Wifiman Desktop For Macos
Monthly
WiFiman Desktop for macOS allows a low-privileged local user to control a file name or path used by a privileged component, leading to arbitrary command execution as root. The flaw is rated CVSS 7.8 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N), so exploitation requires an interactive local account and the macOS client to be installed, with no user interaction once those prerequisites are met; remote exploitation is not possible. No public exploit code or CISA KEV entry is identified at time of analysis, and the trigger details and affected version range are not specified in the available sources.
Information disclosure in WiFiman Desktop for macOS stems from the application binding its local service to an unrestricted IP address instead of the loopback interface, so the service is reachable from the network rather than only from the host itself. The flaw is rated CVSS:3.1 7.5 HIGH (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N), meaning remote attackers need no credentials and no user interaction to reach it, and impact is confined to confidentiality - an attacker who can reach the port can obtain information about the host device, with no integrity or availability effect. The practical limiting factor is network position, since the advisory frames the attacker as having 'access to the network', which generally implies the same local network segment as the running macOS host with WiFiman Desktop active; no public exploit identified at time of analysis.
Privilege escalation in Ubiquiti WiFiman Desktop for macOS lets a local actor who already holds high privileges on the host raise their effective privilege level, with high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability (CVSS 6.7, CWE-284). The flaw is local-only and requires an existing privileged foothold (vector AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N), so it is not reachable remotely and needs no user interaction beyond the attacker's own actions; the affected software must be installed on the macOS host. No public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation are identified in the available intelligence, and the priority signal places remediation within a normal monthly patch cycle rather than an emergency response.
WiFiman Desktop for macOS allows a low-privileged local user to control a file name or path used by a privileged component, leading to arbitrary command execution as root. The flaw is rated CVSS 7.8 (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N), so exploitation requires an interactive local account and the macOS client to be installed, with no user interaction once those prerequisites are met; remote exploitation is not possible. No public exploit code or CISA KEV entry is identified at time of analysis, and the trigger details and affected version range are not specified in the available sources.
Information disclosure in WiFiman Desktop for macOS stems from the application binding its local service to an unrestricted IP address instead of the loopback interface, so the service is reachable from the network rather than only from the host itself. The flaw is rated CVSS:3.1 7.5 HIGH (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N), meaning remote attackers need no credentials and no user interaction to reach it, and impact is confined to confidentiality - an attacker who can reach the port can obtain information about the host device, with no integrity or availability effect. The practical limiting factor is network position, since the advisory frames the attacker as having 'access to the network', which generally implies the same local network segment as the running macOS host with WiFiman Desktop active; no public exploit identified at time of analysis.
Privilege escalation in Ubiquiti WiFiman Desktop for macOS lets a local actor who already holds high privileges on the host raise their effective privilege level, with high impact on confidentiality, integrity and availability (CVSS 6.7, CWE-284). The flaw is local-only and requires an existing privileged foothold (vector AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N), so it is not reachable remotely and needs no user interaction beyond the attacker's own actions; the affected software must be installed on the macOS host. No public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation are identified in the available intelligence, and the priority signal places remediation within a normal monthly patch cycle rather than an emergency response.