Information Disclosure
Monthly
Unauthenticated remote download of a raw SQL database backup in code-projects Hotel and Tourism Reservation in PHP 1.0 exposes the full application database to any internet-connected attacker. The file /ht/hotel_db%20(1).sql is placed inside the web root without access restrictions, making it directly retrievable over HTTP with no credentials. A publicly available proof-of-concept exploit exists; the database dump likely contains guest PII, booking records, and potentially hashed or plaintext admin credentials.
Shortcode injection in the Redirection for Contact Form 7 WordPress plugin (versions 2.2.7 through 3.2.10) enables unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary registered WordPress shortcodes server-side and capture their output. The plugin substitutes raw form submission values into its action settings and then evaluates those settings through WordPress's do_shortcode() pipeline without sanitizing or stripping user-supplied shortcode syntax first. A public proof-of-concept is available via WPScan; vendor-released patch version 3.2.11 addresses the issue.
Unauthenticated remote access to an exposed SQL database backup file in code-projects Daily Expense Manager 1.0 allows any network attacker to retrieve sensitive application data. The file `/Daily-Expense-Manager/exp_ak.sql` - a raw database dump - is served directly from the web root without access control, disclosing potentially credentials, user records, and expense data. No public exploitation via CISA KEV, but a public exploit writeup is available on GitHub confirming the exposure path.
SSH authentication bypass in MikroTik RouterOS allows any unauthenticated network attacker to skip the entire SSH user-authentication phase by triggering a client-requested rekey, causing the server to advance directly into the connection protocol and accept session channel and exec requests. The result is unauthenticated file creation, overwrite, and exfiltration within the RouterOS managed file namespace - including support bundles containing configuration and diagnostic data. Publicly available exploit code exists, CERT-PL has published dedicated research, and a companion CERT-PL post titled 'vulnerabilities-in-mikrotik-routeros-actively-exploited' suggests observed exploitation in the wild, though CISA KEV listing is not confirmed in the available data.
Unauthenticated remote access to restricted internal APIs is possible in N-able N-central due to an incomplete access control filter, classified under CWE-791. All N-central deployments prior to versions 2026.3 HF3 and 2026.4 are affected, as confirmed by the vendor advisory. Impact is limited to partial information disclosure (CVSS 4.0 VC:L) with no integrity or availability effects reported; no public exploit code or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis.
Remote memory disclosure in libpcap's rpcap client allows a malicious or compromised rpcap server to cause a connected client to read up to 20 bytes beyond the end of its receive buffer and treat that data as captured packet content. All libpcap versions with rpcap support are affected per CPE cpe:2.3:a:the_tcpdump_group:libpcap:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*. The root cause is an incorrect boundary check in pcap_read_nocb_remote(): the RPCAP_MSG_PACKET caplen field was validated against the full payload length rather than against the payload length minus the fixed-size RPCAP_MSG_PACKET header, creating a window of up to sizeof(struct rpcap_pkthdr) bytes that could be read beyond the buffer. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing is identified at time of analysis.
Out-of-bounds memory reads in libpcap's userland BPF interpreter allow a local attacker who can supply a crafted filter program to drive the interpreter's program counter past the end of the filter buffer, reading up to 32 GiB of surrounding process memory on 64-bit systems or the entire address space on 32-bit systems. All libpcap versions tracked under CPE cpe:2.3:a:the_tcpdump_group:libpcap are affected; The Tcpdump Group has published a fix via commit d3f358d3. No active exploitation has been confirmed and no public exploit exists; the vulnerability is restricted to uncommon application patterns that pass raw BPF bytecode directly to the interpreter without prior validation.
SiYuan's `getAttributeViewKeysByID` endpoint, present in all versions before v3.8.2, allows authenticated publish readers to retrieve full key schemas-including sensitive field names and relation definitions-from private or hidden databases they have no visibility into. The flaw is an authorization bypass (CWE-639/IDOR) where the endpoint validates that a caller holds a publish-reader session but never verifies the caller's access rights against the parent database owning the requested attribute view. No public exploit code and no CISA KEV listing have been identified at time of analysis, keeping real-world risk moderate despite the network-accessible attack vector.
Information disclosure in the EmbedPress WordPress plugin (versions 4.6.0 through 4.6.3) allows any authenticated contributor-level user or above to retrieve the site administrator's email address via an improperly restricted Google Reviews REST API endpoint. WordPress core deliberately withholds administrator email from the contributor role as a privacy control; this plugin bypass defeats that restriction without requiring administrative privileges. A publicly available proof-of-concept has been published by WPScan, though EPSS at 0.14% and SSVC exploitation status of 'none' indicate no observed active exploitation at time of analysis.
The Events Calendar WordPress plugin before 6.17.3.1 exposes unpublished site content - drafts, pending posts, and private records from all users - through its public REST API archive endpoints to any contributor-level authenticated user. The plugin fails to enforce WordPress's standard post-status visibility controls on its custom REST routes, allowing a low-privilege account holder to enumerate and read the full body of every non-public record site-wide, bypassing intended access controls. A public proof-of-concept is documented via WPScan, and a vendor patch (6.17.3.1) is available.
Unauthenticated information disclosure in the My Private Site WordPress plugin (all versions before 4.2.3) exposes post content, post URLs, and comments to anonymous visitors, directly defeating the plugin's stated purpose of enforcing mandatory login across a WordPress site. The plugin fails to apply its privacy gate to certain front-end read surfaces, meaning requests to those endpoints bypass the authentication requirement entirely. A publicly available proof-of-concept exists; the vendor has released a corrective patch in version 4.2.3.
Unauthenticated information disclosure in the Smart Post WordPress plugin (versions prior to 4.0.8) exposes both the content of password-protected posts and the passwords themselves via an unprotected AJAX endpoint. Any unauthenticated remote user can query the endpoint to bypass WordPress's native post-password protection mechanism entirely, retrieving guarded content without knowing the password - and also harvesting the password itself for reuse. A public exploit is documented by WPScan; a vendor patch (4.0.8) has been released.
Flatpak's `org.freedesktop.Flatpak.SystemHelper` D-Bus service contains a TOCTOU race condition in the `Deploy()` function where a privileged `chmod` executes before OSTree repository validation completes, allowing a local low-privileged attacker to redirect symlinks to arbitrary system files within that timing window. A successful exploit can yield high-confidentiality impact (reading privileged files) and limited integrity and availability impact (CVSS C:H/I:L/A:L), as the unguarded chmod can be inherited by attacker-controlled symlink targets. No public exploit code or CISA KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis, and the High attack complexity (AC:H) reflects the precision timing required to win the race.
Race condition in jofpin trape 2.0 allows remote unauthenticated attackers to manipulate telemetry data via the vId argument in core/user.py's Telemetry Endpoint, yielding low-impact confidentiality, integrity, and availability compromise. Exploitation is rated high complexity (AC:H) due to the timing requirements inherent in race condition attacks, and the CVSS 4.0 base score is 2.9. A public proof-of-concept exists as a GitHub issue report (#408); the project maintainer has not responded to the disclosure.
SolidInvoice's REST API authenticator, in all versions prior to 3.0.1, silently accepts long-lived bearer tokens via a `?token=` URL query parameter as a fallback to the intended `X-API-TOKEN` request header, causing credentials to be permanently recorded in server access logs, reverse-proxy logs, CDN access logs, browser history, and HTTP Referer headers forwarded to third-party origins. Any actor with read access to those artifacts - sysadmins, log-aggregation pipelines, analytics vendors receiving Referer data, or post-compromise intruders pivoting through log stores - can extract a valid API token and authenticate to the invoicing platform without exploiting any application logic. Version 3.0.1 fixes the issue by removing the query-parameter fallback and enforcing header-only delivery; no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux: require every boolean value to be defined p_bools.nprim comes from the policy image independently of how many booleans follow it, and cond_index_bool() fills bool_val_to_struct[] at value - 1, so a count larger than the values present leaves NULL entries. Every user of that array then walks it by index and dereferences each entry: cond_evaluate_expr() on the access-vector path, security_get_bools() and security_get_bool_value() behind selinuxfs, and security_set_bools(). A sparse class value is absorbed by policydb_class_isvalid() and its siblings; booleans have no such predicate, and no consumer that could use one. Reject a boolean value that no boolean defines, once, where the array is built. Conforming policies define every boolean they declare and are unaffected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux: reject an unclaimed class value in security_get_classes() security_get_classes() sizes an array by p_classes.nprim and fills it at value - 1, so a class value the policy never defines leaves a NULL. sel_make_classes() passes every entry to sel_make_dir(), reaching the same d_alloc_name() dereference as the permission array. The class symbol table is allowed to be sparse (policydb_class_isvalid() exists to absorb that), but this getter builds its own array straight from the hash table and has no such predicate. Fail the lookup when a value went unclaimed instead of handing out the NULL. Conforming policies define every class they declare and are unaffected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: sof-audio: Fix error path in sof_widget_setup_unlocked() If either tplg_ops->dai_config or widget_kcontrol_setup fail during widget setup we would double decrement the use_count of the widget because the sof_widget_free_unlocked() would be called twice, similarly the core_put would be invoked twice as well. Since the use_count and core_put() is handled within the widget_free function we need to return without falling through the pipe_widget_free label. The fixes tag is picked to the last change around this part of the code which is adequately old enough for backporting purposes.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: codecs: lpass-wsa-macro: Fix enum kcontrol accesses EAR SPKR PA Gain" and the four "WSA RX* Mux" controls are enumerated, but their get and put callbacks access the value through ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] (a long) instead of ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] (an unsigned int). This same pattern was fixed in the sibling drivers by commit bcfe5f76cc40 ("ASoC: codecs: rx-macro: fix accessing array out of bounds for enum type") and commit 0ea5eff7c606 ("ASoC: codecs: va-macro: fix accessing array out of bounds for enum type"), but wsa-macro was missed. On 64-bit kernels with CONFIG_SND_CTL_DEBUG this trips the elem value sanity check and every read of these controls fails with -EINVAL.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fix UVD dpb min size calculation for H264 This should use actual number of references from the decode message, instead of maximum derived from level. (cherry picked from commit 64b525edb7e7bdfcdc77883c5e413804e2396856)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: packet: fix wrong transport_header when sending VLAN-tagged frame In packet_parse_headers(), when processing a VLAN-tagged frame, skb_set_network_header() is called to advance network_header past the VLAN tag to the inner protocol header. skb_probe_transport_header() is then called with skb->protocol still set to the outer VLAN EtherType (e.g. ETH_P_8021Q), while nhoff (derived from skb_network_offset()) already points past the VLAN tag to the inner protocol header. In __skb_flow_dissect(), proto is initialized to ETH_P_8021Q and nhoff points past the VLAN tag. When the dissector hits case ETH_P_8021Q, it reads a struct vlan_hdr at nhoff via __skb_header_pointer(), but that offset contains the inner protocol header (e.g. an IP header). The bytes are misinterpreted as a VLAN header, yielding a garbage encapsulated EtherType that matches no known protocol. The dissector returns false, so skb_probe_transport_header() never calls skb_set_transport_header(), leaving transport_header at its uninitialized sentinel value (~0U). Move skb_probe_transport_header() to before skb_set_network_header(). At the time skb_probe_transport_header() is called, network_header still points to the VLAN header, so nhoff correctly points to the VLAN header. The flow dissector can then parse the VLAN header, extract the inner EtherType, and advance nhoff to the inner protocol header, allowing transport_header to be set correctly.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tap: fix wrong transport_header when sending VLAN-tagged frame In tap_get_user_xdp(), when processing a VLAN-tagged frame (e.g. ETH_P_8021Q), skb_set_network_header() is called first to advance network_header past the VLAN tag to the inner protocol header. skb_probe_transport_header() is then called with skb->protocol still set to ETH_P_8021Q, while nhoff (derived from skb_network_offset()) already points past the VLAN tag to the inner protocol header. In __skb_flow_dissect(), proto is initialized to ETH_P_8021Q and nhoff points past the VLAN tag. When the dissector hits case ETH_P_8021Q, it reads a struct vlan_hdr at the current nhoff via __skb_header_pointer(), but that offset contains the inner protocol header (e.g. an IP header). The bytes are misinterpreted as a VLAN header, yielding a garbage encapsulated EtherType that matches no known protocol. The dissector returns false, so skb_probe_transport_header() never calls skb_set_transport_header(), leaving transport_header at its uninitialized sentinel value (~0U). Move skb_set_network_header() to after skb_probe_transport_header(). At the time skb_probe_transport_header() is called, network_header still points to the VLAN header (offset ETH_HLEN), so nhoff is correct and the flow dissector can parse the VLAN header, extract the inner EtherType, and advance nhoff to the inner protocol header, allowing transport_header to be set correctly.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/tls: Fail tls_sw_splice_read() after a failed async decrypt When an async decrypt fails, tls_decrypt_done() records the error in ctx->async_wait.err and calls tls_err_abort(), which stores it in sk_err. tls_sw_recvmsg() and tls_sw_read_sock() each read async_wait.err once they hold the reader lock and fail the call: a record that did not authenticate breaks the connection. tls_sw_splice_read() has no such check, and sk_err does not stand in for one. tls_rx_rec_wait() tests sk_err only inside the loop it skips whenever a record is already parsed, and the first reader to reach sock_error() clears it, while async_wait.err persists. A splice therefore keeps delivering records on a connection that recvmsg() and read_sock() refuse to read. Read async_wait.err in tls_sw_splice_read() as the other two readers do.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/oa: Fix sync entry leak on OA config emit failure xe_oa_emit_oa_config() releases the sync entries and the syncs array only on its success path. When it fails before the point of no return (fence allocation, config buffer allocation or batch submission), it returns without touching stream->syncs. The stream open path handles such failures in the caller, but xe_oa_config_locked() propagates the error without any cleanup, so the syncs array and the fence references held by the parsed entries are leaked. The next config ioctl overwrites stream->syncs, making the memory unreachable for good. Clean up the parsed syncs when xe_oa_emit_oa_config() fails, matching the cleanup done by the stream open error path. (cherry picked from commit 8af97b3da2cfce04e6b457c6eb17ed3c1daf912b)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: sun6i-dma: Fix reclaim descriptors while terminating DMA When terminating DMA transfers, active descriptors are not properly reclaimed. Only cyclic descriptors were handled, leaving non-cyclic descriptors and their LLI chains to be permanently leaked. Fix by using vchan_terminate_vdesc() which handles both cyclic and non-cyclic descriptors by adding them to desc_terminated queue for proper cleanup. Add pchan->desc != pchan->done check to prevent double-adding completed descriptors, which would corrupt the list.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: fix the checksum validations ip_vs_in_icmp_v6() is missing checksum validation for ICMPv6 packets from clients. In fact, as for TCP/UDP we should validate the checksum for ICMP packets only when we mangle the packets on MASQ or on reply for tunnel. Also, Sashiko points out that handle_response_icmp() being common for IPv4 and IPv6 is missing the pseudo-header calculation while validating ICMPv6 messages from real servers which is a problem if checksum is not validated by the hardware. Fix the problems by creating ip_vs_checksum_common_check() helper and use it for TCP/UDP/ICMP both for IPv4 and IPv6. Rely on the nf_checksum() for validating the ICMP messages but use it also for TCP and UDP. Use correct IP offset for IP_VS_DBG_RL_PKT for TCP/UDP/SCTP. IPVS packets (TCP/UDP/SCTP/ICMP) do not need checksum validation on LOCAL_OUT (local clients or local real servers) and on FORWARD (traffic from servers on LAN). Do it only on LOCAL_IN, in case nf_checksum() is not called on PRE_ROUTING. Also, ip_vs_checksum_complete() can be marked static.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SDCA: Make UMP message size check more robust If message offset was larger than the buffer length the size check will pass incorrectly. Refactor the check such that it is more robust to invalid sizes.