Hatchet
Monthly
Account fixation in Hatchet's OAuth callback handling lets an unauthenticated attacker bind a victim's existing Hatchet session to an OAuth identity the attacker controls, achieving login CSRF and account takeover. The flaw affects Hatchet versions prior to 0.91.1 and is only reachable when the deployment has enabled at least one OAuth integration (auth.google.enabled, auth.github.enabled, or the Slack integration) and the victim has already completed an OAuth flow in the current browser session; exploitation still requires victim interaction (the victim's browser must follow the attacker's crafted callback URL containing an empty state parameter and the attacker's own authorization code). The vendor-released patch is version 0.91.1 (upstream commit f90464189ad642251e09412d0f99fde353036428); there is no indication of confirmed active exploitation (no CISA KEV listing) and no public exploit code identified at time of analysis, although the upstream fix ships an integration test that documents the bypass chain.
Unauthenticated remote attackers can exhaust server memory in Hatchet 0.110.5 and earlier by sending arbitrarily large or highly concurrent request bodies to the SNS ingestion endpoint POST /api/v1/sns/{tenant}/{event}, degrading availability only (CVSS 4.0 base 6.9, vector AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N with impact restricted to low availability; assessed CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L). No credentials, valid tenant ID, or genuine SNS signature are required because the SnsUpdate handler buffers the full request body before signature verification and accepts any UUID, so the SNS signature check provides no protective limit; the practical exposure constraint is network reachability of the endpoint. The issue is tracked by VulnCheck and is not listed in CISA KEV, no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and no vendor-released patched version is confirmed in the available data, leaving request-size limits and network restriction of the endpoint as the primary defenses.
Cross-tenant information disclosure in Hatchet before 0.106.1 allows an authenticated tenant worker in a multi-tenant deployment to read durable event-log records belonging to another tenant if it knows that tenant's durable-task UUIDv4. The flaw is in the WorkerStatus gRPC polling path, where ListSatisfiedEntries was called without a tenant filter; single-tenant installs are unaffected, and the UUIDv4 requirement makes practical exploitation unlikely. Vendor-released patch: 0.106.1. No public exploit identified at time of analysis.
Cross-tenant disclosure of durable workflow callback results in Hatchet before 0.95.3 lets an authenticated tenant worker receive another tenant's durable callback result payload. The V1 DurableTask stream handler stores worker-supplied task_external_id values in the durableInvocations routing map before tenant ownership is verified, and callback delivery resolves that map by task UUID alone with no tenant identity, so a tenant worker that knows a victim's durable task UUID and holds a stream open on the same dispatcher process can be handed the victim's payload. Exploitation requires out-of-band knowledge of a non-enumerable UUIDv4 plus same-process co-location, giving an assessed CVSS of 3.1 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N); no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and single-tenant deployments are unaffected in practice.
Hatchet deployments prior to 0.91.1 expose a cross-tenant insecure direct object reference (IDOR) on the durable-task event log endpoint, allowing an authenticated user who already knows another tenant's durable-task UUID to read that task's full event log. Successful abuse discloses task display names, workflow identifiers, user messages, wait conditions, branching logic, and timing metadata - a confidentiality-only impact with no integrity or availability effect. Exploitation requires valid Hatchet credentials (PR:L) plus prior out-of-band knowledge of a 128-bit UUID from a foreign tenant (AC:H), so this is a genuine but moderate-severity authorization flaw rather than a critical drop-everything issue; it is not confirmed as actively exploited (CISA KEV) and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis.
Server-side request forgery in Hatchet versions prior to 0.91.1 lets an authenticated tenant of the platform coerce the SNS ingest service into issuing an outbound HTTP request to an arbitrary URL, because the SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation handler calls http.Get() against the payload's UnsubscribeURL even though that field is excluded from the AWS signature verification performed by BuildSignature(). Successful exploitation allows the server to reach internal-only endpoints such as the EC2 Instance Metadata Service, internal HTTP APIs, and other services on the deployment's network, with the practical payoff limited to information disclosure (for example, potentially exposing IAM credentials) rather than code execution or data modification. Exploitation requires the SNS integration to be enabled and reachable and the attacker to already hold a Hatchet tenant account; there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and no confirmable tracking in CISA KEV.
