Nanocoai
Monthly
Privilege escalation in NanoClaw before 2.1.17 lets remote attackers with a valid questionId approve or reject privileged actions (such as package installation) by submitting crafted approval response payloads. The handleApprovalsResponse function dispatches sensitive handlers without verifying the responder holds an owner/admin role, turning approval callbacks into an authorization bypass. Publicly available exploit code exists via the upstream patch diff, but no active exploitation is currently confirmed.
Link-following (symlink) handling in NanoClaw's agent-to-agent attachment forwarding lets an authenticated, low-privileged user cause the service to read or modify files outside the intended attachment directory. The flaw is in forwardAttachedFiles() in src/modules/agent-to-agent/agent-route.ts and affects every NanoClaw release from 2.1.0 through 2.1.17; the attack is network-reachable and requires no user interaction. Public exploit code exists and the vendor fix is identified as commit 3f9ed607b7e7a4872747295f75286f1c377d7c33, but real-world risk is currently low (CVSS 4.0 base 2.1, EPSS 0.29%, no CISA KEV listing).
Improper privilege management in NanoClaw (versions up to 2.0.64) allows authenticated remote attackers to abuse the `handleCreateAgent` function within the agent-to-agent creation module to escalate privileges beyond their authorization level. A public proof-of-concept exploit is available via a GitHub issue report, and the vendor has not responded to the coordinated disclosure, leaving deployments unpatched. No public exploit identified as actively exploited in CISA KEV, but the public POC and absence of a vendor patch materially elevate near-term exploitation risk.
Improper authorization in nanocoai NanoClaw's add_mcp_server endpoint allows authenticated attackers with low privileges to bypass access controls and perform unauthorized actions, such as adding MCP servers without proper authorization. Versions up to and including 2.0.64 are affected, and publicly available exploit code exists. A vendor patch is available via commit e5b928783d5c485637565eb07d2967922dfbf8d8.
Improper authorization in NanoClaw's MCP Server Approval component allows local attackers to bypass security controls by manipulating the createChatSdkBridge.setup function. The vulnerability affects all versions up to 2.0.64, and a public exploit is available, although no active exploitation or CISA KEV inclusion has been confirmed.
Privilege escalation in NanoClaw before 2.1.0 lets scoped admins cross agent-group authorization boundaries by submitting forged or stale connect callback values during the channel-registration approval flow. The `handleChannelApprovalResponse` function accepted any `connect:ag-X` callback value without verifying that the approver held admin privileges over the target agent group, allowing a scoped admin to wire messaging channels into groups they do not govern. No active exploitation has been confirmed (not listed in CISA KEV), and an upstream fix is available in commit 0eef8fafdd7c475ab5fd8d37ea566a81e74cd834 (PR #2566).
Privilege escalation in NanoClaw before 2.1.17 allows confined agent containers to bypass their architectural confinement boundary by invoking the `create_agent` delivery-action handler without host-side authorization. The handler performed privileged central-database writes - creating agent groups, container configurations, and destinations - gated only by a container-side MCP tool check that, being inside the untrusted container, is trivially bypassed by writing outbound system rows directly. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; a vendor patch is available and the fix is documented in a public GitHub commit.
Symlink following in NanoClaw's agent-to-agent file forwarding exposes arbitrary host-readable files to container-controlled agents. All releases before 2.1.17 are affected; the `forwardAttachedFiles` function validated attachment filenames with `isSafeAttachmentName` but called `fs.copyFileSync` without first resolving symlinks or confirming the resolved path remained inside the agent's outbox directory. A low-privileged agent can craft a symlink with a safe-looking filename, point it at any host file readable by the NanoClaw process, and receive its contents forwarded as a message attachment. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis, though the VulnCheck advisory and GitHub PR diff provide sufficient detail for a technically capable attacker to reproduce exploitation.
Privilege escalation in NanoClaw before 2.1.17 lets remote attackers with a valid questionId approve or reject privileged actions (such as package installation) by submitting crafted approval response payloads. The handleApprovalsResponse function dispatches sensitive handlers without verifying the responder holds an owner/admin role, turning approval callbacks into an authorization bypass. Publicly available exploit code exists via the upstream patch diff, but no active exploitation is currently confirmed.
Link-following (symlink) handling in NanoClaw's agent-to-agent attachment forwarding lets an authenticated, low-privileged user cause the service to read or modify files outside the intended attachment directory. The flaw is in forwardAttachedFiles() in src/modules/agent-to-agent/agent-route.ts and affects every NanoClaw release from 2.1.0 through 2.1.17; the attack is network-reachable and requires no user interaction. Public exploit code exists and the vendor fix is identified as commit 3f9ed607b7e7a4872747295f75286f1c377d7c33, but real-world risk is currently low (CVSS 4.0 base 2.1, EPSS 0.29%, no CISA KEV listing).
Improper privilege management in NanoClaw (versions up to 2.0.64) allows authenticated remote attackers to abuse the `handleCreateAgent` function within the agent-to-agent creation module to escalate privileges beyond their authorization level. A public proof-of-concept exploit is available via a GitHub issue report, and the vendor has not responded to the coordinated disclosure, leaving deployments unpatched. No public exploit identified as actively exploited in CISA KEV, but the public POC and absence of a vendor patch materially elevate near-term exploitation risk.
Improper authorization in nanocoai NanoClaw's add_mcp_server endpoint allows authenticated attackers with low privileges to bypass access controls and perform unauthorized actions, such as adding MCP servers without proper authorization. Versions up to and including 2.0.64 are affected, and publicly available exploit code exists. A vendor patch is available via commit e5b928783d5c485637565eb07d2967922dfbf8d8.
Improper authorization in NanoClaw's MCP Server Approval component allows local attackers to bypass security controls by manipulating the createChatSdkBridge.setup function. The vulnerability affects all versions up to 2.0.64, and a public exploit is available, although no active exploitation or CISA KEV inclusion has been confirmed.
Privilege escalation in NanoClaw before 2.1.0 lets scoped admins cross agent-group authorization boundaries by submitting forged or stale connect callback values during the channel-registration approval flow. The `handleChannelApprovalResponse` function accepted any `connect:ag-X` callback value without verifying that the approver held admin privileges over the target agent group, allowing a scoped admin to wire messaging channels into groups they do not govern. No active exploitation has been confirmed (not listed in CISA KEV), and an upstream fix is available in commit 0eef8fafdd7c475ab5fd8d37ea566a81e74cd834 (PR #2566).
Privilege escalation in NanoClaw before 2.1.17 allows confined agent containers to bypass their architectural confinement boundary by invoking the `create_agent` delivery-action handler without host-side authorization. The handler performed privileged central-database writes - creating agent groups, container configurations, and destinations - gated only by a container-side MCP tool check that, being inside the untrusted container, is trivially bypassed by writing outbound system rows directly. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; a vendor patch is available and the fix is documented in a public GitHub commit.
Symlink following in NanoClaw's agent-to-agent file forwarding exposes arbitrary host-readable files to container-controlled agents. All releases before 2.1.17 are affected; the `forwardAttachedFiles` function validated attachment filenames with `isSafeAttachmentName` but called `fs.copyFileSync` without first resolving symlinks or confirming the resolved path remained inside the agent's outbox directory. A low-privileged agent can craft a symlink with a safe-looking filename, point it at any host file readable by the NanoClaw process, and receive its contents forwarded as a message attachment. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis, though the VulnCheck advisory and GitHub PR diff provide sufficient detail for a technically capable attacker to reproduce exploitation.