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: remove fscache backend entirely EROFS over fscache was introduced to provide image lazy pulling functionality. After the feature landed, the fscache subsystem made netfs a new hard dependency, which is unexpected for a local filesystem and has an kernel-defined caching hierarchy which could be inflexible compared to the fanotify pre-content hooks. Therefore, this feature has been deprecated for almost two years. As EROFS file-backed mounts and fanotify pre-content hooks both upstream for a while and already providing equivalent functionality (erofs-utils has supported fanotify pre-content hooks), let's remove the fscache backend now. The main application of this feature is Nydus [1], and they plan to move to use fanotify pre-content hooks in the near future too. I hope this patch can be merged into Linux 7.2, which is also motivated by newly found implementation issues [2][3] that are not worth investigating given the deprecation and limited development resources. The associated fscache/cachefiles cleanup patch will follow separately through the vfs tree (netfs) later: it seems fine since the codebase is isolated by CONFIG_CACHEFILES_ONDEMAND. [1] https://github.com/dragonflyoss/nydus/blob/v2.1.0/docs/nydus-fscache.md [2] https://github.com/dragonflyoss/nydus/pull/1824 [3] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260619135800.1594811-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: clear PG_private_2 on copy-to-cache append failure netfs_pgpriv2_copy_to_cache() marks the folio with PG_private_2 before netfs_pgpriv2_copy_folio() appends it to the copy-to-cache rolling buffer. If the append fails, the folio is not queued for cache writeback, so the PG_private_2 state and its reference must be released immediately.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: release readahead folios on iterator preparation failure netfs_prepare_read_iterator() batches readahead folios in put_batch so that the folio references can be dropped after the I/O iterator has been prepared. If rolling_buffer_load_from_ra() fails after earlier folios have been batched, the function returns immediately and leaves those references held. Release the batch before returning the error.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mshv: Fix race in mshv_irqfd_deassign mshv_irqfd_deactivate() and the hlist traversal of pt_irqfds_list require pt->pt_irqfds_lock to be held, but mshv_irqfd_deassign() omits it. This races with the EPOLLHUP path in mshv_irqfd_wakeup(), which does take the lock before calling mshv_irqfd_deactivate(). Additionally, mshv_irqfd_deactivate() uses hlist_del() which poisons the node pointers rather than resetting them. Since mshv_irqfd_is_active() relies on hlist_unhashed() (checks pprev == NULL), a poisoned node still appears active. If a concurrent path calls mshv_irqfd_deactivate() again on the same irqfd, the guard fails to prevent a double hlist_del() on poisoned pointers. Fix both issues: - Add the missing spin_lock_irq/spin_unlock_irq around the list traversal in mshv_irqfd_deassign(), matching mshv_irqfd_release(). - Use hlist_del_init() instead of hlist_del() so the node is properly marked as unhashed after removal, making the is_active guard reliable.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Fix wrong hwpt passed to iommufd_auto_response_faults on replace iommufd_hwpt_replace_device() calls: iommufd_auto_response_faults(hwpt, old_handle); passing the *new* hwpt together with the handle of the device's *old* domain. This should be a parameter mismatch: 1. Semantically, iommufd_auto_response_faults(x, handle) scans x->fault's deliver list and response xarray for groups matching "handle". A group is queued under the hwpt that was attached at fault-delivery time. old_handle is fetched *before* the domain switch, so its group lives on old->fault, not on the new hwpt->fault. 2. Historically, the first argument was "old". The routine was introduced by commit b7d8833677ba ("iommufd: Fault-capable hwpt attach/detach/replace") as __fault_domain_replace_dev() in fault.c, correctly calling iommufd_auto_response_faults(old, curr). Commit fb21b1568ada ("iommufd: Make attach_handle generic than fault specific") moved this into iommufd_hwpt_replace_device() in device.c and swapped it to "hwpt". This should be a refactor regression, not an intentional change. Fix this by passing "old" instead.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/hugetlb: fix swap entry corruption when clearing uffd-wp at fork() copy_hugetlb_page_range() clears the uffd-wp bit of migration and hwpoison entries with huge_pte_clear_uffd_wp(), which operates on the present-PTE bit position. Swap entries keep the uffd-wp state elsewhere -- the migration branch reads and sets it with pte_swp_uffd_wp() and pte_swp_mkuffd_wp() -- and the present-PTE position falls into the swap payload. On x86-64 it lands in the inverted swap offset, where a naturally-aligned hugetlb PFN always has the affected bit set, so the clear advances the encoded PFN by two pages. No userfaultfd needs to be involved: the clear is guarded only by the child VMA not being uffd-wp registered, so a plain fork() with an in-flight hugetlb migration entry (or a poisoned hugetlb page) corrupts the entry copied into the child. Instrumenting the clear and forking after MADV_HWPOISON on a 2MB anon hugetlb page shows: offset before=120e00 offset after =120e02 The fallout is mostly latent: rmap walks match migration entries by folio range and remove_migration_pte() rebuilds the PTE from the folio, so a within-folio PFN skew heals once migration completes. But any path that re-encodes the corrupted offset -- e.g. hugetlb_change_protection() rewriting a writable migration entry via make_readable_migration_entry(swp_offset(entry)) -- propagates it. Migration entries legitimately carry uffd-wp, so clear it with pte_swp_clear_uffd_wp(), matching copy_nonpresent_pte() and move_huge_pte(). A hwpoison entry, on the other hand, never carries the uffd-wp bit: it is installed fresh by make_hwpoison_entry() (try_to_unmap_one() does not preserve uffd-wp on the hwpoison path) and hugetlb_change_protection() leaves hwpoison entries untouched. There was nothing to clear there, only the corruption, so drop the clear entirely.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: cap LZMA stream pool size fs/erofs/decompressor_lzma.c sizes the module-global MicroLZMA stream pool from num_possible_cpus() when the lzma_streams module parameter is unset, then z_erofs_load_lzma_config() preallocates one image-supplied dictionary per stream, accepting dictionaries up to 8 MiB. On high-CPU systems, a small EROFS image can pin hundreds of MiB of vmalloc-backed decoder state until the erofs module is unloaded. Impact: An EROFS image mounted by the system can pin up to 8 MiB of vmalloc memory per LZMA stream, either as intended or unexpectedly. Bound the default stream count by a new CONFIG_EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS option, default 16, so the worst-case default preallocation is 128 MiB if the number of CPUs is no less than 16 while preserving the existing per-image dictionary limit. An explicit lzma_streams module parameter is still honoured as-is, so administrators who deliberately size the pool are not affected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: pci: Validate AIBV and AISB before pinning guest pages The AIBV holds one bit per MSI-X vector for a given function. The size of the bit vector is derived from the NOI and the AIBVO. If the size of the AIBV exceeds a single page boundary, then reject the request as we cannot safely pin the guest AIBV. Similarly reject the request if the AISB address is not 8-byte aligned as the architecture requires doubleword alignment for the summary bit address. Since the AISBO can address up to 64 bits, the size of the AISB can only be 8 bytes for the function. This also ensures the AISB doesn't exceed a single page boundary.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: reject stale cookies with mismatched verification tags sctp_unpack_cookie() skips cookie expiration checks whenever an association already exists. This is broader than the exception in RFC 9260 Section 5.2.4. For an existing association, Section 5.2.4 permits an expired State Cookie only when both Verification Tags in the cookie match the current association. Otherwise, the packet SHOULD be discarded and a Stale Cookie ERROR MUST be sent. The broad check lets an expired Action A restart cookie reach sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a(). In a runtime test with the default 60 second cookie lifetime, replaying such a cookie after 65 seconds returned a COOKIE-ACK and restarted the association. Check cookie expiration unless both Verification Tags match. This preserves the Action D exception for a lost COOKIE ACK while rejecting expired cookies in all other cases.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: isotp: fix timer drain order, wakeup handling and tx_gen ordering This patch is a follow-up to commit cf070fe33bfb ("can: isotp: serialize TX state transitions under so->rx_lock") which addresses following sashiko-bot findings: - isotp_sendmsg(): drain so->txfrtimer first so a stale callback can't re-arm echotimer after the claim - isotp_release(): wake so->wait after forcing ISOTP_SHUTDOWN so a sleeping sendmsg() claim isn't stranded - isotp_sendmsg(): have both wait_event_interruptible() calls in isotp_sendmsg() also wake on ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and do not return claim to IDLE to avoid corrupting a concurrent isotp_release() process. - isotp_sendmsg(): handle potential claim of a new transfer when the wait_event_interruptible() call returns in CAN_ISOTP_WAIT_TX_DONE mode. Don't touch timers and states of the new transfer if a new thread incremented so->tx_gen before getting the lock at err_event_drop. - isotp_sendmsg(): handle a stuck can_send() and omit timer and state changes if a new transfer was claimed. wait_tx_done() returns the error recorded in so->tx_result[], tagged with the caller's own generation. - isotp_tx_timeout(): on a claimed timeout, record the ECOMM error for the timed-out transfer's own generation in so->tx_result[]; sk->sk_err is raised unconditionally, same as every other error path here. - isotp_tx_gen_done()/isotp_tx_timeout(): always read tx.state (acquire) before tx_gen - the reverse order let a weakly ordered CPU pair a fresh tx.state with a stale tx_gen/tx_result slot. - isotp_sendmsg(): wait_tx_done: drain sk_err via sock_error() once we have read the result from so->tx_result[], so an already-reported error doesn't stay latched for a later poll()/SO_ERROR. Also align the remaining lock-free so->tx.state/rx.state/cfecho accesses and use skb->hash as unique loopback echo frame indicator.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vmwgfx: drop dma_buf reference on foreign-fd prime import ttm_prime_fd_to_handle() returns -ENOSYS when the imported fd's dma_buf->ops do not match the ttm_object_device's ops, but does so without releasing the reference acquired by dma_buf_get(). Any unprivileged renderD client passing a non-vmwgfx prime fd through the DRM_VMW_GB_SURFACE_REF{,_EXT} path leaks one dma_buf reference per call and indefinitely pins the foreign exporter's GEM resources. Funnel the error path through the existing dma_buf_put() so the reference is always dropped.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Fix uncancelled rxrpc OOB message handler Fix AFS to cancel its OOB message processing (typically to respond to security challenges). Also move OOB message processing to afs_wq so that it's also waited for and make the OOB handler just return if the net namespace is no longer live.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntb: Store original DMA address for future release The DMA API requires that dma_free_attrs receive the exact dma_handle originally returned by the allocation function. Do not modify it.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/tegra: gr2d/gr3d: Initialize address register map before HOST1X client is registered The host1x_client_register() function is called just prior to register map initialization loop, making the device available to userspace. This may result in userspace attempting to submits a job before the register map is initialized. Address this by moving register initialization before host1x client registration.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: tegra - Return ENOMEM when input buffer allocation fails for ccm Ensure the ENOMEM error value is set when the input buffer allocation fails in tegra_ccm_do_one_req.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix buffer head management in ocfs2_read_blocks() In ocfs2_read_blocks(), caller should't assume that buffer head returned by 'sb_getblk()' is exclusively owned and so 'put_bh()' always drops b_count from 1 to 0. If it is not so, buffer head remains on hold and likely to be returned by the next call to 'sb_getblk()' unchanged - that is, with BH_Uptodate bit set even if it has failed validation previously, thus allowing to insert that buffer head into OCFS2 metadata cache and submit it to upper layers. To avoid such a scenario, BH_Uptodate should be cleared immediately after 'validate()' callback has detected some data inconsistency.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/mlx5: Properly support implicit ODP rereg_mr Due to all the child mkeys in the implicit ODP configuration we cannot change anything in place for the parent mkey. Instead the whole thing needs to be rebuilt if any change is requested. If the user does not specify a translation then force the implicit values which will then fall through the logic into mlx5_ib_reg_user_mr() to allocate a completely new MR. Since implicit children were also touching the mr->pd, this removes another case where the access was racy.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix circular locking dependency in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write A circular locking dependency involves INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE, EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE, and ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE. 1. ocfs2_mknod() acquires INODE_ALLOC then EXTENT_ALLOC. 2. ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() acquires EXTENT_ALLOC for unwritten extents, then ORPHAN_DIR via ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan() while still holding EXTENT_ALLOC. 3. ocfs2_wipe_inode() acquires ORPHAN_DIR then INODE_ALLOC via ocfs2_remove_inode. Break the cycle in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() by freeing the allocation contexts (releasing EXTENT_ALLOC) before acquiring ORPHAN_DIR. WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected ------------------------------------------------------ is trying to acquire lock: ffff8881e78b33a0 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_evict_inode+0x1539/0x43b0 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1299 but task is already holding lock: ffff8881e78b4fa0 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_evict_inode+0xe97/0x43b0 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1299 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1029 [inline] ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan+0x12e/0x7a0 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:2728 ocfs2_dio_end_io+0xf9c/0x1370 fs/ocfs2/aops.c:2418 dio_complete+0x25b/0x790 fs/direct-io.c:281 -> #1 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1029 [inline] ocfs2_reserve_suballoc_bits+0x16d/0x4840 fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:882 ocfs2_reserve_new_metadata_blocks+0x415/0x9a0 fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1078 ocfs2_mknod+0x10f3/0x2260 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:351 -> #0 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x15a5/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 down_write+0x96/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625 inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1029 [inline] ocfs2_remove_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:733 [inline] ocfs2_wipe_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:896 [inline] ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1157 [inline] ocfs2_evict_inode+0x1539/0x43b0 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1299 Chain exists of: &ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE] --> &ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE] --> &ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE] Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]); lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]); lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]); lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]); *** DEADLOCK ***
