Sparkyfitness
Monthly
OS command injection in SparkyFitness versions prior to 1.6.0 allows an authenticated global administrator to execute arbitrary operating-system commands on the server by uploading a restore archive with a filename containing shell metacharacters. The vulnerability resides in the api/admin/backup/restore endpoint, which improperly interpolates the user-supplied filename into a shell command. Exploitation requires the highest-level application privilege (global admin), and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis. The issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.
Missing authorization in SparkyFitness before 0.17.0 allows any authenticated user to delete other users' food variants through the DELETE /api/foods/food-variants/:id endpoint, destroying serving and nutrition data attached to publicly shared foods. The flaw is exploitable by low-privileged account holders (PR:L) who harvest variant IDs from the public food read endpoints; no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis and the issue is not in CISA KEV. Impact is limited to data integrity and availability (no confidentiality loss, no code execution or privilege escalation), and realistically only matters on multi-user deployments where foods are shared publicly.
Server-side request forgery in SparkyFitness (self-hosted AI health and fitness tracker) before version 1.6.0 lets an authenticated user point the built-in custom AI service configuration at arbitrary internal or private network addresses, causing the server to issue outbound POST requests carrying an attacker-controlled bearer token and to leak the AI system prompt. Exploitation requires a valid account and the ability to save a custom AI provider URL (custom, ollama, or openai_compatible) and then trigger an AI flow such as chat or the label/food-photo scan, matching the assessed vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (5.4). No public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation (CISA KEV) were identified at time of analysis; impact is bounded to internal-service probing, forged outbound POSTs, and prompt disclosure rather than code execution. The issue is fixed in 1.6.0, which enforces an outbound URL policy that rejects private-network AI destinations with HTTP 403 by default.
SparkyFitness v0.15.8.2 is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS) via user input and LLM output. [CVSS 6.1 MEDIUM]
OS command injection in SparkyFitness versions prior to 1.6.0 allows an authenticated global administrator to execute arbitrary operating-system commands on the server by uploading a restore archive with a filename containing shell metacharacters. The vulnerability resides in the api/admin/backup/restore endpoint, which improperly interpolates the user-supplied filename into a shell command. Exploitation requires the highest-level application privilege (global admin), and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis. The issue is fixed in version 1.6.0.
Missing authorization in SparkyFitness before 0.17.0 allows any authenticated user to delete other users' food variants through the DELETE /api/foods/food-variants/:id endpoint, destroying serving and nutrition data attached to publicly shared foods. The flaw is exploitable by low-privileged account holders (PR:L) who harvest variant IDs from the public food read endpoints; no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis and the issue is not in CISA KEV. Impact is limited to data integrity and availability (no confidentiality loss, no code execution or privilege escalation), and realistically only matters on multi-user deployments where foods are shared publicly.
Server-side request forgery in SparkyFitness (self-hosted AI health and fitness tracker) before version 1.6.0 lets an authenticated user point the built-in custom AI service configuration at arbitrary internal or private network addresses, causing the server to issue outbound POST requests carrying an attacker-controlled bearer token and to leak the AI system prompt. Exploitation requires a valid account and the ability to save a custom AI provider URL (custom, ollama, or openai_compatible) and then trigger an AI flow such as chat or the label/food-photo scan, matching the assessed vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N (5.4). No public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation (CISA KEV) were identified at time of analysis; impact is bounded to internal-service probing, forged outbound POSTs, and prompt disclosure rather than code execution. The issue is fixed in 1.6.0, which enforces an outbound URL policy that rejects private-network AI destinations with HTTP 403 by default.
SparkyFitness v0.15.8.2 is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS) via user input and LLM output. [CVSS 6.1 MEDIUM]