Kamaji CVE-2026-62246

Exploitation requires the ability to create a TenantControlPlane resource (PR:L) whose namespace-and-name combination, after Kamaji's dash-to-underscore normalization in GetDefaultDatastoreSchema()/GetDefaultDatastoreUsername(), collides with a target tenant's normalized identifier - for example a tenant using a dash where another uses an underscore in the corresponding position. It further requires a shared datastore backend across tenants so the colliding schema/user/etcd-prefix maps to the same physical storage. Limiting factors: high attack complexity (a usable normalized collision must already exist or be engineered, hence AC:H), the attacker must be authorized to provision tenants, and deployments that enforce strict/unique tenant naming or give each tenant a dedicated datastore are not exploitable. This is not remote-unauthenticated against default configs - it is a multi-tenant isolation break contingent on naming collisions.

The CVSS 3.1 base score is 8.5 (High) with vector AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H: network reachable, but high attack complexity and low privileges required, with a scope change reflecting that impact crosses the tenant isolation boundary into another tenant's data (full C/I/A loss of the victim cluster). The AC:H rating is well-justified - an attacker must control or induce a tenant whose namespace/name normalizes to collide with a target's, which is opportunistic rather than trivially reproducible on demand, and PR:L reflects that the actor must be able to provision a TenantControlPlane. No EPSS score was provided in the input, there is no CISA KEV listing, and no public POC is referenced (references are limited to the vendor advisory and the fix commit), so this is a real but not mass-exploitable priority: highest urgency for multi-tenant Kamaji operators offering self-service tenant naming, lower for single-operator deployments with tightly controlled naming conventions. The signals are internally consistent - no contradiction between the CVSS vector and the description.

In a multi-tenant Kamaji platform where customers self-select cluster names, an attacker provisions a TenantControlPlane whose namespace/name normalizes (dashes-to-underscores) to the same identifier as a victim tenant, causing Kamaji to assign both the same datastore schema, DB user, and etcd key prefix. The attacker's control plane then reads and writes the victim's shared etcd/kine state, letting it exfiltrate secrets, tamper with workloads, or wipe the victim cluster's data. No public POC is referenced, and the collision dependency (AC:H) makes this most practical where naming is unconstrained.