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Fix leak of ungot volume Fix afs_lookup_volume_rcu() so that it doesn't leak a dying volume if afs_try_get_volume() fails.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Fix vllist leak Fix a leak of the new vllist in afs_update_cell() in the event that it is an empty list (nr_servers == 0), in which case the old list isn't displaced unless the old list is also empty.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Fix event length with forced 8-byte alignment When RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT is true, rb_calculate_event_length() reserves the space of event->array[0] for placing the data length and rb_update_event() stores the data length in event->array[0] accordingly. As a result the whole event length will add extra 4 bytes for sizeof(event.array[0]) unconditionally. But ring_buffer_event_length() only subtracts the sizeof(event->array[0]) for events larger than RB_MAX_SMALL_DATA + sizeof(event->array[0]). As a result, small events on architectures with RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT=true report a data length that is 4 bytes larger than expected. To fix it, add the RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT as a condition to subtract the size of that length field whenever RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT is true. This issue is observed in a riscv64 kernel with CONFIG_HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS set to y, when we run ftrace selftest trace_marker_raw.tc, we get the weird log: for cases where the id is 1..100, the number of data field is 8*N, but once id exceeds 100, the number of data field becomes 8*N+4: # 1 buf: 58 00 00 00 80 5e d1 63 (number of data field is 8*1) ... # a buf: 58 ... (number of data field is 8*2) ... # 64 buf: 58 ... (number of data field is 8*13) # 65 buf: 58 ... (number of data field is 8*13+4) After applying this change, the number of data field keeps being 8*N+4 consistently.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: use parsed transport offset in TCP state lookup TCP state handling reparses the skb to find the TCP header. For IPv6 it uses sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), while the surrounding IPVS code already parsed the packet with ip_vs_fill_iph_skb() and has the real transport-header offset in iph.len. This makes TCP state handling look at the wrong bytes when an IPv6 packet carries extension headers. Use the parsed transport offset passed down from ip_vs_set_state() when reading the TCP header. For IPv4 and for IPv6 packets without extension headers, the passed offset matches the previous value.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: dts: renesas: ironhide: Describe inline ECC carveouts The DBSC5 DRAM controller protects DRAM content using inline ECC. The inline ECC utilizes areas of DRAM for its operation, which are in the DRAM address range, but must not be accessed or modified. Describe the inline ECC carveout areas used by the DBSC5 controller on this hardware as reserved-memory, which must not be accessed. Include DRAM areas which are unprotected by ECC as well, those are parts of the DRAM which directly precede the ECC carveout. In case of high DRAM utilization, unless the inline ECC carveouts are properly reserved, Linux may use and corrupt the memory used by the DBSC5 DRAM controller for inline ECC, which would lead to the system becoming unstable.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: hda/tas2781: Cancel async firmware request at unbind TAS2781 HDA I2C and SPI queue RCA firmware loading from component bind with request_firmware_nowait(). The firmware loader keeps the callback module pinned and holds a device reference, but the callback still uses driver-private HDA state. Component unbind removes controls and DSP state immediately. Later device removal tears down the TAS2781 private data, including codec_lock. If the async firmware callback runs after unbind has started, it can operate on state that is being torn down. Cancel or synchronize the async firmware request before removing controls and DSP state. A queued callback is cancelled, and an already-running callback is allowed to finish before unbind continues.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: xilinx-trng - Remove crypto_rng interface Implementing the crypto_rng interface has no purpose, as it isn't used in practice. It's being removed from other drivers too. Just remove it. This leaves hwrng, which is actually used. Tagging with 'Cc stable' due to the bugs that this removes: - xtrng_trng_generate() sometimes returned success even when it didn't fill in all the bytes. - It was possible for xtrng_trng_generate() and xtrng_hwrng_trng_read() to run concurrently and interfere with each other, as the locking code in xtrng_hwrng_trng_read() was broken.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Validate CRIU-restored IDs before idr_alloc The KFD CRIU restore flow restores previously saved object IDs from userspace. For event restore: kfd_criu_restore_event() -> create_signal_event() / create_other_event() -> allocate_event_notification_slot() -> idr_alloc(..., *restore_id, *restore_id + 1, ...) For BO restore: criu_restore_memory_of_gpu() -> idr_alloc(..., bo_priv->idr_handle, ...) In both cases, the restored ID comes from userspace-provided CRIU data. idr_alloc() expects the ID range values to fit within signed int limits. If a restored ID is larger than INT_MAX, it can trigger a WARN in the IDR layer. A kernel WARN is undesirable because it prints a warning trace and may cause a panic or reboot on systems with panic_on_warn enabled. Smatch reported these paths as allowing unchecked userspace values to reach idr_alloc(). Add INT_MAX validation before using restored IDs in: - kfd_criu_restore_event() - criu_restore_memory_of_gpu() If the restored ID is invalid, return -EINVAL. This prevents invalid restore data from reaching the IDR layer and avoids WARN-triggering paths, while keeping valid restore behavior unchanged.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: Allocate iomap inline_data using alloc_page This fixes a BUG reported in iomap_write_end_inline: iomap_inline_data_valid checks that the inline_data fits within a page. If the inline_data is allocated with kmemdup there's no guarantee that it's page-aligned, so the check sometimes fails. Allocate it with alloc_page to ensure it's page-aligned.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: alpha/PCI: Add security_locked_down() check to pci_mmap_resource() Currently, Alpha's pci_mmap_resource() does not check security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS) before allowing userspace to mmap PCI BARs. The generic version has had this check since commit eb627e17727e ("PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down") to prevent DMA attacks when the kernel is locked down. Add the same check to Alpha's pci_mmap_resource().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: avoid busy looping in tipc_exit_net() Blamed commit introduced a busy-wait loop in tipc_exit_net() to wait for pending UDP bearer cleanup works to complete: while (atomic_read(&tn->wq_count)) cond_resched(); This loop can busy-wait for a long time if cond_resched() is a NOP. This typically happens if the netns exit is executed by a high priority task, or under kernels configured without preemption (CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE). In such cases, it wastes CPU cycles and can lead to soft lockups. Fix this by replacing the busy loop with wait_var_event(), allowing the thread to sleep properly until the work queue count reaches zero. Accordingly, update cleanup_bearer() to use atomic_dec_and_test() and wake_up_var() to wake up the waiter when the count drops to zero. This uses the global wait queue hash table, avoiding the need to bloat struct tipc_net with a wait_queue_head_t. The atomic_dec_and_test() provides the necessary memory barrier to ensure the wakeup is not missed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Add missing access_ok call to copy_user_syms As reported by sashiko we use __get_user without prior access_ok call on the user space pointer. Adding the missing call for the whole pointer array. Plus removing the err check in the error path, because it's not needed and also we can return -ENOMEM directly from the first kvmalloc_array fail path. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260611115503.AC16D1F00893@smtp.kernel.org/
Credential leakage via improper logging affects IBM App Connect Enterprise 12.x-13.x and IBM Integration Bus for z/OS 10.1.x, allowing a local attacker to recover plaintext credentials from application log files without requiring elevated privileges. The root cause is CWE-532, where sensitive authentication material is written to diagnostic or operational logs during normal product operation. No public exploit code or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis; IBM has released a patch via their support advisory.
IBM i versions 7.3 through 7.6 expose encryption key material to high-privileged local users due to hardcoded cryptographic constants used in the key-obfuscation layer. An attacker with elevated local privileges can leverage knowledge of these constants to reverse the obfuscation and recover plaintext encryption keys, gaining access to data that was assumed to be cryptographically protected. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, and IBM has released a patch via its support portal.
Cleartext credential exposure in IBM App Connect Enterprise 12.x and 13.x and IBM Integration Bus for z/OS 10.x allows a local attacker to harvest service credentials directly from trace log files. The middleware writes authentication material in unencrypted form during trace operations, violating the principle of minimal data exposure in diagnostic output (CWE-532). No public exploit has been identified and exploitation requires local filesystem access under high-complexity conditions, but successful compromise yields full credential disclosure with a CVSS confidentiality impact of High.
Sensitive process information disclosure in IBM i's PASE subsystem allows authenticated network users to access details about processes they lack permission to view. Affected versions span IBM i 7.3 through 7.6, covering a wide range of currently-supported releases. The vulnerability is limited to confidentiality impact; no integrity or availability degradation results. No public exploit code or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis.
IBM i versions 7.5 and 7.6 expose privileged file contents to locally authenticated users operating over SSH, allowing a low-privilege account to read information that should be restricted by the operating system's privilege model. The vulnerability is rooted in CWE-267 (Privilege Defined With Unsafe Actions), meaning the IBM i SSH subsystem permits file access operations that violate the intended privilege boundary for the relevant file. No public exploit code has been identified and the vendor-assigned CVSS score of 3.3 (Low) reflects the constrained local access requirement and limited confidentiality impact.
Local information disclosure in IBM Db2 Mirror for i 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 stems from a predictable Unix domain socket path placed in a world-writable directory, enabling a TOCTOU race condition (CWE-367). A local, low-privileged attacker can pre-create or replace the socket at the predictable path before the Db2 Mirror service claims it, intercepting communications that flow through that socket and obtaining sensitive information. No active exploitation has been confirmed, and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Fix responder UAF on IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC modify_qp rxe_qp_from_attr() handles IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC outside the IB_QP_STATE path, so it holds no state_lock and runs while the responder task rxe_receiver() (recv_task on rxe_wq) is live. A modify_qp() setting only that attribute calls free_rd_atomic_resources() then alloc_rd_atomic_resources(), swapping qp->resp.resources[] while rxe_prepare_res()/find_resource() walk it; free_rd_atomic_resources() also leaves the cached pointer qp->resp.res dangling. A local unprivileged user can race the free/realloc into a use-after-free in rxe_receiver() (local DoS). Drain recv_task around the swap with rxe_disable_task()/rxe_enable_task(), as rxe_qp_reset() already does when tearing this array down, re-enabling only after alloc_rd_atomic_resources() succeeds so the responder never resumes against a NULL qp->resp.resources on the ENOMEM path. Also clear qp->resp.res in free_rd_atomic_resources(), like the rxe_resp.c completion paths. Reproduced under KASAN; the slab-use-after-free in rxe_receiver() is gone.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme-tcp: fix usage of page_frag_cache nvme uses page_frag_cache to preallocate PDU for each preallocated request of block device. Block devices are created in parallel threads, consequently page_frag_cache is used in not thread-safe manner. That leads to incorrect refcounting of backstore pages and premature free. That can be catched by !sendpage_ok inside network stack: WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 467 at ../net/core/skbuff.c:6931 skb_splice_from_iter+0xfa/0x310. tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x782/0xce0 tcp_sendmsg+0x27/0x40 sock_sendmsg+0x8b/0xa0 nvme_tcp_try_send_cmd_pdu+0x149/0x2a0 Then random panic may occur. Fix that by serializing the usage of page_frag_cache.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: xhci: bail out of setup if the controller is inaccessible xhci_gen_setup() locates the operational registers using the capability length read from the very first register: xhci->op_regs = hcd->regs + HC_LENGTH(readl(&xhci->cap_regs->hc_capbase)); If the controller is dead or has dropped off the bus, that read returns ~0, HC_LENGTH() truncates it to 0xff, and op_regs ends up 0xff bytes past the page-aligned MMIO base, i.e. unaligned. The first access through it, xhci_halt() -> xhci_handshake() reading op_regs->status, is then an unaligned readl() on device memory. arm64 faults on unaligned device accesses, so instead of xhci_handshake() catching the all-ones value and returning -ENODEV, setup oopses: xhci-pci-renesas 0005:08:00.0: Unable to change power state from D3cold to D0, device inaccessible xhci-pci-renesas 0005:08:00.0: xHCI Host Controller xhci-pci-renesas 0005:08:00.0: new USB bus registered, assigned bus number 1 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80030a770103 ESR = 0x0000000096000021 FSC = 0x21: alignment fault Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000021 [#1] SMP pc : xhci_halt [xhci_hcd] Call trace: xhci_halt xhci_gen_setup xhci_pci_setup usb_add_hcd usb_hcd_pci_probe xhci_pci_common_probe xhci_pci_renesas_probe This was hit with a Renesas uPD720201 that failed to power up ("Unable to change power state from D3cold to D0, device inaccessible") yet still reached the HCD probe path. Read the capability register once, and if it reads back the all-ones value (as xhci_handshake() and xhci_reset() already test for), abort setup with -ENODEV before op_regs is derived from it. Reading it once also avoids re-reading a register that may change under a concurrent hot-removal.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: fix race between interrupt and resend After commit f8fce75fedf7 ("fuse: clear intr_entry in fuse_resend and fuse_remove_pending_req") the WARN_ON(!list_empty(&req->intr_entry)) in fuse_request_free() still triggers due to the following race: In request_wait_answer() if (test_bit(FR_SENT, &req->flags)) -> returns true In fuse_chan_resend() clear_bit(FR_SENT, &req->flags) In request_wait_answer() queue_interrupt(req) Fix by: - move clearing FR_SENT inside fpq->lock - move setting FR_PENDING inside fiq->lock - recheck FR_SENT after acquiring fiq->lock in fuse_dev_queue_interrupt()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: fix missing barrier when checking io-uring readiness fuse_block_alloc() reads fch->initialized and then fch->io_uring. fch->io_uring is set before fch->initialized, ordered by the smp_wmb() in fuse_chan_set_intialized(), but fuse_block_alloc() has no matching read barrier between the two loads. This may lead a CPU to observe fch->initialized=1 but fch->io_uring=0, and skip the check that blocks request allocation until the io-uring queues are ready. This can reintroduce the lock-order inversion deadlock that commit 3393ff964e0f prevents. Add an smp_rmb() barrier to pair with the smp_wmb() in fuse_chan_set_initialized() to prevent this.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: publish io-uring queues with release semantics fuse_uring_create_queue() initializes a fuse_ring_queue and then publishes the pointer into ring->queues[qid] with WRITE_ONCE() under the fch->lock. There are several readers that may concurrently be fetching that pointer locklessly and then deferencing it. WRITE_ONCE() doesn't ensure ordering of the queue's field initialization before the ring->queues[qid] pointer assignment. The queue must be published with smp_store_release() so the field initialization is guaranteed to happen before. Readers in paths where the read may happen concurrently with the store need to use READ_ONCE() because any race involving a plain access is undefined.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: wait for FR_FINISHED on abort_on_kill to prevent use-after-free The abort_on_kill path in request_wait_answer() calls fuse_abort_conn() and returns without waiting for FR_FINISHED. If fuse_dev_do_write() is concurrently processing the same request (FR_LOCKED set), the caller frees req->args while it is still being accessed, causing a use-after-free. Fix this by jumping to the existing wait_event(FR_FINISHED) instead of returning early. The wait will not hang because fuse_abort_conn() ensures all requests are ended.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on setattr writeback failure fuse_do_setattr() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate (fault_blocked = true) and releases it at the out:/error: labels. But when a writeback flush is also needed, a write_inode_now() failure returns directly and leaks the lock, so any later fault or truncate on the file stalls on the stale rwsem. For example, truncate(2) on a setuid file reaches fuse_do_setattr() with both ATTR_SIZE and ATTR_MODE set: truncate(2) └─ do_truncate() ├─ dentry_needs_remove_privs() # S_ISUID └─ notify_change() # KILL_SUID -> ATTR_MODE └─ fuse_setattr() # no killpriv: │ # ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE └─ fuse_do_setattr() ├─ filemap_invalidate_lock() # IS_DAX && is_truncate └─ write_inode_now() # is_wb && ATTR_MODE └─ if (err) # e.g. daemon -> -EIO return err # <- lock leaked Fix this by adding an unlock label that releases the lock before returning the error, and use it for the fuse_dax_break_layouts() failure path as well.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on open O_TRUNC DAX failure fuse_open() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate (dax_truncate = true) and releases it before the out_inode_unlock label. But when fuse_dax_break_layouts() fails, the goto out_inode_unlock skips the unlock and leaks the rwsem, so any later fault or truncate on the file stalls on the stale lock. fuse_dax_break_layouts() can fail with -ERESTARTSYS when a signal interrupts the wait for busy DAX pages to drain: open("file", O_RDWR | O_TRUNC) └─ fuse_open() ├─ filemap_invalidate_lock() # dax_truncate └─ fuse_dax_break_layouts() └─ dax_break_layout() └─ wait_page_idle() # TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE └─ fuse_wait_dax_page() # unlock, schedule, re-lock └─ signal → -ERESTARTSYS goto out_inode_unlock # <- lock leaked Fix this by moving filemap_invalidate_unlock() below the label so that all error paths release the lock, and rename the label to out_unlock as it now covers more than just the inode lock.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_tcm: keep port count until LUN teardown completes tcm_usbg_drop_nexus() permits session removal once tpg_port_count reaches zero. However, usbg_port_unlink() currently decrements that count from the fabric_pre_unlink() callback, before core_dev_del_lun() waits for active se_lun references to drain. If removal of the last LUN races a nexus removal, the latter can observe a zero port count and call target_remove_session(). This frees sess_cmd_map while an in-flight struct usbg_cmd, including its work item, can still be accessed. Overlapping the last-LUN unlink with nexus removal reproduces this lifetime violation as a DEBUG_OBJECTS "free active" warning for usbg_cmd_work, followed by a target-core BUG/Oops. The generic target-core unlink path has no callback after core_dev_del_lun() completes. Add an optional fabric_post_unlink() callback and use it for the f_tcm port count. The count now remains nonzero until core_dev_del_lun() has finished draining active LUN references, preventing nexus removal from freeing the session during command completion.