio() also requires the page to be locked, but forgot the filemap_release_folio() only locks one page, not all pages of an extent buffer.

[FIX] Move all the code requiring i_private_lock into attach_eb_folio_to_filemap(), so that everything is done with proper lock protection.

Furthermore to prevent future problems, add an extra lockdep_assert_locked() to ensure we're holding the proper lock.

To reproducer that is able to hit the race (takes a few minutes with instrumented code inserting delays to alloc_extent_buffer()):

#!/bin/sh drop_caches () { while(true); do echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/compact_memory done }

run_tar () { while(true); do for x in seq 1 80 ; do tar cf /dev/zero /mnt > /dev/null & done wait done }

mkfs.btrfs -f -d single -m single ---truncated---

AnalysisAI

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: protect folio::private when attaching extent buffer folios [BUG] Since v6.8 there are rare kernel crashes reported by. Rated medium severity (CVSS 4.7).

Technical ContextAI

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-362. In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: protect folio::private when attaching extent buffer folios [BUG] Since v6.8 there are rare kernel crashes reported by various people, the common factor is bad page status error messages like this: BUG: Bad page state in process kswapd0 pfn:d6e840 page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:000000007512f4f2 index:0x2796c2c7c pfn:0xd6e840 aops:btree_aops ino:1 flags: 0x17ffffe0000008(uptodate|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x3fffff) page_type: 0xffffffff() raw: 0017ffffe0000008 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff88826d0be4c0 raw: 00000002796c2c7c 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: non-NULL mapping [CAUSE] Commit 09e6cef19c9f ("btrfs: refactor alloc_extent_buffer() to allocate-then-attach method") changes the sequence when allocating a new extent buffer. Previously we always called grab_extent_buffer() under mapping->i_private_lock, to ensure the safety on modification on folio::private (which is a pointer to extent buffer for regular sectorsize). This can lead to the following race: Thread A is trying to allocate an extent buffer at bytenr X, with 4 4K pages, meanwhile thread B is trying to release the page at X + 4K (the second page of the extent buffer at X). Thread A | Thread B -----------------------------------+------------------------------------- | btree_release_folio() | | This is for the page at X + 4K, | | Not page X. | | alloc_extent_buffer() | |- release_extent_buffer() |- filemap_add_folio() for the | | |- atomic_dec_and_test(eb->refs) | page at bytenr X (the first | | | | page). | | | | Which returned -EEXIST. | | | | | | | |- filemap_lock_folio() | | | | Returned the first page locked. | | | | | | | |- grab_extent_buffer() | | | | |- atomic_inc_not_zero() | | | | | Returned false | | | | |- folio_detach_private() | | |- folio_detach_private() for X | |- folio_test_private() | | |- folio_test_private() | Returned true | | | Returned true |- folio_put() | |- folio_put() Now there are two puts on the same folio at folio X, leading to refcount underflow of the folio X, and eventually causing the BUG_ON() on the page->mapping. The condition is not that easy to hit: - The release must be triggered for the middle page of an eb If the release is on the same first page of an eb, page lock would kick in and prevent the race. - folio_detach_private() has a very small race window It's only between folio_test_private() and folio_clear_private(). That's exactly when mapping->i_private_lock is used to prevent such race, and commit 09e6cef19c9f ("btrfs: refactor alloc_extent_buffer() to allocate-then-attach method") screwed that up. At that time, I thought the page lock would kick in as filemap_release_folio() also requires the page to be locked, but forgot the filemap_release_folio() only locks one page, not all pages of an extent buffer. [FIX] Move all the code requiring i_private_lock into attach_eb_folio_to_filemap(), so that everything is done with proper lock protection. Furthermore to prevent future problems, add an extra lockdep_assert_locked() to ensure we're holding the proper lock. To reproducer that is able to hit the race (takes a few minutes with instrumented code inserting delays to alloc_extent_buffer()): #!/bin/sh drop_caches () { while(true); do echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches echo 1 > /proc/sys/vm/compact_memory done } run_tar () { while(true); do for x in seq 1 80 ; do tar cf /dev/zero /mnt > /dev/null & done wait done } mkfs.btrfs -f -d single -m single ---truncated--- Affected products include: Linux Linux Kernel.

RemediationAI

A vendor patch is available. Apply the latest security update as soon as possible. Apply vendor patches when available. Implement network segmentation and monitoring as interim mitigations.

CVE-2022-0847 HIGH POC
7.8 Mar 10

Linux kernel contains a flaw known as 'Dirty Pipe' where improper pipe buffer flag initialization allows unprivileged lo

CVE-2015-1328 HIGH POC
7.8 Nov 28

The overlayfs implementation in the linux (aka Linux kernel) package before 3.19.0-21.21 in Ubuntu through 15.04 does no

CVE-2017-7308 HIGH POC
7.8 Mar 29

The packet_set_ring function in net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel through 4.10.6 does not properly validate cer

CVE-2017-16995 HIGH POC
7.8 Dec 27

The check_alu_op function in kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.4 allows local users to cause a denial

CVE-2017-1000112 HIGH POC
7.0 Oct 05

Linux kernel: Exploitable memory corruption due to UFO to non-UFO path switch. Rated high severity (CVSS 7.0). Public ex

CVE-2015-8660 MEDIUM POC
6.7 Dec 28

The ovl_setattr function in fs/overlayfs/inode.c in the Linux kernel through 4.3.3 attempts to merge distinct setattr op

CVE-2012-0056 MEDIUM POC
6.9 Jan 27

The mem_write function in the Linux kernel before 3.2.2, when ASLR is disabled, does not properly check permissions when

CVE-2014-0038 MEDIUM POC
6.9 Feb 06

The compat_sys_recvmmsg function in net/compat.c in the Linux kernel before 3.13.2, when CONFIG_X86_X32 is enabled, allo

CVE-2016-8655 HIGH POC
7.8 Dec 08

Race condition in net/packet/af_packet.c in the Linux kernel through 4.8.12 allows local users to gain privileges or cau

CVE-2016-0728 HIGH POC
7.8 Feb 08

The join_session_keyring function in security/keys/process_keys.c in the Linux kernel before 4.4.1 mishandles object ref

CVE-2017-0561 CRITICAL POC
9.8 Apr 07

A remote code execution vulnerability in the Broadcom Wi-Fi firmware could enable a remote attacker to execute arbitrary

CVE-2022-2588 MEDIUM POC
5.3 Jan 08

It was discovered that the cls_route filter implementation in the Linux kernel would not remove an old filter from the h

Share

CVE-2024-38306 vulnerability details – vuln.today

This site uses cookies essential for authentication and security. No tracking or analytics cookies are used. Privacy Policy