Praisonai Platform
Monthly
Authentication bypass in praisonai-platform before 0.1.6 lets any remote unauthenticated attacker mint a valid HS256 JSON Web Token and impersonate arbitrary users against protected API routes. The flaw is a hardcoded fallback signing secret ('dev-secret-change-me') combined with a production guard that never fires when the operator leaves both PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET and PLATFORM_ENV unset - the common mis-deploy - so the platform silently starts signing tokens with a publicly known literal drawn straight from the source code. CVSS 3.1 scores this 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) and EPSS is 0.51% (42nd percentile); there is no CISA KEV listing and no public exploit identified at time of analysis, though exploitation requires nothing more than a forged token and no authentication whatsoever.
Unauthenticated authentication bypass in praisonai-platform prior to 0.1.6 (and PraisonAI before 4.6.51) allows a remote attacker to forge HS256 session JWTs using the publicly known default signing key 'dev-secret-change-me' and be accepted as any identity the attacker names in the token's sub claim, including a workspace owner. The vulnerable state is the shipped default: the documented startup command sets neither PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET (so the hardcoded fallback is used) nor PLATFORM_ENV (which stays at 'dev', leaving the startup and token-issuance guards default-open). CVSS 3.1 scores this 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H), consistent with an unauthenticated full-compromise primitive; EPSS is low at 0.53% (43rd percentile), no public exploit code was identified at time of analysis, and there is no CISA KEV listing, although the flaw is trivially exploitable against default deployments and the only practical constraint is that workspace-owner takeover requires knowing the target owner's user/sub identifier.
Any authenticated workspace member on PraisonAI Platform 0.1.8 and earlier can delete dependency edges attached to owner-created issues by routing the request through a member-owned related issue, because the DELETE dependency endpoint checks delete permission only against the caller-selected issue ID. Exploitation requires a valid member account (CVSS PR:L), a shared workspace, and a pre-existing dependency edge linking a member-owned issue to an owner-created issue; impact is limited to unauthorized removal of dependency relationships, with no data exposure or service disruption. No public exploit code was identified at time of analysis, and this is a moderate missing-authorization flaw rather than a high-urgency priority.
Authentication bypass in praisonai-platform before 0.1.6 lets any remote unauthenticated attacker mint a valid HS256 JSON Web Token and impersonate arbitrary users against protected API routes. The flaw is a hardcoded fallback signing secret ('dev-secret-change-me') combined with a production guard that never fires when the operator leaves both PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET and PLATFORM_ENV unset - the common mis-deploy - so the platform silently starts signing tokens with a publicly known literal drawn straight from the source code. CVSS 3.1 scores this 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) and EPSS is 0.51% (42nd percentile); there is no CISA KEV listing and no public exploit identified at time of analysis, though exploitation requires nothing more than a forged token and no authentication whatsoever.
Unauthenticated authentication bypass in praisonai-platform prior to 0.1.6 (and PraisonAI before 4.6.51) allows a remote attacker to forge HS256 session JWTs using the publicly known default signing key 'dev-secret-change-me' and be accepted as any identity the attacker names in the token's sub claim, including a workspace owner. The vulnerable state is the shipped default: the documented startup command sets neither PLATFORM_JWT_SECRET (so the hardcoded fallback is used) nor PLATFORM_ENV (which stays at 'dev', leaving the startup and token-issuance guards default-open). CVSS 3.1 scores this 9.8 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H), consistent with an unauthenticated full-compromise primitive; EPSS is low at 0.53% (43rd percentile), no public exploit code was identified at time of analysis, and there is no CISA KEV listing, although the flaw is trivially exploitable against default deployments and the only practical constraint is that workspace-owner takeover requires knowing the target owner's user/sub identifier.
Any authenticated workspace member on PraisonAI Platform 0.1.8 and earlier can delete dependency edges attached to owner-created issues by routing the request through a member-owned related issue, because the DELETE dependency endpoint checks delete permission only against the caller-selected issue ID. Exploitation requires a valid member account (CVSS PR:L), a shared workspace, and a pre-existing dependency edge linking a member-owned issue to an owner-created issue; impact is limited to unauthorized removal of dependency relationships, with no data exposure or service disruption. No public exploit code was identified at time of analysis, and this is a moderate missing-authorization flaw rather than a high-urgency priority.