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gtp: serialize PDP context updates PDP contexts can be deleted through GTP_CMD_DELPDP or while the GTP network device is being unregistered. The latter is serialized by RTNL, but the generic-netlink delete path only holds RCU. Running both paths concurrently can therefore make both paths delete the same PDP context. The issue was found through static analysis and reproduced on a KASAN-enabled kernel by a simple two-thread program racing GTP_CMD_DELPDP against RTM_DELLINK: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000120-0xdead000000000127] RIP: gtp_genl_del_pdp+0x1c1/0x420 [gtp] RBP: dead000000000122 The second deletion dereferenced the poisoned hlist pprev pointer. Serialize gtp_pdp_add(), gtp_genl_del_pdp(), and gtp_dellink() with a shared mutex. Keep the mutex held until the final use of a PDP context in the NEWPDP path, and keep the RCU read-side section around the complete PDP context use in the DELPDP path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of current_key on reconnect to another peer tcp_inbound_ao_hash() is called before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken, with only rcu_read_lock() held. On the fast path for established sockets, if the rnext_keyid sent by the peer differs from current_key->sndid, the key the peer asked for is looked up and stored in current_key. The lookup is inside the RCU read side, but current_key outlives it. When the socket is disconnected and connect() is called again for another peer, tcp_ao_connect_init() unlinks every key that does not match the new peer and frees it with call_rcu(). If current_key points at such a key, it is cleared to NULL. The fast path reads sk_state only once on entry, so a softirq that got into it while the socket was still established can update current_key after that loop has already run. The update is inside the RCU read side, so it comes before the call_rcu() callback, and once the callback frees the key, current_key is left pointing at freed memory. The next transmission picks that pointer up in tcp_get_current_key(). tcp_ao_transmit_skb() then reads the traffic key from the freed object, which is the use-after-free. Wait for one grace period before unlinking, and only if a key is going to be removed. By the time tcp_connect() runs the socket is already in TCP_SYN_SENT, and TCP_AO_ESTABLISHED does not contain TCPF_SYN_SENT, so a softirq entering after the wait cannot reach the fast path, and the ones already in it have finished. The existing NULL handling in the loop is then enough.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close ZDI reported and analyzed a race condition during close for espintcp sockets: espintcp_close() frees emsg->skb via kfree_skb() without holding any socket lock. Concurrently, the xfrm_trans_reinject work queue invokes esp_output_tcp_finish() -> espintcp_push_skb() -> espintcp_push_msgs() -> skb_send_sock_locked(), which reads the same skb as a data source. Fix this by adding a synchronize_rcu() call after resetting sk_prot, since esp_output_tcp_finish() runs under RCU and won't use a socket with sk_prot == &tcp_prot. Simply taking the socket lock in espintcp_close() could lead to leaks, if esp_output_tcp_finish() re-adds an skb in the slot we just freed. After this, the existing barrier() is no longer needed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: clamp route advmss to TCP_MIN_MSS tcp_select_initial_window() assumes that callers never pass an MSS smaller than 1, but route-derived advmss values can violate that assumption. A too-small explicit RTAX_ADVMSS is one way to get there, but it is not the only one. The same divide-by-zero can also be reached through the "default advmss" path when RTAX_ADVMSS is left at 0 and the effective advmss is later driven down by route MTU and min_adv_mss. Introduce a tcp_dst_advmss() helper that clamps route advmss to TCP_MIN_MSS before TCP consumes it, and use it in the TCP paths that derive advmss from dst metrics. This keeps the effective MSS from dropping to zero before tcp_select_initial_window() rounds the receive window.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device ESP-in-TCP receives records through the TCP strparser. handle_esp() restores skb->dev from the saved skb_iif before passing the packet into the XFRM input path. Queued TCP data can be processed after the original ingress device has been removed, for example during veth or net namespace teardown. In that case dev_get_by_index_rcu() returns NULL. The XFRM IPv4 and IPv6 input paths both expect skb->dev to be valid while building the route lookup, so queued ESP-in-TCP data can dereference a NULL device. Drop the packet if the saved ingress device can no longer be resolved. Such a packet can no longer be routed through the normal XFRM receive path, and this preserves the existing behaviour for packets whose ingress device still exists.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work nat_keepalive_work() walks the state table while xfrm_state_walk() holds net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock. Its callback then acquires x->lock, which conflicts with the delete path taking the same locks in reverse order via xfrm_state_delete() and __xfrm_state_delete(). This creates an AB-BA deadlock that is reported by lockdep when a NAT keepalive worker races with SA deletion. Fix this by splitting the keepalive walk into two phases. First, collect the candidate states while the walk holds xfrm_state_lock and take a reference on each state. Then, after the walk completes, process each collected state and acquire x->lock without nesting it under xfrm_state_lock.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x->aalg while leaving x->props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes). xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x->props.aalgo as "no auth algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites x->aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown only frees the replacement pointer. Check whether x->aalg is already attached instead of inferring that state from x->props.aalgo.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: mcast: fix use-after-free of a master VLAN's multicast context br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan() clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under br->multicast_lock before stopping a VLAN's multicast context. That is the teardown handshake: lockless readers gate on the flag through br_multicast_ctx_should_use() -> br_multicast_ctx_vlan_disabled(), so once it is cleared under the lock no reader can arm the context again. For a master VLAN the handshake never runs. __vlan_del() clears BRIDGE_VLAN_INFO_BRENTRY before calling br_vlan_put_master(), so br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan(masterv, false) returns early on !br_vlan_is_brentry(vlan): the flag stays set and br->multicast_lock is never taken. br_vlan_put_master() then drains the context in br_multicast_ctx_deinit() and frees the VLAN through call_rcu(), while a reader still inside rcu_read_lock() sees the context as enabled and re-arms it. The port and port-VLAN branch of the function has no br_vlan_is_brentry() test and flips the flag under br->multicast_lock, so it is not affected. The reader is the bridge transmit path. For a master VLAN br_multicast_rcv() selects brmctx = &vlan->br_mcast_ctx with pmctx = NULL, so IGMP sent to the bridge device re-arms the context's timers after br_multicast_ctx_deinit() has already stopped them. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in detach_if_pending+0x412/0x4a0 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88810ac39918 by task brmc/601 __mod_timer+0x51a/0xc50 br_multicast_host_join+0x25b/0x390 __br_multicast_add_group+0x468/0x530 br_ip4_multicast_add_group+0x1a0/0x260 br_multicast_rcv+0x2cda/0x61e0 br_dev_xmit+0x6c4/0x1540 Allocated by task 610: br_vlan_add+0x111/0xb40 br_vlan_info+0x370/0x3e0 Freed by task 0: kfree+0x1a7/0x4f0 rcu_core+0x7dc/0x10a0 Only test br_vlan_is_brentry() when enabling, like the br_multicast_ctx_vlan_global_disabled() test next to it. Disabling then always clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under br->multicast_lock before br_multicast_ctx_deinit() drains the context.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: reject unrepresentable multicast TVLV offsets The network and transport header fields in struct sk_buff are 16-bit offsets from skb->head, and U16_MAX is reserved as the unset transport header value. batadv_tvlv_call_handler() sets both fields from a received multicast TVLV without checking whether the TVLV end is representable. If the end offset exceeds the field's range, skb_set_transport_header() truncates it so that the transport header precedes the network header. The negative difference is then returned by skb_network_header_len() as a large u32. batadv_mcast_forw_packet() consequently accepts an oversized multicast tracker and accesses memory beyond the skb data. Add skb_set_transport_header_careful(), an offset-aware counterpart to skb_reset_transport_header_careful(), which validates the final head-relative offset before assigning it. Use the new helper in batadv_tvlv_call_handler() and reject unrepresentable TVLVs before setting the network header.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: keep the last remote linked during FDB flush A non-nexthop FDB entry is expected to have at least one remote while it remains reachable through the FDB hash table. A filtered bulk flush violates this invariant when every remote matches: It unlinks the last remote in vxlan_fdb_dst_destroy() and only afterwards tells vxlan_flush() to destroy the parent FDB entry. An RCU reader can find the parent during this interval. first_remote_rcu() then applies list_entry_rcu() to the empty list head, producing an invalid remote pointer that the receive learning path can read from and write to. When a matching remote is the sole remaining remote, leave it linked and ask the caller to destroy the entire FDB entry. vxlan_fdb_destroy() keeps the remote attached while sending the deletion notification and removing the parent from the lookup structures.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: don't queue packet path object notifications All file:line references below are against v7.2-rc4 (ac5b0e5651b1). The trace was captured on 7.2.0-rc6-kasan72rc6 (075b74841bd0), where the same lines apply. nft_obj_notify() is exported and reached from the packet path. Its only in-tree caller is nft_quota_obj_eval() (net/netfilter/nft_quota.c:68), which notifies with GFP_ATOMIC while evaluating a rule for a transiting packet, holding no mutex. Since commit 67cc570edaa0 ("netfilter: nf_tables: coalesce multiple notifications into one skbuff") that notification is no longer sent immediately. __nft_obj_notify() queues it onto nft_net->notify_list via nft_notify_enqueue() (net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1211), which is a bare list_add_tail(). notify_list has no lock of its own (include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h:1951), it is serialised by commit_mutex: the six other enqueue sites all run inside a netlink transaction, and the drain in nft_commit_notify() (net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:10746) does list_del() + kfree_skb() from nf_tables_commit() with commit_mutex held. Sending packets through a chain that references a depleted quota object therefore races an unlocked list_add_tail() against list_del() + kfree_skb() on another CPU. The WRITE_ONCE(prev->next, new) in __list_add() then stores through an sk_buff that has already been freed: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __nft_obj_notify+0x2c5/0x2d0 Write of size 8 at addr ff110001047183c0 by task poc/76 CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 76 Comm: poc Tainted: G W 7.2.0-rc6-kasan72rc6 #4 Call Trace: <IRQ> __nft_obj_notify (include/linux/list.h:164 include/linux/list.h:191 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1211 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:8743) nft_quota_obj_eval (net/netfilter/nft_quota.c:68) nft_do_chain_inet nf_hook_slow __ip_local_out ip_push_pending_frames udp_send_skb udp_sendmsg __x64_sys_sendto Allocated by task 77: __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:704) __nft_obj_notify (include/net/netlink.h:1055 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:8731) nft_quota_obj_eval (net/netfilter/nft_quota.c:68) nft_do_chain Freed by task 79: nf_tables_commit (include/linux/skbuff.h:1332 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:10759 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:11185) nfnetlink_rcv_batch (net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:574) netlink_unicast netlink_sendmsg The buggy address belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232 Queueing from the packet path is wrong even leaving the race aside: notify_list is only drained by nft_commit_notify() from nf_tables_commit() (:11185), so a notification enqueued outside a transaction is not sent until some later netlink batch commits, if one ever does. The gfp argument that nft_obj_notify() still takes is a leftover of the pre-67cc570edaa0 behaviour, where this path called nfnetlink_send() directly. Restore that: split the message construction out into nft_obj_notify_alloc() and let each caller decide what to do with the skb. nft_obj_notify(), the exported one reached from the packet path, sends it straight away; nf_tables_obj_notify(), which runs under commit_mutex, keeps queueing it, so transaction notifications are still coalesced.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qcom-rng - Remove crypto_rng interface qcom-rng.c exposes the same hardware through two completely separate interfaces, crypto_rng and hwrng. However, the implementation of this is buggy because it permits generation operations from these interfaces to run concurrently with each other, accessing the same registers. That is, qcom_rng_generate() synchronizes with itself but not with qcom_hwrng_read(). This results in potential repetition of output from the RNG, output of non-random values, etc. Fortunately, there's actually no point in hardware RNG drivers implementing the crypto_rng interface. It's not actually used by anything besides the "rng" algorithm type of AF_ALG, which in turn is not actually used in practice. Other crypto_rng hardware drivers are likewise being phased out, leaving just the hwrng support. Thus, remove it to simplify the code and avoid conflict (and confusion) with the hwrng interface which is the one that actually matters.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: sun8i-ce - Remove crypto_rng interface Since the crypto_rng interface for hardware PRNGs is unused and is redundant with hwrng and the actual Linux RNG, it's being phased out. Most drivers for it were already removed. Go ahead and remove the sun8i-ce support which is one of the only remaining ones. Note that the sun8i-ce support for hwrng remains in place. That is the interface that actually matters. As usual for crypto_rng, this driver was also buggy: its ->generate() function had a use-after-free vulnerability due to using wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() without handling shutting down the DMA operation if a signal is sent. There's no point in fixing this separately only to remove the code anyway, so this commit is marked with Fixes and Cc stable.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: sun8i-ss - Remove crypto_rng interface Since the crypto_rng interface for hardware PRNGs is unused and is redundant with hwrng and the actual Linux RNG, it's being phased out. Most drivers for it were already removed. Go ahead and remove the sun8i-ss support which is one of the only remaining ones. As usual for crypto_rng, this driver was also buggy: its ->generate() function had a use-after-free vulnerability due to using wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() without handling shutting down the DMA operation if a signal is sent. Also, it had a buffer overread bug in the line 'memcpy(ctx->seed, d + dlen, ctx->slen);'. There's no point in fixing these bugs separately only to remove the code anyway, so this commit is marked with Fixes and Cc stable.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation The AAD buffer allocated in qce_aead_ccm_prepare_buf_assoclen() can be smaller than the length later programmed into the DMA scatterlist. The allocation size is currently calculated as: ALIGN(assoclen, 16) + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN while the DMA length is set to: ALIGN(assoclen + adata_header_len, 16) Since ALIGN() does not distribute over addition, the allocation can be smaller than the DMA length. For example, when assoclen = 32 and adata_header_len = 2: allocation = ALIGN(32, 16) + 6 = 38 DMA length = ALIGN(32 + 2, 16) = 48 As a result, the QCE hardware can read beyond the allocated buffer while computing the CBC-MAC over the associated data. The extra bytes are folded into the authentication tag, resulting in an incorrect tag and causing CCM self-test failures such as: alg: aead: ccm-aes-qce encryption test failed (wrong result) on test vector 8 Fix the allocation by adding the maximum possible AAD header length before alignment: ALIGN(assoclen + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN, 16) This guarantees that the allocated buffer is large enough for the fully padded AAD data for all supported header sizes.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: mxs-dcp - fix source scatterlist length access mxs_dcp_aes_block_crypt() uses sg_dma_len() without mapping the source scatterlist with dma_map_sg() first. Therefore, sg_dma_len() is invalid and could return zero or a stale DMA length, causing encryption and decryption to process the wrong number of bytes when CONFIG_NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH=y. Use the original scatterlist length instead.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: core: Add lock to usb_wakeup_notification() Add a spin lock to usb_wakeup notification to prevent a race condition with dereferencing freed memory. This could be hit by the xHCI driver as it calls this function from an IRQ and could race with the hub_disconnect() function, which properly grabs this lock to protect the state of the device.
Unauthenticated remote download of a raw SQL database backup in code-projects Hotel and Tourism Reservation in PHP 1.0 exposes the full application database to any internet-connected attacker. The file /ht/hotel_db%20(1).sql is placed inside the web root without access restrictions, making it directly retrievable over HTTP with no credentials. A publicly available proof-of-concept exploit exists; the database dump likely contains guest PII, booking records, and potentially hashed or plaintext admin credentials.
Shortcode injection in the Redirection for Contact Form 7 WordPress plugin (versions 2.2.7 through 3.2.10) enables unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary registered WordPress shortcodes server-side and capture their output. The plugin substitutes raw form submission values into its action settings and then evaluates those settings through WordPress's do_shortcode() pipeline without sanitizing or stripping user-supplied shortcode syntax first. A public proof-of-concept is available via WPScan; vendor-released patch version 3.2.11 addresses the issue.
