Ladela
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Stored cross-site scripting in the Bookly WordPress appointment booking plugin (versions up to and including 27.7) enables unauthenticated remote attackers to inject persistent JavaScript via the bookly_speed_up_update_addons AJAX endpoint, with payloads stored verbatim in the bookly_log.details database column and executing in administrator browser sessions when they navigate to the Diagnostics → Logs page. The injection point is registered under the wp_ajax_nopriv_* hook prefix, making it reachable without any authentication via the standard WordPress AJAX endpoint; the error-logging code path in lib/PluginsUpdater.php writes attacker-controlled input directly to the database when a request is submitted without a valid signature. No public exploit code or CISA KEV listing has been confirmed at time of analysis, though the zero-barrier injection path combined with privileged execution context represents a realistic and impactful threat to any active Bookly installation.
Stored cross-site scripting in the Bookly Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System plugin for WordPress (versions through 27.2) allows remote unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript via the 'bookly-customer-full-name' cookie, which is rendered without proper sanitization or output escaping. Exploitation is gated by the non-default 'Remember personal information in cookies' setting being enabled, and no public exploit identified at time of analysis. The flaw was reported by Wordfence and the upstream fix landed in changeset 3504922 in the WordPress plugin repository.
Unauthorized plugin update execution in the Bookly scheduling plugin for WordPress (all versions through 27.2) allows any authenticated Subscriber-level user to force co-installed plugins whose main entry point is named `main.php` to update to their latest version, bypassing WordPress's standard `update_plugins` capability gate. The root cause is a missing capability check (CWE-862) on the `updateAddon` function in `lib/PluginsUpdater.php`, as identified by Wordfence and confirmed by the WordPress plugin SVN diff. No public exploit code has been identified and the vulnerability is absent from CISA KEV, but the low authentication bar makes it relevant on open-registration or multi-tenant WordPress sites.
Insecure Direct Object Reference in the Bookly plugin's Mobile Staff Cabinet API (versions up to and including 27.7) allows any authenticated staff member to read appointment records belonging to other staff by supplying arbitrary sequential appointment IDs. The exposure includes sensitive customer PII - full names, email addresses, phone numbers, internal notes, custom fields, and payment metadata (total, type, status) - with no active exploitation confirmed (not in CISA KEV) and no public POC identified at time of analysis. The flaw is especially notable because sibling API methods in the same codebase correctly enforce staff-scoped ownership checks, making this a targeted authorization omission rather than a systemic design failure.
Price manipulation in Bookly WordPress plugin (versions up to 27.0) allows unauthenticated attackers to reduce appointment booking costs to zero by submitting negative values to the 'tips' parameter, exploiting insufficient server-side validation of user-supplied pricing input. No public exploit code or active exploitation has been confirmed, but the vulnerability carries moderate risk due to its ease of exploitation and direct financial impact on e-commerce transactions.
Stored cross-site scripting in the Bookly WordPress appointment booking plugin (versions up to and including 27.7) enables unauthenticated remote attackers to inject persistent JavaScript via the bookly_speed_up_update_addons AJAX endpoint, with payloads stored verbatim in the bookly_log.details database column and executing in administrator browser sessions when they navigate to the Diagnostics → Logs page. The injection point is registered under the wp_ajax_nopriv_* hook prefix, making it reachable without any authentication via the standard WordPress AJAX endpoint; the error-logging code path in lib/PluginsUpdater.php writes attacker-controlled input directly to the database when a request is submitted without a valid signature. No public exploit code or CISA KEV listing has been confirmed at time of analysis, though the zero-barrier injection path combined with privileged execution context represents a realistic and impactful threat to any active Bookly installation.
Stored cross-site scripting in the Bookly Online Scheduling and Appointment Booking System plugin for WordPress (versions through 27.2) allows remote unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary JavaScript via the 'bookly-customer-full-name' cookie, which is rendered without proper sanitization or output escaping. Exploitation is gated by the non-default 'Remember personal information in cookies' setting being enabled, and no public exploit identified at time of analysis. The flaw was reported by Wordfence and the upstream fix landed in changeset 3504922 in the WordPress plugin repository.
Unauthorized plugin update execution in the Bookly scheduling plugin for WordPress (all versions through 27.2) allows any authenticated Subscriber-level user to force co-installed plugins whose main entry point is named `main.php` to update to their latest version, bypassing WordPress's standard `update_plugins` capability gate. The root cause is a missing capability check (CWE-862) on the `updateAddon` function in `lib/PluginsUpdater.php`, as identified by Wordfence and confirmed by the WordPress plugin SVN diff. No public exploit code has been identified and the vulnerability is absent from CISA KEV, but the low authentication bar makes it relevant on open-registration or multi-tenant WordPress sites.
Insecure Direct Object Reference in the Bookly plugin's Mobile Staff Cabinet API (versions up to and including 27.7) allows any authenticated staff member to read appointment records belonging to other staff by supplying arbitrary sequential appointment IDs. The exposure includes sensitive customer PII - full names, email addresses, phone numbers, internal notes, custom fields, and payment metadata (total, type, status) - with no active exploitation confirmed (not in CISA KEV) and no public POC identified at time of analysis. The flaw is especially notable because sibling API methods in the same codebase correctly enforce staff-scoped ownership checks, making this a targeted authorization omission rather than a systemic design failure.
Price manipulation in Bookly WordPress plugin (versions up to 27.0) allows unauthenticated attackers to reduce appointment booking costs to zero by submitting negative values to the 'tips' parameter, exploiting insufficient server-side validation of user-supplied pricing input. No public exploit code or active exploitation has been confirmed, but the vulnerability carries moderate risk due to its ease of exploitation and direct financial impact on e-commerce transactions.