Kamaji
Monthly
SQL injection via unescaped identifier interpolation in Kamaji's PostgreSQL and MySQL datastore drivers exposes the shared datastore root connection to arbitrary DDL/DML manipulation. Versions prior to 26.7.4-edge interpolate operator-supplied DataStoreUsername and DataStoreSchema fields directly into SQL via fmt.Sprintf without any identifier sanitization, allowing a quote or backtick character to break out of the identifier context. Compounding the risk, the pre-fix MySQL primary connection had multiStatements=true enabled, enabling stacked query execution over a root-privileged database connection that spans all hosted tenant control planes. No active exploitation has been confirmed and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis.
Cross-tenant data compromise in Clastix Kamaji (Hosted Control Plane Manager for Kubernetes) before 26.7.4-edge lets one tenant read, modify, or destroy another tenant's control-plane state. Kamaji's defaulting webhook derived each TenantControlPlane's datastore schema, database user, and etcd key prefix from a lossy namespace-and-name normalization that replaced dashes with underscores, so two tenants whose names normalize to the same string (e.g. 'a-b' vs 'a_b') were assigned identical datastore identifiers and silently shared backing storage. No public exploit identified at time of analysis and it is not in CISA KEV, but the root cause is confirmed by the vendor advisory (GHSA-4f3f-65vx-r34f) and the fixing commit, which now uses the immutable resource UID.
Kamaji is the Hosted Control Plane Manager for Kubernetes. Rated critical severity (CVSS 9.9), this vulnerability is remotely exploitable, low attack complexity. Public exploit code available.
SQL injection via unescaped identifier interpolation in Kamaji's PostgreSQL and MySQL datastore drivers exposes the shared datastore root connection to arbitrary DDL/DML manipulation. Versions prior to 26.7.4-edge interpolate operator-supplied DataStoreUsername and DataStoreSchema fields directly into SQL via fmt.Sprintf without any identifier sanitization, allowing a quote or backtick character to break out of the identifier context. Compounding the risk, the pre-fix MySQL primary connection had multiStatements=true enabled, enabling stacked query execution over a root-privileged database connection that spans all hosted tenant control planes. No active exploitation has been confirmed and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis.
Cross-tenant data compromise in Clastix Kamaji (Hosted Control Plane Manager for Kubernetes) before 26.7.4-edge lets one tenant read, modify, or destroy another tenant's control-plane state. Kamaji's defaulting webhook derived each TenantControlPlane's datastore schema, database user, and etcd key prefix from a lossy namespace-and-name normalization that replaced dashes with underscores, so two tenants whose names normalize to the same string (e.g. 'a-b' vs 'a_b') were assigned identical datastore identifiers and silently shared backing storage. No public exploit identified at time of analysis and it is not in CISA KEV, but the root cause is confirmed by the vendor advisory (GHSA-4f3f-65vx-r34f) and the fixing commit, which now uses the immutable resource UID.
Kamaji is the Hosted Control Plane Manager for Kubernetes. Rated critical severity (CVSS 9.9), this vulnerability is remotely exploitable, low attack complexity. Public exploit code available.