Unauthenticated remote access to an exposed SQL database backup file in code-projects Daily Expense Manager 1.0 allows any network attacker to retrieve sensitive application data. The file `/Daily-Expense-Manager/exp_ak.sql` - a raw database dump - is served directly from the web root without access control, disclosing potentially credentials, user records, and expense data. No public exploitation via CISA KEV, but a public exploit writeup is available on GitHub confirming the exposure path.
SSH authentication bypass in MikroTik RouterOS allows any unauthenticated network attacker to skip the entire SSH user-authentication phase by triggering a client-requested rekey, causing the server to advance directly into the connection protocol and accept session channel and exec requests. The result is unauthenticated file creation, overwrite, and exfiltration within the RouterOS managed file namespace - including support bundles containing configuration and diagnostic data. Publicly available exploit code exists, CERT-PL has published dedicated research, and a companion CERT-PL post titled 'vulnerabilities-in-mikrotik-routeros-actively-exploited' suggests observed exploitation in the wild, though CISA KEV listing is not confirmed in the available data.
Unauthenticated remote access to restricted internal APIs is possible in N-able N-central due to an incomplete access control filter, classified under CWE-791. All N-central deployments prior to versions 2026.3 HF3 and 2026.4 are affected, as confirmed by the vendor advisory. Impact is limited to partial information disclosure (CVSS 4.0 VC:L) with no integrity or availability effects reported; no public exploit code or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis.
Remote memory disclosure in libpcap's rpcap client allows a malicious or compromised rpcap server to cause a connected client to read up to 20 bytes beyond the end of its receive buffer and treat that data as captured packet content. All libpcap versions with rpcap support are affected per CPE cpe:2.3:a:the_tcpdump_group:libpcap:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*. The root cause is an incorrect boundary check in pcap_read_nocb_remote(): the RPCAP_MSG_PACKET caplen field was validated against the full payload length rather than against the payload length minus the fixed-size RPCAP_MSG_PACKET header, creating a window of up to sizeof(struct rpcap_pkthdr) bytes that could be read beyond the buffer. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing is identified at time of analysis.
Out-of-bounds memory reads in libpcap's userland BPF interpreter allow a local attacker who can supply a crafted filter program to drive the interpreter's program counter past the end of the filter buffer, reading up to 32 GiB of surrounding process memory on 64-bit systems or the entire address space on 32-bit systems. All libpcap versions tracked under CPE cpe:2.3:a:the_tcpdump_group:libpcap are affected; The Tcpdump Group has published a fix via commit d3f358d3. No active exploitation has been confirmed and no public exploit exists; the vulnerability is restricted to uncommon application patterns that pass raw BPF bytecode directly to the interpreter without prior validation.
SiYuan's `getAttributeViewKeysByID` endpoint, present in all versions before v3.8.2, allows authenticated publish readers to retrieve full key schemas-including sensitive field names and relation definitions-from private or hidden databases they have no visibility into. The flaw is an authorization bypass (CWE-639/IDOR) where the endpoint validates that a caller holds a publish-reader session but never verifies the caller's access rights against the parent database owning the requested attribute view. No public exploit code and no CISA KEV listing have been identified at time of analysis, keeping real-world risk moderate despite the network-accessible attack vector.
Information disclosure in the EmbedPress WordPress plugin (versions 4.6.0 through 4.6.3) allows any authenticated contributor-level user or above to retrieve the site administrator's email address via an improperly restricted Google Reviews REST API endpoint. WordPress core deliberately withholds administrator email from the contributor role as a privacy control; this plugin bypass defeats that restriction without requiring administrative privileges. A publicly available proof-of-concept has been published by WPScan, though EPSS at 0.14% and SSVC exploitation status of 'none' indicate no observed active exploitation at time of analysis.
The Events Calendar WordPress plugin before 6.17.3.1 exposes unpublished site content - drafts, pending posts, and private records from all users - through its public REST API archive endpoints to any contributor-level authenticated user. The plugin fails to enforce WordPress's standard post-status visibility controls on its custom REST routes, allowing a low-privilege account holder to enumerate and read the full body of every non-public record site-wide, bypassing intended access controls. A public proof-of-concept is documented via WPScan, and a vendor patch (6.17.3.1) is available.
Unauthenticated information disclosure in the My Private Site WordPress plugin (all versions before 4.2.3) exposes post content, post URLs, and comments to anonymous visitors, directly defeating the plugin's stated purpose of enforcing mandatory login across a WordPress site. The plugin fails to apply its privacy gate to certain front-end read surfaces, meaning requests to those endpoints bypass the authentication requirement entirely. A publicly available proof-of-concept exists; the vendor has released a corrective patch in version 4.2.3.
Unauthenticated information disclosure in the Smart Post WordPress plugin (versions prior to 4.0.8) exposes both the content of password-protected posts and the passwords themselves via an unprotected AJAX endpoint. Any unauthenticated remote user can query the endpoint to bypass WordPress's native post-password protection mechanism entirely, retrieving guarded content without knowing the password - and also harvesting the password itself for reuse. A public exploit is documented by WPScan; a vendor patch (4.0.8) has been released.
Flatpak's `org.freedesktop.Flatpak.SystemHelper` D-Bus service contains a TOCTOU race condition in the `Deploy()` function where a privileged `chmod` executes before OSTree repository validation completes, allowing a local low-privileged attacker to redirect symlinks to arbitrary system files within that timing window. A successful exploit can yield high-confidentiality impact (reading privileged files) and limited integrity and availability impact (CVSS C:H/I:L/A:L), as the unguarded chmod can be inherited by attacker-controlled symlink targets. No public exploit code or CISA KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis, and the High attack complexity (AC:H) reflects the precision timing required to win the race.
Race condition in jofpin trape 2.0 allows remote unauthenticated attackers to manipulate telemetry data via the vId argument in core/user.py's Telemetry Endpoint, yielding low-impact confidentiality, integrity, and availability compromise. Exploitation is rated high complexity (AC:H) due to the timing requirements inherent in race condition attacks, and the CVSS 4.0 base score is 2.9. A public proof-of-concept exists as a GitHub issue report (#408); the project maintainer has not responded to the disclosure.
SolidInvoice's REST API authenticator, in all versions prior to 3.0.1, silently accepts long-lived bearer tokens via a `?token=` URL query parameter as a fallback to the intended `X-API-TOKEN` request header, causing credentials to be permanently recorded in server access logs, reverse-proxy logs, CDN access logs, browser history, and HTTP Referer headers forwarded to third-party origins. Any actor with read access to those artifacts - sysadmins, log-aggregation pipelines, analytics vendors receiving Referer data, or post-compromise intruders pivoting through log stores - can extract a valid API token and authenticate to the invoicing platform without exploiting any application logic. Version 3.0.1 fixes the issue by removing the query-parameter fallback and enforcing header-only delivery; no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux: require every boolean value to be defined p_bools.nprim comes from the policy image independently of how many booleans follow it, and cond_index_bool() fills bool_val_to_struct[] at value - 1, so a count larger than the values present leaves NULL entries. Every user of that array then walks it by index and dereferences each entry: cond_evaluate_expr() on the access-vector path, security_get_bools() and security_get_bool_value() behind selinuxfs, and security_set_bools(). A sparse class value is absorbed by policydb_class_isvalid() and its siblings; booleans have no such predicate, and no consumer that could use one. Reject a boolean value that no boolean defines, once, where the array is built. Conforming policies define every boolean they declare and are unaffected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux: reject an unclaimed class value in security_get_classes() security_get_classes() sizes an array by p_classes.nprim and fills it at value - 1, so a class value the policy never defines leaves a NULL. sel_make_classes() passes every entry to sel_make_dir(), reaching the same d_alloc_name() dereference as the permission array. The class symbol table is allowed to be sparse (policydb_class_isvalid() exists to absorb that), but this getter builds its own array straight from the hash table and has no such predicate. Fail the lookup when a value went unclaimed instead of handing out the NULL. Conforming policies define every class they declare and are unaffected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SOF: sof-audio: Fix error path in sof_widget_setup_unlocked() If either tplg_ops->dai_config or widget_kcontrol_setup fail during widget setup we would double decrement the use_count of the widget because the sof_widget_free_unlocked() would be called twice, similarly the core_put would be invoked twice as well. Since the use_count and core_put() is handled within the widget_free function we need to return without falling through the pipe_widget_free label. The fixes tag is picked to the last change around this part of the code which is adequately old enough for backporting purposes.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: codecs: lpass-wsa-macro: Fix enum kcontrol accesses EAR SPKR PA Gain" and the four "WSA RX* Mux" controls are enumerated, but their get and put callbacks access the value through ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] (a long) instead of ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] (an unsigned int). This same pattern was fixed in the sibling drivers by commit bcfe5f76cc40 ("ASoC: codecs: rx-macro: fix accessing array out of bounds for enum type") and commit 0ea5eff7c606 ("ASoC: codecs: va-macro: fix accessing array out of bounds for enum type"), but wsa-macro was missed. On 64-bit kernels with CONFIG_SND_CTL_DEBUG this trips the elem value sanity check and every read of these controls fails with -EINVAL.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Fix UVD dpb min size calculation for H264 This should use actual number of references from the decode message, instead of maximum derived from level. (cherry picked from commit 64b525edb7e7bdfcdc77883c5e413804e2396856)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: packet: fix wrong transport_header when sending VLAN-tagged frame In packet_parse_headers(), when processing a VLAN-tagged frame, skb_set_network_header() is called to advance network_header past the VLAN tag to the inner protocol header. skb_probe_transport_header() is then called with skb->protocol still set to the outer VLAN EtherType (e.g. ETH_P_8021Q), while nhoff (derived from skb_network_offset()) already points past the VLAN tag to the inner protocol header. In __skb_flow_dissect(), proto is initialized to ETH_P_8021Q and nhoff points past the VLAN tag. When the dissector hits case ETH_P_8021Q, it reads a struct vlan_hdr at nhoff via __skb_header_pointer(), but that offset contains the inner protocol header (e.g. an IP header). The bytes are misinterpreted as a VLAN header, yielding a garbage encapsulated EtherType that matches no known protocol. The dissector returns false, so skb_probe_transport_header() never calls skb_set_transport_header(), leaving transport_header at its uninitialized sentinel value (~0U). Move skb_probe_transport_header() to before skb_set_network_header(). At the time skb_probe_transport_header() is called, network_header still points to the VLAN header, so nhoff correctly points to the VLAN header. The flow dissector can then parse the VLAN header, extract the inner EtherType, and advance nhoff to the inner protocol header, allowing transport_header to be set correctly.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tap: fix wrong transport_header when sending VLAN-tagged frame In tap_get_user_xdp(), when processing a VLAN-tagged frame (e.g. ETH_P_8021Q), skb_set_network_header() is called first to advance network_header past the VLAN tag to the inner protocol header. skb_probe_transport_header() is then called with skb->protocol still set to ETH_P_8021Q, while nhoff (derived from skb_network_offset()) already points past the VLAN tag to the inner protocol header. In __skb_flow_dissect(), proto is initialized to ETH_P_8021Q and nhoff points past the VLAN tag. When the dissector hits case ETH_P_8021Q, it reads a struct vlan_hdr at the current nhoff via __skb_header_pointer(), but that offset contains the inner protocol header (e.g. an IP header). The bytes are misinterpreted as a VLAN header, yielding a garbage encapsulated EtherType that matches no known protocol. The dissector returns false, so skb_probe_transport_header() never calls skb_set_transport_header(), leaving transport_header at its uninitialized sentinel value (~0U). Move skb_set_network_header() to after skb_probe_transport_header(). At the time skb_probe_transport_header() is called, network_header still points to the VLAN header (offset ETH_HLEN), so nhoff is correct and the flow dissector can parse the VLAN header, extract the inner EtherType, and advance nhoff to the inner protocol header, allowing transport_header to be set correctly.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/tls: Fail tls_sw_splice_read() after a failed async decrypt When an async decrypt fails, tls_decrypt_done() records the error in ctx->async_wait.err and calls tls_err_abort(), which stores it in sk_err. tls_sw_recvmsg() and tls_sw_read_sock() each read async_wait.err once they hold the reader lock and fail the call: a record that did not authenticate breaks the connection. tls_sw_splice_read() has no such check, and sk_err does not stand in for one. tls_rx_rec_wait() tests sk_err only inside the loop it skips whenever a record is already parsed, and the first reader to reach sock_error() clears it, while async_wait.err persists. A splice therefore keeps delivering records on a connection that recvmsg() and read_sock() refuse to read. Read async_wait.err in tls_sw_splice_read() as the other two readers do.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/oa: Fix sync entry leak on OA config emit failure xe_oa_emit_oa_config() releases the sync entries and the syncs array only on its success path. When it fails before the point of no return (fence allocation, config buffer allocation or batch submission), it returns without touching stream->syncs. The stream open path handles such failures in the caller, but xe_oa_config_locked() propagates the error without any cleanup, so the syncs array and the fence references held by the parsed entries are leaked. The next config ioctl overwrites stream->syncs, making the memory unreachable for good. Clean up the parsed syncs when xe_oa_emit_oa_config() fails, matching the cleanup done by the stream open error path. (cherry picked from commit 8af97b3da2cfce04e6b457c6eb17ed3c1daf912b)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: sun6i-dma: Fix reclaim descriptors while terminating DMA When terminating DMA transfers, active descriptors are not properly reclaimed. Only cyclic descriptors were handled, leaving non-cyclic descriptors and their LLI chains to be permanently leaked. Fix by using vchan_terminate_vdesc() which handles both cyclic and non-cyclic descriptors by adding them to desc_terminated queue for proper cleanup. Add pchan->desc != pchan->done check to prevent double-adding completed descriptors, which would corrupt the list.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: fix the checksum validations ip_vs_in_icmp_v6() is missing checksum validation for ICMPv6 packets from clients. In fact, as for TCP/UDP we should validate the checksum for ICMP packets only when we mangle the packets on MASQ or on reply for tunnel. Also, Sashiko points out that handle_response_icmp() being common for IPv4 and IPv6 is missing the pseudo-header calculation while validating ICMPv6 messages from real servers which is a problem if checksum is not validated by the hardware. Fix the problems by creating ip_vs_checksum_common_check() helper and use it for TCP/UDP/ICMP both for IPv4 and IPv6. Rely on the nf_checksum() for validating the ICMP messages but use it also for TCP and UDP. Use correct IP offset for IP_VS_DBG_RL_PKT for TCP/UDP/SCTP. IPVS packets (TCP/UDP/SCTP/ICMP) do not need checksum validation on LOCAL_OUT (local clients or local real servers) and on FORWARD (traffic from servers on LAN). Do it only on LOCAL_IN, in case nf_checksum() is not called on PRE_ROUTING. Also, ip_vs_checksum_complete() can be marked static.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: SDCA: Make UMP message size check more robust If message offset was larger than the buffer length the size check will pass incorrectly. Refactor the check such that it is more robust to invalid sizes.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: remove fscache backend entirely EROFS over fscache was introduced to provide image lazy pulling functionality. After the feature landed, the fscache subsystem made netfs a new hard dependency, which is unexpected for a local filesystem and has an kernel-defined caching hierarchy which could be inflexible compared to the fanotify pre-content hooks. Therefore, this feature has been deprecated for almost two years. As EROFS file-backed mounts and fanotify pre-content hooks both upstream for a while and already providing equivalent functionality (erofs-utils has supported fanotify pre-content hooks), let's remove the fscache backend now. The main application of this feature is Nydus [1], and they plan to move to use fanotify pre-content hooks in the near future too. I hope this patch can be merged into Linux 7.2, which is also motivated by newly found implementation issues [2][3] that are not worth investigating given the deprecation and limited development resources. The associated fscache/cachefiles cleanup patch will follow separately through the vfs tree (netfs) later: it seems fine since the codebase is isolated by CONFIG_CACHEFILES_ONDEMAND. [1] https://github.com/dragonflyoss/nydus/blob/v2.1.0/docs/nydus-fscache.md [2] https://github.com/dragonflyoss/nydus/pull/1824 [3] https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260619135800.1594811-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: clear PG_private_2 on copy-to-cache append failure netfs_pgpriv2_copy_to_cache() marks the folio with PG_private_2 before netfs_pgpriv2_copy_folio() appends it to the copy-to-cache rolling buffer. If the append fails, the folio is not queued for cache writeback, so the PG_private_2 state and its reference must be released immediately.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: release readahead folios on iterator preparation failure netfs_prepare_read_iterator() batches readahead folios in put_batch so that the folio references can be dropped after the I/O iterator has been prepared. If rolling_buffer_load_from_ra() fails after earlier folios have been batched, the function returns immediately and leaves those references held. Release the batch before returning the error.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mshv: Fix race in mshv_irqfd_deassign mshv_irqfd_deactivate() and the hlist traversal of pt_irqfds_list require pt->pt_irqfds_lock to be held, but mshv_irqfd_deassign() omits it. This races with the EPOLLHUP path in mshv_irqfd_wakeup(), which does take the lock before calling mshv_irqfd_deactivate(). Additionally, mshv_irqfd_deactivate() uses hlist_del() which poisons the node pointers rather than resetting them. Since mshv_irqfd_is_active() relies on hlist_unhashed() (checks pprev == NULL), a poisoned node still appears active. If a concurrent path calls mshv_irqfd_deactivate() again on the same irqfd, the guard fails to prevent a double hlist_del() on poisoned pointers. Fix both issues: - Add the missing spin_lock_irq/spin_unlock_irq around the list traversal in mshv_irqfd_deassign(), matching mshv_irqfd_release(). - Use hlist_del_init() instead of hlist_del() so the node is properly marked as unhashed after removal, making the is_active guard reliable.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommufd: Fix wrong hwpt passed to iommufd_auto_response_faults on replace iommufd_hwpt_replace_device() calls: iommufd_auto_response_faults(hwpt, old_handle); passing the *new* hwpt together with the handle of the device's *old* domain. This should be a parameter mismatch: 1. Semantically, iommufd_auto_response_faults(x, handle) scans x->fault's deliver list and response xarray for groups matching "handle". A group is queued under the hwpt that was attached at fault-delivery time. old_handle is fetched *before* the domain switch, so its group lives on old->fault, not on the new hwpt->fault. 2. Historically, the first argument was "old". The routine was introduced by commit b7d8833677ba ("iommufd: Fault-capable hwpt attach/detach/replace") as __fault_domain_replace_dev() in fault.c, correctly calling iommufd_auto_response_faults(old, curr). Commit fb21b1568ada ("iommufd: Make attach_handle generic than fault specific") moved this into iommufd_hwpt_replace_device() in device.c and swapped it to "hwpt". This should be a refactor regression, not an intentional change. Fix this by passing "old" instead.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/hugetlb: fix swap entry corruption when clearing uffd-wp at fork() copy_hugetlb_page_range() clears the uffd-wp bit of migration and hwpoison entries with huge_pte_clear_uffd_wp(), which operates on the present-PTE bit position. Swap entries keep the uffd-wp state elsewhere -- the migration branch reads and sets it with pte_swp_uffd_wp() and pte_swp_mkuffd_wp() -- and the present-PTE position falls into the swap payload. On x86-64 it lands in the inverted swap offset, where a naturally-aligned hugetlb PFN always has the affected bit set, so the clear advances the encoded PFN by two pages. No userfaultfd needs to be involved: the clear is guarded only by the child VMA not being uffd-wp registered, so a plain fork() with an in-flight hugetlb migration entry (or a poisoned hugetlb page) corrupts the entry copied into the child. Instrumenting the clear and forking after MADV_HWPOISON on a 2MB anon hugetlb page shows: offset before=120e00 offset after =120e02 The fallout is mostly latent: rmap walks match migration entries by folio range and remove_migration_pte() rebuilds the PTE from the folio, so a within-folio PFN skew heals once migration completes. But any path that re-encodes the corrupted offset -- e.g. hugetlb_change_protection() rewriting a writable migration entry via make_readable_migration_entry(swp_offset(entry)) -- propagates it. Migration entries legitimately carry uffd-wp, so clear it with pte_swp_clear_uffd_wp(), matching copy_nonpresent_pte() and move_huge_pte(). A hwpoison entry, on the other hand, never carries the uffd-wp bit: it is installed fresh by make_hwpoison_entry() (try_to_unmap_one() does not preserve uffd-wp on the hwpoison path) and hugetlb_change_protection() leaves hwpoison entries untouched. There was nothing to clear there, only the corruption, so drop the clear entirely.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: erofs: cap LZMA stream pool size fs/erofs/decompressor_lzma.c sizes the module-global MicroLZMA stream pool from num_possible_cpus() when the lzma_streams module parameter is unset, then z_erofs_load_lzma_config() preallocates one image-supplied dictionary per stream, accepting dictionaries up to 8 MiB. On high-CPU systems, a small EROFS image can pin hundreds of MiB of vmalloc-backed decoder state until the erofs module is unloaded. Impact: An EROFS image mounted by the system can pin up to 8 MiB of vmalloc memory per LZMA stream, either as intended or unexpectedly. Bound the default stream count by a new CONFIG_EROFS_FS_ZIP_LZMA_DEFAULT_MAX_STREAMS option, default 16, so the worst-case default preallocation is 128 MiB if the number of CPUs is no less than 16 while preserving the existing per-image dictionary limit. An explicit lzma_streams module parameter is still honoured as-is, so administrators who deliberately size the pool are not affected.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: pci: Validate AIBV and AISB before pinning guest pages The AIBV holds one bit per MSI-X vector for a given function. The size of the bit vector is derived from the NOI and the AIBVO. If the size of the AIBV exceeds a single page boundary, then reject the request as we cannot safely pin the guest AIBV. Similarly reject the request if the AISB address is not 8-byte aligned as the architecture requires doubleword alignment for the summary bit address. Since the AISBO can address up to 64 bits, the size of the AISB can only be 8 bytes for the function. This also ensures the AISB doesn't exceed a single page boundary.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: reject stale cookies with mismatched verification tags sctp_unpack_cookie() skips cookie expiration checks whenever an association already exists. This is broader than the exception in RFC 9260 Section 5.2.4. For an existing association, Section 5.2.4 permits an expired State Cookie only when both Verification Tags in the cookie match the current association. Otherwise, the packet SHOULD be discarded and a Stale Cookie ERROR MUST be sent. The broad check lets an expired Action A restart cookie reach sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a(). In a runtime test with the default 60 second cookie lifetime, replaying such a cookie after 65 seconds returned a COOKIE-ACK and restarted the association. Check cookie expiration unless both Verification Tags match. This preserves the Action D exception for a lost COOKIE ACK while rejecting expired cookies in all other cases.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: isotp: fix timer drain order, wakeup handling and tx_gen ordering This patch is a follow-up to commit cf070fe33bfb ("can: isotp: serialize TX state transitions under so->rx_lock") which addresses following sashiko-bot findings: - isotp_sendmsg(): drain so->txfrtimer first so a stale callback can't re-arm echotimer after the claim - isotp_release(): wake so->wait after forcing ISOTP_SHUTDOWN so a sleeping sendmsg() claim isn't stranded - isotp_sendmsg(): have both wait_event_interruptible() calls in isotp_sendmsg() also wake on ISOTP_SHUTDOWN and do not return claim to IDLE to avoid corrupting a concurrent isotp_release() process. - isotp_sendmsg(): handle potential claim of a new transfer when the wait_event_interruptible() call returns in CAN_ISOTP_WAIT_TX_DONE mode. Don't touch timers and states of the new transfer if a new thread incremented so->tx_gen before getting the lock at err_event_drop. - isotp_sendmsg(): handle a stuck can_send() and omit timer and state changes if a new transfer was claimed. wait_tx_done() returns the error recorded in so->tx_result[], tagged with the caller's own generation. - isotp_tx_timeout(): on a claimed timeout, record the ECOMM error for the timed-out transfer's own generation in so->tx_result[]; sk->sk_err is raised unconditionally, same as every other error path here. - isotp_tx_gen_done()/isotp_tx_timeout(): always read tx.state (acquire) before tx_gen - the reverse order let a weakly ordered CPU pair a fresh tx.state with a stale tx_gen/tx_result slot. - isotp_sendmsg(): wait_tx_done: drain sk_err via sock_error() once we have read the result from so->tx_result[], so an already-reported error doesn't stay latched for a later poll()/SO_ERROR. Also align the remaining lock-free so->tx.state/rx.state/cfecho accesses and use skb->hash as unique loopback echo frame indicator.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vmwgfx: drop dma_buf reference on foreign-fd prime import ttm_prime_fd_to_handle() returns -ENOSYS when the imported fd's dma_buf->ops do not match the ttm_object_device's ops, but does so without releasing the reference acquired by dma_buf_get(). Any unprivileged renderD client passing a non-vmwgfx prime fd through the DRM_VMW_GB_SURFACE_REF{,_EXT} path leaks one dma_buf reference per call and indefinitely pins the foreign exporter's GEM resources. Funnel the error path through the existing dma_buf_put() so the reference is always dropped.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Fix uncancelled rxrpc OOB message handler Fix AFS to cancel its OOB message processing (typically to respond to security challenges). Also move OOB message processing to afs_wq so that it's also waited for and make the OOB handler just return if the net namespace is no longer live.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntb: Store original DMA address for future release The DMA API requires that dma_free_attrs receive the exact dma_handle originally returned by the allocation function. Do not modify it.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/tegra: gr2d/gr3d: Initialize address register map before HOST1X client is registered The host1x_client_register() function is called just prior to register map initialization loop, making the device available to userspace. This may result in userspace attempting to submits a job before the register map is initialized. Address this by moving register initialization before host1x client registration.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: tegra - Return ENOMEM when input buffer allocation fails for ccm Ensure the ENOMEM error value is set when the input buffer allocation fails in tegra_ccm_do_one_req.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix buffer head management in ocfs2_read_blocks() In ocfs2_read_blocks(), caller should't assume that buffer head returned by 'sb_getblk()' is exclusively owned and so 'put_bh()' always drops b_count from 1 to 0. If it is not so, buffer head remains on hold and likely to be returned by the next call to 'sb_getblk()' unchanged - that is, with BH_Uptodate bit set even if it has failed validation previously, thus allowing to insert that buffer head into OCFS2 metadata cache and submit it to upper layers. To avoid such a scenario, BH_Uptodate should be cleared immediately after 'validate()' callback has detected some data inconsistency.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/mlx5: Properly support implicit ODP rereg_mr Due to all the child mkeys in the implicit ODP configuration we cannot change anything in place for the parent mkey. Instead the whole thing needs to be rebuilt if any change is requested. If the user does not specify a translation then force the implicit values which will then fall through the logic into mlx5_ib_reg_user_mr() to allocate a completely new MR. Since implicit children were also touching the mr->pd, this removes another case where the access was racy.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix circular locking dependency in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write A circular locking dependency involves INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE, EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE, and ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE. 1. ocfs2_mknod() acquires INODE_ALLOC then EXTENT_ALLOC. 2. ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() acquires EXTENT_ALLOC for unwritten extents, then ORPHAN_DIR via ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan() while still holding EXTENT_ALLOC. 3. ocfs2_wipe_inode() acquires ORPHAN_DIR then INODE_ALLOC via ocfs2_remove_inode. Break the cycle in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() by freeing the allocation contexts (releasing EXTENT_ALLOC) before acquiring ORPHAN_DIR. WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected ------------------------------------------------------ is trying to acquire lock: ffff8881e78b33a0 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_evict_inode+0x1539/0x43b0 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1299 but task is already holding lock: ffff8881e78b4fa0 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_evict_inode+0xe97/0x43b0 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1299 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1029 [inline] ocfs2_del_inode_from_orphan+0x12e/0x7a0 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:2728 ocfs2_dio_end_io+0xf9c/0x1370 fs/ocfs2/aops.c:2418 dio_complete+0x25b/0x790 fs/direct-io.c:281 -> #1 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1029 [inline] ocfs2_reserve_suballoc_bits+0x16d/0x4840 fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:882 ocfs2_reserve_new_metadata_blocks+0x415/0x9a0 fs/ocfs2/suballoc.c:1078 ocfs2_mknod+0x10f3/0x2260 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:351 -> #0 (&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]){+.+.}-{4:4}: __lock_acquire+0x15a5/0x2cf0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5237 lock_acquire+0x106/0x350 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5868 down_write+0x96/0x200 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625 inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:1029 [inline] ocfs2_remove_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:733 [inline] ocfs2_wipe_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:896 [inline] ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1157 [inline] ocfs2_evict_inode+0x1539/0x43b0 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1299 Chain exists of: &ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE] --> &ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE] --> &ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE] Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]); lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[EXTENT_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]); lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[ORPHAN_DIR_SYSTEM_INODE]); lock(&ocfs2_sysfile_lock_key[INODE_ALLOC_SYSTEM_INODE]); *** DEADLOCK ***