Account fixation in Hatchet's OAuth callback handling lets an unauthenticated attacker bind a victim's existing Hatchet session to an OAuth identity the attacker controls, achieving login CSRF and account takeover. The flaw affects Hatchet versions prior to 0.91.1 and is only reachable when the deployment has enabled at least one OAuth integration (auth.google.enabled, auth.github.enabled, or the Slack integration) and the victim has already completed an OAuth flow in the current browser session; exploitation still requires victim interaction (the victim's browser must follow the attacker's crafted callback URL containing an empty state parameter and the attacker's own authorization code). The vendor-released patch is version 0.91.1 (upstream commit f90464189ad642251e09412d0f99fde353036428); there is no indication of confirmed active exploitation (no CISA KEV listing) and no public exploit code identified at time of analysis, although the upstream fix ships an integration test that documents the bypass chain.
Unauthenticated remote attackers can exhaust server memory in Hatchet 0.110.5 and earlier by sending arbitrarily large or highly concurrent request bodies to the SNS ingestion endpoint POST /api/v1/sns/{tenant}/{event}, degrading availability only (CVSS 4.0 base 6.9, vector AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N with impact restricted to low availability; assessed CVSS 3.1: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L). No credentials, valid tenant ID, or genuine SNS signature are required because the SnsUpdate handler buffers the full request body before signature verification and accepts any UUID, so the SNS signature check provides no protective limit; the practical exposure constraint is network reachability of the endpoint. The issue is tracked by VulnCheck and is not listed in CISA KEV, no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and no vendor-released patched version is confirmed in the available data, leaving request-size limits and network restriction of the endpoint as the primary defenses.
Cross-tenant information disclosure in Hatchet before 0.106.1 allows an authenticated tenant worker in a multi-tenant deployment to read durable event-log records belonging to another tenant if it knows that tenant's durable-task UUIDv4. The flaw is in the WorkerStatus gRPC polling path, where ListSatisfiedEntries was called without a tenant filter; single-tenant installs are unaffected, and the UUIDv4 requirement makes practical exploitation unlikely. Vendor-released patch: 0.106.1. No public exploit identified at time of analysis.
Cross-tenant disclosure of durable workflow callback results in Hatchet before 0.95.3 lets an authenticated tenant worker receive another tenant's durable callback result payload. The V1 DurableTask stream handler stores worker-supplied task_external_id values in the durableInvocations routing map before tenant ownership is verified, and callback delivery resolves that map by task UUID alone with no tenant identity, so a tenant worker that knows a victim's durable task UUID and holds a stream open on the same dispatcher process can be handed the victim's payload. Exploitation requires out-of-band knowledge of a non-enumerable UUIDv4 plus same-process co-location, giving an assessed CVSS of 3.1 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N); no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and single-tenant deployments are unaffected in practice.
Hatchet deployments prior to 0.91.1 expose a cross-tenant insecure direct object reference (IDOR) on the durable-task event log endpoint, allowing an authenticated user who already knows another tenant's durable-task UUID to read that task's full event log. Successful abuse discloses task display names, workflow identifiers, user messages, wait conditions, branching logic, and timing metadata - a confidentiality-only impact with no integrity or availability effect. Exploitation requires valid Hatchet credentials (PR:L) plus prior out-of-band knowledge of a 128-bit UUID from a foreign tenant (AC:H), so this is a genuine but moderate-severity authorization flaw rather than a critical drop-everything issue; it is not confirmed as actively exploited (CISA KEV) and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis.
Server-side request forgery in Hatchet versions prior to 0.91.1 lets an authenticated tenant of the platform coerce the SNS ingest service into issuing an outbound HTTP request to an arbitrary URL, because the SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation handler calls http.Get() against the payload's UnsubscribeURL even though that field is excluded from the AWS signature verification performed by BuildSignature(). Successful exploitation allows the server to reach internal-only endpoints such as the EC2 Instance Metadata Service, internal HTTP APIs, and other services on the deployment's network, with the practical payoff limited to information disclosure (for example, potentially exposing IAM credentials) rather than code execution or data modification. Exploitation requires the SNS integration to be enabled and reachable and the attacker to already hold a Hatchet tenant account; there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and no confirmable tracking in CISA KEV.