Yamux CVE-2024-32984
HIGHSeverity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Primary rating from Vendor (github) · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorVendor: github
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
Yamux is a stream multiplexer over reliable, ordered connections such as TCP/IP. The Rust implementation of the Yamux stream multiplexer uses a vector for pending frames. This vector is not bounded in length. Every time the Yamux protocol requires sending of a new frame, this frame gets appended to this vector. This can be remotely triggered in a number of ways, for example by: 1. Opening a new libp2p Identify stream. This causes the node to send its Identify message. Of course, every other protocol that causes the sending of data also works. The larger the response, the more data is enqueued. 2. Sending a Yamux Ping frame. This causes a Pong frame to be enqueued. Under normal circumstances, this queue of pending frames would be drained once they’re sent out over the network. However, the attacker can use TCP’s receive window mechanism to prevent the victim from sending out any data: By not reading from the TCP connection, the receive window will never be increased, and the victim won’t be able to send out any new data (this is how TCP implements backpressure). Once this happens, Yamux’s queue of pending frames will start growing indefinitely. The queue will only be drained once the underlying TCP connection is closed. An attacker can cause a remote node to run out of memory, which will result in the corresponding process getting terminated by the operating system.
AnalysisAI
Yamux is a stream multiplexer over reliable, ordered connections such as TCP/IP. Rated high severity (CVSS 7.5), this vulnerability is remotely exploitable, no authentication required, low attack complexity. No vendor patch available.
Technical ContextAI
This vulnerability is classified as Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (CWE-400), which allows attackers to cause denial of service by exhausting system resources. Yamux is a stream multiplexer over reliable, ordered connections such as TCP/IP. The Rust implementation of the Yamux stream multiplexer uses a vector for pending frames. This vector is not bounded in length. Every time the Yamux protocol requires sending of a new frame, this frame gets appended to this vector. This can be remotely triggered in a number of ways, for example by: 1. Opening a new libp2p Identify stream. This causes the node to send its Identify message. Of course, every other protocol that causes the sending of data also works. The larger the response, the more data is enqueued. 2. Sending a Yamux Ping frame. This causes a Pong frame to be enqueued. Under normal circumstances, this queue of pending frames would be drained once they’re sent out over the network. However, the attacker can use TCP’s receive window mechanism to prevent the victim from sending out any data: By not reading from the TCP connection, the receive window will never be increased, and the victim won’t be able to send out any new data (this is how TCP implements backpressure). Once this happens, Yamux’s queue of pending frames will start growing indefinitely. The queue will only be drained once the underlying TCP connection is closed. An attacker can cause a remote node to run out of memory, which will result in the corresponding process getting terminated by the operating system.
Affected ProductsAI
See vendor advisory for affected versions.
RemediationAI
No vendor patch is available at time of analysis. Monitor vendor advisories for updates. Implement rate limiting, set resource quotas, validate input sizes, use timeouts.
Same weakness CWE-400 – Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
View allSame technique Denial Of Service
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today