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Fix leak of ungot volume Fix afs_lookup_volume_rcu() so that it doesn't leak a dying volume if afs_try_get_volume() fails.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: afs: Fix vllist leak Fix a leak of the new vllist in afs_update_cell() in the event that it is an empty list (nr_servers == 0), in which case the old list isn't displaced unless the old list is also empty.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ring-buffer: Fix event length with forced 8-byte alignment When RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT is true, rb_calculate_event_length() reserves the space of event->array[0] for placing the data length and rb_update_event() stores the data length in event->array[0] accordingly. As a result the whole event length will add extra 4 bytes for sizeof(event.array[0]) unconditionally. But ring_buffer_event_length() only subtracts the sizeof(event->array[0]) for events larger than RB_MAX_SMALL_DATA + sizeof(event->array[0]). As a result, small events on architectures with RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT=true report a data length that is 4 bytes larger than expected. To fix it, add the RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT as a condition to subtract the size of that length field whenever RB_FORCE_8BYTE_ALIGNMENT is true. This issue is observed in a riscv64 kernel with CONFIG_HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS set to y, when we run ftrace selftest trace_marker_raw.tc, we get the weird log: for cases where the id is 1..100, the number of data field is 8*N, but once id exceeds 100, the number of data field becomes 8*N+4: # 1 buf: 58 00 00 00 80 5e d1 63 (number of data field is 8*1) ... # a buf: 58 ... (number of data field is 8*2) ... # 64 buf: 58 ... (number of data field is 8*13) # 65 buf: 58 ... (number of data field is 8*13+4) After applying this change, the number of data field keeps being 8*N+4 consistently.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipvs: use parsed transport offset in TCP state lookup TCP state handling reparses the skb to find the TCP header. For IPv6 it uses sizeof(struct ipv6hdr), while the surrounding IPVS code already parsed the packet with ip_vs_fill_iph_skb() and has the real transport-header offset in iph.len. This makes TCP state handling look at the wrong bytes when an IPv6 packet carries extension headers. Use the parsed transport offset passed down from ip_vs_set_state() when reading the TCP header. For IPv4 and for IPv6 packets without extension headers, the passed offset matches the previous value.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: dts: renesas: ironhide: Describe inline ECC carveouts The DBSC5 DRAM controller protects DRAM content using inline ECC. The inline ECC utilizes areas of DRAM for its operation, which are in the DRAM address range, but must not be accessed or modified. Describe the inline ECC carveout areas used by the DBSC5 controller on this hardware as reserved-memory, which must not be accessed. Include DRAM areas which are unprotected by ECC as well, those are parts of the DRAM which directly precede the ECC carveout. In case of high DRAM utilization, unless the inline ECC carveouts are properly reserved, Linux may use and corrupt the memory used by the DBSC5 DRAM controller for inline ECC, which would lead to the system becoming unstable.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: hda/tas2781: Cancel async firmware request at unbind TAS2781 HDA I2C and SPI queue RCA firmware loading from component bind with request_firmware_nowait(). The firmware loader keeps the callback module pinned and holds a device reference, but the callback still uses driver-private HDA state. Component unbind removes controls and DSP state immediately. Later device removal tears down the TAS2781 private data, including codec_lock. If the async firmware callback runs after unbind has started, it can operate on state that is being torn down. Cancel or synchronize the async firmware request before removing controls and DSP state. A queued callback is cancelled, and an already-running callback is allowed to finish before unbind continues.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: xilinx-trng - Remove crypto_rng interface Implementing the crypto_rng interface has no purpose, as it isn't used in practice. It's being removed from other drivers too. Just remove it. This leaves hwrng, which is actually used. Tagging with 'Cc stable' due to the bugs that this removes: - xtrng_trng_generate() sometimes returned success even when it didn't fill in all the bytes. - It was possible for xtrng_trng_generate() and xtrng_hwrng_trng_read() to run concurrently and interfere with each other, as the locking code in xtrng_hwrng_trng_read() was broken.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Validate CRIU-restored IDs before idr_alloc The KFD CRIU restore flow restores previously saved object IDs from userspace. For event restore: kfd_criu_restore_event() -> create_signal_event() / create_other_event() -> allocate_event_notification_slot() -> idr_alloc(..., *restore_id, *restore_id + 1, ...) For BO restore: criu_restore_memory_of_gpu() -> idr_alloc(..., bo_priv->idr_handle, ...) In both cases, the restored ID comes from userspace-provided CRIU data. idr_alloc() expects the ID range values to fit within signed int limits. If a restored ID is larger than INT_MAX, it can trigger a WARN in the IDR layer. A kernel WARN is undesirable because it prints a warning trace and may cause a panic or reboot on systems with panic_on_warn enabled. Smatch reported these paths as allowing unchecked userspace values to reach idr_alloc(). Add INT_MAX validation before using restored IDs in: - kfd_criu_restore_event() - criu_restore_memory_of_gpu() If the restored ID is invalid, return -EINVAL. This prevents invalid restore data from reaching the IDR layer and avoids WARN-triggering paths, while keeping valid restore behavior unchanged.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs3: Allocate iomap inline_data using alloc_page This fixes a BUG reported in iomap_write_end_inline: iomap_inline_data_valid checks that the inline_data fits within a page. If the inline_data is allocated with kmemdup there's no guarantee that it's page-aligned, so the check sometimes fails. Allocate it with alloc_page to ensure it's page-aligned.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: alpha/PCI: Add security_locked_down() check to pci_mmap_resource() Currently, Alpha's pci_mmap_resource() does not check security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS) before allowing userspace to mmap PCI BARs. The generic version has had this check since commit eb627e17727e ("PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down") to prevent DMA attacks when the kernel is locked down. Add the same check to Alpha's pci_mmap_resource().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tipc: avoid busy looping in tipc_exit_net() Blamed commit introduced a busy-wait loop in tipc_exit_net() to wait for pending UDP bearer cleanup works to complete: while (atomic_read(&tn->wq_count)) cond_resched(); This loop can busy-wait for a long time if cond_resched() is a NOP. This typically happens if the netns exit is executed by a high priority task, or under kernels configured without preemption (CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE). In such cases, it wastes CPU cycles and can lead to soft lockups. Fix this by replacing the busy loop with wait_var_event(), allowing the thread to sleep properly until the work queue count reaches zero. Accordingly, update cleanup_bearer() to use atomic_dec_and_test() and wake_up_var() to wake up the waiter when the count drops to zero. This uses the global wait queue hash table, avoiding the need to bloat struct tipc_net with a wait_queue_head_t. The atomic_dec_and_test() provides the necessary memory barrier to ensure the wakeup is not missed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Add missing access_ok call to copy_user_syms As reported by sashiko we use __get_user without prior access_ok call on the user space pointer. Adding the missing call for the whole pointer array. Plus removing the err check in the error path, because it's not needed and also we can return -ENOMEM directly from the first kvmalloc_array fail path. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260611115503.AC16D1F00893@smtp.kernel.org/
Credential leakage via improper logging affects IBM App Connect Enterprise 12.x-13.x and IBM Integration Bus for z/OS 10.1.x, allowing a local attacker to recover plaintext credentials from application log files without requiring elevated privileges. The root cause is CWE-532, where sensitive authentication material is written to diagnostic or operational logs during normal product operation. No public exploit code or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis; IBM has released a patch via their support advisory.
IBM i versions 7.3 through 7.6 expose encryption key material to high-privileged local users due to hardcoded cryptographic constants used in the key-obfuscation layer. An attacker with elevated local privileges can leverage knowledge of these constants to reverse the obfuscation and recover plaintext encryption keys, gaining access to data that was assumed to be cryptographically protected. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, and IBM has released a patch via its support portal.
Cleartext credential exposure in IBM App Connect Enterprise 12.x and 13.x and IBM Integration Bus for z/OS 10.x allows a local attacker to harvest service credentials directly from trace log files. The middleware writes authentication material in unencrypted form during trace operations, violating the principle of minimal data exposure in diagnostic output (CWE-532). No public exploit has been identified and exploitation requires local filesystem access under high-complexity conditions, but successful compromise yields full credential disclosure with a CVSS confidentiality impact of High.
Sensitive process information disclosure in IBM i's PASE subsystem allows authenticated network users to access details about processes they lack permission to view. Affected versions span IBM i 7.3 through 7.6, covering a wide range of currently-supported releases. The vulnerability is limited to confidentiality impact; no integrity or availability degradation results. No public exploit code or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis.
IBM i versions 7.5 and 7.6 expose privileged file contents to locally authenticated users operating over SSH, allowing a low-privilege account to read information that should be restricted by the operating system's privilege model. The vulnerability is rooted in CWE-267 (Privilege Defined With Unsafe Actions), meaning the IBM i SSH subsystem permits file access operations that violate the intended privilege boundary for the relevant file. No public exploit code has been identified and the vendor-assigned CVSS score of 3.3 (Low) reflects the constrained local access requirement and limited confidentiality impact.
Local information disclosure in IBM Db2 Mirror for i 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 stems from a predictable Unix domain socket path placed in a world-writable directory, enabling a TOCTOU race condition (CWE-367). A local, low-privileged attacker can pre-create or replace the socket at the predictable path before the Db2 Mirror service claims it, intercepting communications that flow through that socket and obtaining sensitive information. No active exploitation has been confirmed, and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Fix responder UAF on IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC modify_qp rxe_qp_from_attr() handles IB_QP_MAX_DEST_RD_ATOMIC outside the IB_QP_STATE path, so it holds no state_lock and runs while the responder task rxe_receiver() (recv_task on rxe_wq) is live. A modify_qp() setting only that attribute calls free_rd_atomic_resources() then alloc_rd_atomic_resources(), swapping qp->resp.resources[] while rxe_prepare_res()/find_resource() walk it; free_rd_atomic_resources() also leaves the cached pointer qp->resp.res dangling. A local unprivileged user can race the free/realloc into a use-after-free in rxe_receiver() (local DoS). Drain recv_task around the swap with rxe_disable_task()/rxe_enable_task(), as rxe_qp_reset() already does when tearing this array down, re-enabling only after alloc_rd_atomic_resources() succeeds so the responder never resumes against a NULL qp->resp.resources on the ENOMEM path. Also clear qp->resp.res in free_rd_atomic_resources(), like the rxe_resp.c completion paths. Reproduced under KASAN; the slab-use-after-free in rxe_receiver() is gone.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvme-tcp: fix usage of page_frag_cache nvme uses page_frag_cache to preallocate PDU for each preallocated request of block device. Block devices are created in parallel threads, consequently page_frag_cache is used in not thread-safe manner. That leads to incorrect refcounting of backstore pages and premature free. That can be catched by !sendpage_ok inside network stack: WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 467 at ../net/core/skbuff.c:6931 skb_splice_from_iter+0xfa/0x310. tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x782/0xce0 tcp_sendmsg+0x27/0x40 sock_sendmsg+0x8b/0xa0 nvme_tcp_try_send_cmd_pdu+0x149/0x2a0 Then random panic may occur. Fix that by serializing the usage of page_frag_cache.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: xhci: bail out of setup if the controller is inaccessible xhci_gen_setup() locates the operational registers using the capability length read from the very first register: xhci->op_regs = hcd->regs + HC_LENGTH(readl(&xhci->cap_regs->hc_capbase)); If the controller is dead or has dropped off the bus, that read returns ~0, HC_LENGTH() truncates it to 0xff, and op_regs ends up 0xff bytes past the page-aligned MMIO base, i.e. unaligned. The first access through it, xhci_halt() -> xhci_handshake() reading op_regs->status, is then an unaligned readl() on device memory. arm64 faults on unaligned device accesses, so instead of xhci_handshake() catching the all-ones value and returning -ENODEV, setup oopses: xhci-pci-renesas 0005:08:00.0: Unable to change power state from D3cold to D0, device inaccessible xhci-pci-renesas 0005:08:00.0: xHCI Host Controller xhci-pci-renesas 0005:08:00.0: new USB bus registered, assigned bus number 1 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff80030a770103 ESR = 0x0000000096000021 FSC = 0x21: alignment fault Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000021 [#1] SMP pc : xhci_halt [xhci_hcd] Call trace: xhci_halt xhci_gen_setup xhci_pci_setup usb_add_hcd usb_hcd_pci_probe xhci_pci_common_probe xhci_pci_renesas_probe This was hit with a Renesas uPD720201 that failed to power up ("Unable to change power state from D3cold to D0, device inaccessible") yet still reached the HCD probe path. Read the capability register once, and if it reads back the all-ones value (as xhci_handshake() and xhci_reset() already test for), abort setup with -ENODEV before op_regs is derived from it. Reading it once also avoids re-reading a register that may change under a concurrent hot-removal.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: fix race between interrupt and resend After commit f8fce75fedf7 ("fuse: clear intr_entry in fuse_resend and fuse_remove_pending_req") the WARN_ON(!list_empty(&req->intr_entry)) in fuse_request_free() still triggers due to the following race: In request_wait_answer() if (test_bit(FR_SENT, &req->flags)) -> returns true In fuse_chan_resend() clear_bit(FR_SENT, &req->flags) In request_wait_answer() queue_interrupt(req) Fix by: - move clearing FR_SENT inside fpq->lock - move setting FR_PENDING inside fiq->lock - recheck FR_SENT after acquiring fiq->lock in fuse_dev_queue_interrupt()
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: fix missing barrier when checking io-uring readiness fuse_block_alloc() reads fch->initialized and then fch->io_uring. fch->io_uring is set before fch->initialized, ordered by the smp_wmb() in fuse_chan_set_intialized(), but fuse_block_alloc() has no matching read barrier between the two loads. This may lead a CPU to observe fch->initialized=1 but fch->io_uring=0, and skip the check that blocks request allocation until the io-uring queues are ready. This can reintroduce the lock-order inversion deadlock that commit 3393ff964e0f prevents. Add an smp_rmb() barrier to pair with the smp_wmb() in fuse_chan_set_initialized() to prevent this.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: publish io-uring queues with release semantics fuse_uring_create_queue() initializes a fuse_ring_queue and then publishes the pointer into ring->queues[qid] with WRITE_ONCE() under the fch->lock. There are several readers that may concurrently be fetching that pointer locklessly and then deferencing it. WRITE_ONCE() doesn't ensure ordering of the queue's field initialization before the ring->queues[qid] pointer assignment. The queue must be published with smp_store_release() so the field initialization is guaranteed to happen before. Readers in paths where the read may happen concurrently with the store need to use READ_ONCE() because any race involving a plain access is undefined.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: wait for FR_FINISHED on abort_on_kill to prevent use-after-free The abort_on_kill path in request_wait_answer() calls fuse_abort_conn() and returns without waiting for FR_FINISHED. If fuse_dev_do_write() is concurrently processing the same request (FR_LOCKED set), the caller frees req->args while it is still being accessed, causing a use-after-free. Fix this by jumping to the existing wait_event(FR_FINISHED) instead of returning early. The wait will not hang because fuse_abort_conn() ensures all requests are ended.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on setattr writeback failure fuse_do_setattr() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate (fault_blocked = true) and releases it at the out:/error: labels. But when a writeback flush is also needed, a write_inode_now() failure returns directly and leaks the lock, so any later fault or truncate on the file stalls on the stale rwsem. For example, truncate(2) on a setuid file reaches fuse_do_setattr() with both ATTR_SIZE and ATTR_MODE set: truncate(2) └─ do_truncate() ├─ dentry_needs_remove_privs() # S_ISUID └─ notify_change() # KILL_SUID -> ATTR_MODE └─ fuse_setattr() # no killpriv: │ # ia_valid |= ATTR_MODE └─ fuse_do_setattr() ├─ filemap_invalidate_lock() # IS_DAX && is_truncate └─ write_inode_now() # is_wb && ATTR_MODE └─ if (err) # e.g. daemon -> -EIO return err # <- lock leaked Fix this by adding an unlock label that releases the lock before returning the error, and use it for the fuse_dax_break_layouts() failure path as well.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fuse: fix invalidate lock leak on open O_TRUNC DAX failure fuse_open() takes filemap_invalidate_lock() for a DAX truncate (dax_truncate = true) and releases it before the out_inode_unlock label. But when fuse_dax_break_layouts() fails, the goto out_inode_unlock skips the unlock and leaks the rwsem, so any later fault or truncate on the file stalls on the stale lock. fuse_dax_break_layouts() can fail with -ERESTARTSYS when a signal interrupts the wait for busy DAX pages to drain: open("file", O_RDWR | O_TRUNC) └─ fuse_open() ├─ filemap_invalidate_lock() # dax_truncate └─ fuse_dax_break_layouts() └─ dax_break_layout() └─ wait_page_idle() # TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE └─ fuse_wait_dax_page() # unlock, schedule, re-lock └─ signal → -ERESTARTSYS goto out_inode_unlock # <- lock leaked Fix this by moving filemap_invalidate_unlock() below the label so that all error paths release the lock, and rename the label to out_unlock as it now covers more than just the inode lock.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: f_tcm: keep port count until LUN teardown completes tcm_usbg_drop_nexus() permits session removal once tpg_port_count reaches zero. However, usbg_port_unlink() currently decrements that count from the fabric_pre_unlink() callback, before core_dev_del_lun() waits for active se_lun references to drain. If removal of the last LUN races a nexus removal, the latter can observe a zero port count and call target_remove_session(). This frees sess_cmd_map while an in-flight struct usbg_cmd, including its work item, can still be accessed. Overlapping the last-LUN unlink with nexus removal reproduces this lifetime violation as a DEBUG_OBJECTS "free active" warning for usbg_cmd_work, followed by a target-core BUG/Oops. The generic target-core unlink path has no callback after core_dev_del_lun() completes. Add an optional fabric_post_unlink() callback and use it for the f_tcm port count. The count now remains nonzero until core_dev_del_lun() has finished draining active LUN references, preventing nexus removal from freeing the session during command completion.