Next Tinacms Azure
Monthly
Cross-tenant authorization bypass in TinaCMS self-hosted deployments allows any holder of a legitimate TinaCloud account and its valid bearer token to read, create, update, delete, and manage media on a victim site without any victim account or interaction. The flaw affects @tinacms/auth before 1.1.4 and the next-tinacms-azure adapter before 15.0.1, where the server-side isAuthorized helper trusts a request-supplied clientID and therefore validates the attacker's token against the attacker's own TinaCloud app rather than the site's configured app (CWE-639, CVSS 8.8, PR:L). Exploitation is authenticated from the attacker's perspective - the attacker must already control a TinaCloud-verifiable token, so any TinaCloud account suffices - while no public exploit code was identified at time of analysis and the vendor has released patched versions.
Broken access control across all four first-party TinaCMS production media adapters (next-tinacms-s3, next-tinacms-dos, next-tinacms-azure, next-tinacms-cloudinary) allows any authenticated CMS editor to write or delete storage objects outside the operator-configured mediaRoot boundary. The handlers pass attacker-controlled query parameters (req.query.key for presigned S3 PUTs, req.query.media for DELETEs) directly to storage SDK operations without validating that the resulting key falls within the permitted path prefix, giving editors write and delete authority over the entire storage bucket or container reachable by the deployment's IAM or service credential. Vendor-released patches exist in all four packages; no public exploit or CISA KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis.
Cross-tenant authorization bypass in TinaCMS self-hosted deployments allows any holder of a legitimate TinaCloud account and its valid bearer token to read, create, update, delete, and manage media on a victim site without any victim account or interaction. The flaw affects @tinacms/auth before 1.1.4 and the next-tinacms-azure adapter before 15.0.1, where the server-side isAuthorized helper trusts a request-supplied clientID and therefore validates the attacker's token against the attacker's own TinaCloud app rather than the site's configured app (CWE-639, CVSS 8.8, PR:L). Exploitation is authenticated from the attacker's perspective - the attacker must already control a TinaCloud-verifiable token, so any TinaCloud account suffices - while no public exploit code was identified at time of analysis and the vendor has released patched versions.
Broken access control across all four first-party TinaCMS production media adapters (next-tinacms-s3, next-tinacms-dos, next-tinacms-azure, next-tinacms-cloudinary) allows any authenticated CMS editor to write or delete storage objects outside the operator-configured mediaRoot boundary. The handlers pass attacker-controlled query parameters (req.query.key for presigned S3 PUTs, req.query.media for DELETEs) directly to storage SDK operations without validating that the resulting key falls within the permitted path prefix, giving editors write and delete authority over the entire storage bucket or container reachable by the deployment's IAM or service credential. Vendor-released patches exist in all four packages; no public exploit or CISA KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis.