Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Editor auth required (PR:L); no confidentiality impact; but write/delete spans entire bucket (I:H, A:H), not just limited data.
Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).
CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionCVE.org
Tina is a headless content management system. Prior to next-tinacms-s3 23.0.4, next-tinacms-dos 23.0.4, next-tinacms-azure 14.0.4, and next-tinacms-cloudinary 26.0.4, the first-party production media adapters pass attacker-controlled object keys to storage SDK upload and delete operations without enforcing the operator's configured mediaRoot. In packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts, createMediaHandler accepts req.query.key for a signed PutObject URL and the DELETE path uses req.query.media as the DeleteObjectCommand key. The same missing key-boundary check exists in packages/next-tinacms-dos/src/handlers.ts, packages/next-tinacms-azure/src/handlers.ts, and packages/next-tinacms-cloudinary/src/handlers.ts. An authenticated CMS editor can therefore create or delete objects anywhere the deployment's storage credential can reach, including other tenants' or non-media objects. These issues are fixed in next-tinacms-s3 23.0.4, next-tinacms-dos 23.0.4, next-tinacms-azure 14.0.4, and next-tinacms-cloudinary 26.0.4.
AnalysisAI
Broken access control across all four first-party TinaCMS production media adapters (next-tinacms-s3, next-tinacms-dos, next-tinacms-azure, next-tinacms-cloudinary) allows any authenticated CMS editor to write or delete storage objects outside the operator-configured mediaRoot boundary. The handlers pass attacker-controlled query parameters (req.query.key for presigned S3 PUTs, req.query.media for DELETEs) directly to storage SDK operations without validating that the resulting key falls within the permitted path prefix, giving editors write and delete authority over the entire storage bucket or container reachable by the deployment's IAM or service credential. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires an active, authenticated CMS editor account (CVSS PR:L confirmed) within the TinaCMS deployment - anonymous or unauthenticated access is insufficient. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The NVD-assigned CVSS 5.4 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L) understates the practical impact: the I:L and A:L ratings assume limited scope, but the description explicitly states that an editor can reach 'other tenants' or non-media objects' throughout the entire bucket, which aligns more closely with I:H/A:H. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | Vendor-released patches are available: upgrade next-tinacms-s3 to 23.0.4, next-tinacms-dos to 23.0.4, next-tinacms-azure to 14.0.4, and next-tinacms-cloudinary to 26.0.4. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
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Remote code execution in TinaCMS affects versions prior to 3.1.1, @tinacms/cli before 2.0.4, and @tinacms/graphql before
Cross-site request forgery in the TinaCMS CLI dev server allows an attacker-controlled web page to write arbitrary files
Same technique Authentication Bypass
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-63102
GHSA-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4