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gtp: serialize PDP context updates PDP contexts can be deleted through GTP_CMD_DELPDP or while the GTP network device is being unregistered. The latter is serialized by RTNL, but the generic-netlink delete path only holds RCU. Running both paths concurrently can therefore make both paths delete the same PDP context. The issue was found through static analysis and reproduced on a KASAN-enabled kernel by a simple two-thread program racing GTP_CMD_DELPDP against RTM_DELLINK: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: maybe wild-memory-access in range [0xdead000000000120-0xdead000000000127] RIP: gtp_genl_del_pdp+0x1c1/0x420 [gtp] RBP: dead000000000122 The second deletion dereferenced the poisoned hlist pprev pointer. Serialize gtp_pdp_add(), gtp_genl_del_pdp(), and gtp_dellink() with a shared mutex. Keep the mutex held until the final use of a PDP context in the NEWPDP path, and keep the RCU read-side section around the complete PDP context use in the DELPDP path.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/tcp-ao: fix use-after-free of current_key on reconnect to another peer tcp_inbound_ao_hash() is called before bh_lock_sock_nested() is taken, with only rcu_read_lock() held. On the fast path for established sockets, if the rnext_keyid sent by the peer differs from current_key->sndid, the key the peer asked for is looked up and stored in current_key. The lookup is inside the RCU read side, but current_key outlives it. When the socket is disconnected and connect() is called again for another peer, tcp_ao_connect_init() unlinks every key that does not match the new peer and frees it with call_rcu(). If current_key points at such a key, it is cleared to NULL. The fast path reads sk_state only once on entry, so a softirq that got into it while the socket was still established can update current_key after that loop has already run. The update is inside the RCU read side, so it comes before the call_rcu() callback, and once the callback frees the key, current_key is left pointing at freed memory. The next transmission picks that pointer up in tcp_get_current_key(). tcp_ao_transmit_skb() then reads the traffic key from the freed object, which is the use-after-free. Wait for one grace period before unlinking, and only if a key is going to be removed. By the time tcp_connect() runs the socket is already in TCP_SYN_SENT, and TCP_AO_ESTABLISHED does not contain TCPF_SYN_SENT, so a softirq entering after the wait cannot reach the fast path, and the ones already in it have finished. The existing NULL handling in the loop is then enough.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: espintcp: fix UAF during close ZDI reported and analyzed a race condition during close for espintcp sockets: espintcp_close() frees emsg->skb via kfree_skb() without holding any socket lock. Concurrently, the xfrm_trans_reinject work queue invokes esp_output_tcp_finish() -> espintcp_push_skb() -> espintcp_push_msgs() -> skb_send_sock_locked(), which reads the same skb as a data source. Fix this by adding a synchronize_rcu() call after resetting sk_prot, since esp_output_tcp_finish() runs under RCU and won't use a socket with sk_prot == &tcp_prot. Simply taking the socket lock in espintcp_close() could lead to leaks, if esp_output_tcp_finish() re-adds an skb in the slot we just freed. After this, the existing barrier() is no longer needed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: clamp route advmss to TCP_MIN_MSS tcp_select_initial_window() assumes that callers never pass an MSS smaller than 1, but route-derived advmss values can violate that assumption. A too-small explicit RTAX_ADVMSS is one way to get there, but it is not the only one. The same divide-by-zero can also be reached through the "default advmss" path when RTAX_ADVMSS is left at 0 and the effective advmss is later driven down by route MTU and min_adv_mss. Introduce a tcp_dst_advmss() helper that clamps route advmss to TCP_MIN_MSS before TCP consumes it, and use it in the TCP paths that derive advmss from dst metrics. This keeps the effective MSS from dropping to zero before tcp_select_initial_window() rounds the receive window.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: drop ESP-in-TCP packets with no ingress device ESP-in-TCP receives records through the TCP strparser. handle_esp() restores skb->dev from the saved skb_iif before passing the packet into the XFRM input path. Queued TCP data can be processed after the original ingress device has been removed, for example during veth or net namespace teardown. In that case dev_get_by_index_rcu() returns NULL. The XFRM IPv4 and IPv6 input paths both expect skb->dev to be valid while building the route lookup, so queued ESP-in-TCP data can dereference a NULL device. Drop the packet if the saved ingress device can no longer be resolved. Such a packet can no longer be routed through the normal XFRM receive path, and this preserves the existing behaviour for packets whose ingress device still exists.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: avoid lock inversion in nat keepalive work nat_keepalive_work() walks the state table while xfrm_state_walk() holds net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock. Its callback then acquires x->lock, which conflicts with the delete path taking the same locks in reverse order via xfrm_state_delete() and __xfrm_state_delete(). This creates an AB-BA deadlock that is reported by lockdep when a NAT keepalive worker races with SA deletion. Fix this by splitting the keepalive walk into two phases. First, collect the candidate states while the walk holds xfrm_state_lock and take a reference on each state. Then, after the walk completes, process each collected state and acquire x->lock without nesting it under xfrm_state_lock.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: fix xfrm_state_construct() auth-trunc leak attach_auth_trunc() can allocate x->aalg while leaving x->props.aalgo at zero when the selected auth algorithm has no sadb_alg_id. One real case is cmac(aes). xfrm_state_construct() then treats !x->props.aalgo as "no auth algorithm attached yet" and calls attach_auth(). That overwrites x->aalg and loses the first allocation. Any later failure or teardown only frees the replacement pointer. Check whether x->aalg is already attached instead of inferring that state from x->props.aalgo.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: mcast: fix use-after-free of a master VLAN's multicast context br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan() clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under br->multicast_lock before stopping a VLAN's multicast context. That is the teardown handshake: lockless readers gate on the flag through br_multicast_ctx_should_use() -> br_multicast_ctx_vlan_disabled(), so once it is cleared under the lock no reader can arm the context again. For a master VLAN the handshake never runs. __vlan_del() clears BRIDGE_VLAN_INFO_BRENTRY before calling br_vlan_put_master(), so br_multicast_toggle_one_vlan(masterv, false) returns early on !br_vlan_is_brentry(vlan): the flag stays set and br->multicast_lock is never taken. br_vlan_put_master() then drains the context in br_multicast_ctx_deinit() and frees the VLAN through call_rcu(), while a reader still inside rcu_read_lock() sees the context as enabled and re-arms it. The port and port-VLAN branch of the function has no br_vlan_is_brentry() test and flips the flag under br->multicast_lock, so it is not affected. The reader is the bridge transmit path. For a master VLAN br_multicast_rcv() selects brmctx = &vlan->br_mcast_ctx with pmctx = NULL, so IGMP sent to the bridge device re-arms the context's timers after br_multicast_ctx_deinit() has already stopped them. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in detach_if_pending+0x412/0x4a0 Write of size 8 at addr ffff88810ac39918 by task brmc/601 __mod_timer+0x51a/0xc50 br_multicast_host_join+0x25b/0x390 __br_multicast_add_group+0x468/0x530 br_ip4_multicast_add_group+0x1a0/0x260 br_multicast_rcv+0x2cda/0x61e0 br_dev_xmit+0x6c4/0x1540 Allocated by task 610: br_vlan_add+0x111/0xb40 br_vlan_info+0x370/0x3e0 Freed by task 0: kfree+0x1a7/0x4f0 rcu_core+0x7dc/0x10a0 Only test br_vlan_is_brentry() when enabling, like the br_multicast_ctx_vlan_global_disabled() test next to it. Disabling then always clears BR_VLFLAG_MCAST_ENABLED under br->multicast_lock before br_multicast_ctx_deinit() drains the context.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: reject unrepresentable multicast TVLV offsets The network and transport header fields in struct sk_buff are 16-bit offsets from skb->head, and U16_MAX is reserved as the unset transport header value. batadv_tvlv_call_handler() sets both fields from a received multicast TVLV without checking whether the TVLV end is representable. If the end offset exceeds the field's range, skb_set_transport_header() truncates it so that the transport header precedes the network header. The negative difference is then returned by skb_network_header_len() as a large u32. batadv_mcast_forw_packet() consequently accepts an oversized multicast tracker and accesses memory beyond the skb data. Add skb_set_transport_header_careful(), an offset-aware counterpart to skb_reset_transport_header_careful(), which validates the final head-relative offset before assigning it. Use the new helper in batadv_tvlv_call_handler() and reject unrepresentable TVLVs before setting the network header.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: keep the last remote linked during FDB flush A non-nexthop FDB entry is expected to have at least one remote while it remains reachable through the FDB hash table. A filtered bulk flush violates this invariant when every remote matches: It unlinks the last remote in vxlan_fdb_dst_destroy() and only afterwards tells vxlan_flush() to destroy the parent FDB entry. An RCU reader can find the parent during this interval. first_remote_rcu() then applies list_entry_rcu() to the empty list head, producing an invalid remote pointer that the receive learning path can read from and write to. When a matching remote is the sole remaining remote, leave it linked and ask the caller to destroy the entire FDB entry. vxlan_fdb_destroy() keeps the remote attached while sending the deletion notification and removing the parent from the lookup structures.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: don't queue packet path object notifications All file:line references below are against v7.2-rc4 (ac5b0e5651b1). The trace was captured on 7.2.0-rc6-kasan72rc6 (075b74841bd0), where the same lines apply. nft_obj_notify() is exported and reached from the packet path. Its only in-tree caller is nft_quota_obj_eval() (net/netfilter/nft_quota.c:68), which notifies with GFP_ATOMIC while evaluating a rule for a transiting packet, holding no mutex. Since commit 67cc570edaa0 ("netfilter: nf_tables: coalesce multiple notifications into one skbuff") that notification is no longer sent immediately. __nft_obj_notify() queues it onto nft_net->notify_list via nft_notify_enqueue() (net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1211), which is a bare list_add_tail(). notify_list has no lock of its own (include/net/netfilter/nf_tables.h:1951), it is serialised by commit_mutex: the six other enqueue sites all run inside a netlink transaction, and the drain in nft_commit_notify() (net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:10746) does list_del() + kfree_skb() from nf_tables_commit() with commit_mutex held. Sending packets through a chain that references a depleted quota object therefore races an unlocked list_add_tail() against list_del() + kfree_skb() on another CPU. The WRITE_ONCE(prev->next, new) in __list_add() then stores through an sk_buff that has already been freed: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __nft_obj_notify+0x2c5/0x2d0 Write of size 8 at addr ff110001047183c0 by task poc/76 CPU: 0 UID: 1000 PID: 76 Comm: poc Tainted: G W 7.2.0-rc6-kasan72rc6 #4 Call Trace: <IRQ> __nft_obj_notify (include/linux/list.h:164 include/linux/list.h:191 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1211 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:8743) nft_quota_obj_eval (net/netfilter/nft_quota.c:68) nft_do_chain_inet nf_hook_slow __ip_local_out ip_push_pending_frames udp_send_skb udp_sendmsg __x64_sys_sendto Allocated by task 77: __alloc_skb (net/core/skbuff.c:704) __nft_obj_notify (include/net/netlink.h:1055 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:8731) nft_quota_obj_eval (net/netfilter/nft_quota.c:68) nft_do_chain Freed by task 79: nf_tables_commit (include/linux/skbuff.h:1332 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:10759 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:11185) nfnetlink_rcv_batch (net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:574) netlink_unicast netlink_sendmsg The buggy address belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 232 Queueing from the packet path is wrong even leaving the race aside: notify_list is only drained by nft_commit_notify() from nf_tables_commit() (:11185), so a notification enqueued outside a transaction is not sent until some later netlink batch commits, if one ever does. The gfp argument that nft_obj_notify() still takes is a leftover of the pre-67cc570edaa0 behaviour, where this path called nfnetlink_send() directly. Restore that: split the message construction out into nft_obj_notify_alloc() and let each caller decide what to do with the skb. nft_obj_notify(), the exported one reached from the packet path, sends it straight away; nf_tables_obj_notify(), which runs under commit_mutex, keeps queueing it, so transaction notifications are still coalesced.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qcom-rng - Remove crypto_rng interface qcom-rng.c exposes the same hardware through two completely separate interfaces, crypto_rng and hwrng. However, the implementation of this is buggy because it permits generation operations from these interfaces to run concurrently with each other, accessing the same registers. That is, qcom_rng_generate() synchronizes with itself but not with qcom_hwrng_read(). This results in potential repetition of output from the RNG, output of non-random values, etc. Fortunately, there's actually no point in hardware RNG drivers implementing the crypto_rng interface. It's not actually used by anything besides the "rng" algorithm type of AF_ALG, which in turn is not actually used in practice. Other crypto_rng hardware drivers are likewise being phased out, leaving just the hwrng support. Thus, remove it to simplify the code and avoid conflict (and confusion) with the hwrng interface which is the one that actually matters.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: sun8i-ce - Remove crypto_rng interface Since the crypto_rng interface for hardware PRNGs is unused and is redundant with hwrng and the actual Linux RNG, it's being phased out. Most drivers for it were already removed. Go ahead and remove the sun8i-ce support which is one of the only remaining ones. Note that the sun8i-ce support for hwrng remains in place. That is the interface that actually matters. As usual for crypto_rng, this driver was also buggy: its ->generate() function had a use-after-free vulnerability due to using wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() without handling shutting down the DMA operation if a signal is sent. There's no point in fixing this separately only to remove the code anyway, so this commit is marked with Fixes and Cc stable.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: sun8i-ss - Remove crypto_rng interface Since the crypto_rng interface for hardware PRNGs is unused and is redundant with hwrng and the actual Linux RNG, it's being phased out. Most drivers for it were already removed. Go ahead and remove the sun8i-ss support which is one of the only remaining ones. As usual for crypto_rng, this driver was also buggy: its ->generate() function had a use-after-free vulnerability due to using wait_for_completion_interruptible_timeout() without handling shutting down the DMA operation if a signal is sent. Also, it had a buffer overread bug in the line 'memcpy(ctx->seed, d + dlen, ctx->slen);'. There's no point in fixing these bugs separately only to remove the code anyway, so this commit is marked with Fixes and Cc stable.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qce - fix CCM AAD buffer underallocation The AAD buffer allocated in qce_aead_ccm_prepare_buf_assoclen() can be smaller than the length later programmed into the DMA scatterlist. The allocation size is currently calculated as: ALIGN(assoclen, 16) + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN while the DMA length is set to: ALIGN(assoclen + adata_header_len, 16) Since ALIGN() does not distribute over addition, the allocation can be smaller than the DMA length. For example, when assoclen = 32 and adata_header_len = 2: allocation = ALIGN(32, 16) + 6 = 38 DMA length = ALIGN(32 + 2, 16) = 48 As a result, the QCE hardware can read beyond the allocated buffer while computing the CBC-MAC over the associated data. The extra bytes are folded into the authentication tag, resulting in an incorrect tag and causing CCM self-test failures such as: alg: aead: ccm-aes-qce encryption test failed (wrong result) on test vector 8 Fix the allocation by adding the maximum possible AAD header length before alignment: ALIGN(assoclen + MAX_CCM_ADATA_HEADER_LEN, 16) This guarantees that the allocated buffer is large enough for the fully padded AAD data for all supported header sizes.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: mxs-dcp - fix source scatterlist length access mxs_dcp_aes_block_crypt() uses sg_dma_len() without mapping the source scatterlist with dma_map_sg() first. Therefore, sg_dma_len() is invalid and could return zero or a stale DMA length, causing encryption and decryption to process the wrong number of bytes when CONFIG_NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH=y. Use the original scatterlist length instead.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: core: Add lock to usb_wakeup_notification() Add a spin lock to usb_wakeup notification to prevent a race condition with dereferencing freed memory. This could be hit by the xHCI driver as it calls this function from an IRQ and could race with the hub_disconnect() function, which properly grabs this lock to protect the state of the device.