Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessObtain valid account password
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DeliverySubmit credentials to jwt/apply endpoint
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ExploitCapture login temp token
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ExecutionReplay token as bearer JWT or refresh
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ImpactGain full account/admin access
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A07:2025 - Authentication Failures
ASVS 5.0
V6 - Authentication Authentication mechanism validation
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Defense Evasion, Initial Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires that the attacker already possesses valid first-factor credentials (a correct password) for a target account AND that the account relies on TOTP second-factor verification, which this flaw defeats. The specific technical prerequisite is access to the temporary login token issued by the jwt/apply endpoint, which the attacker then reuses as a bearer JWT, via token refresh, or through HTTP Basic login to skip TOTP. The limiting factors are: valid password knowledge is mandatory (so this is not a pre-authentication bypass), and the impact is bounded by the privilege of the compromised account - though the description confirms it extends to the master administrator. Applies to default deployments of Ikaros versions 1.2.0 through 1.2.5. |
| Impact | This is a genuine but conditional priority. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N, 8.6 High) indicates network-reachable, low-complexity exploitation requiring only low privileges - consistent with the description, which states the attacker must already hold a valid password (first factor) and then bypasses TOTP second-factor verification. The core signal is CWE-287 improper authentication: the login temp token issued by the jwt/apply endpoint can be reused as a bearer JWT, refreshed, or replayed via HTTP Basic login to reach full account access including the master administrator, defeating the entire purpose of 2FA. No EPSS score, CISA KEV listing, or explicit POC flag was provided in the input, so exploitation probability cannot be quantified from the data; however, a detailed public technical writeup (hackmd) and a VulnCheck advisory exist, which materially lowers the barrier to developing a working exploit even though neither constitutes confirmed exploit code or active exploitation. The practical risk is bounded by the precondition that the attacker must already possess valid first-factor credentials, so this is best characterized as a 2FA-defeating privilege/assurance bypass rather than a fully unauthenticated takeover. No conflicting signals in the data: CVSS and description agree on network vector and partial-privilege prerequisite. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker who has obtained a user's password (via phishing, reuse, or leak) but is normally blocked by TOTP captures the temporary token returned by the jwt/apply login endpoint and replays it - as a bearer JWT, via a token refresh, or through HTTP Basic login - to complete authentication without the second factor. If the targeted account is the master administrator, the attacker gains full administrative control. No public exploit code is identified in the data, but a detailed technical writeup describing the token-reuse flaw is publicly available. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 13, 2026
TOTP-based second-factor authentication in Ikaros 1.2.0 through 1.2.5 can be bypassed, letting an attacker who already knows a valid account password obtain a fully authenticated session - including the master administrator account - without ever supplying a TOTP code. The temporary login token issued by the jwt/apply endpoint can be replayed as a bearer JWT, refreshed into a session token, or exchanged through HTTP Basic login, collapsing a two-factor login into single-factor authentication. This is not a pre-authentication bypass: valid first-factor credentials and an account that relies on TOTP are both required, and the resulting impact is bounded by the privileges of the compromised account (rated 8.6 under CVSS v4.0; assessor's v3.1 vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N); no public exploit identified at time of analysis, although a public technical writeup documents the temp-token reuse technique.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis - v1.2.5 is itself affected and its release notes contain no security fix for this issue, so affected operators should track https://github.com/ikaros-dev/ikaros/releases and the vendor advisory at https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/ikaros-1.2.0-through-1.2.5-totp-authentication-bypass-via-temp-token for a patched build, and treat a vendor statement confirming remediation as a prerequisite before considering the instance secure. Until then, the highest-leverage control is credential hygiene, because the bypass cannot be reached without a valid password: enforce strong unique passwords, rotate credentials for any account that may have been exposed, and audit for password reuse, accepting that this reduces but does not eliminate the attack surface for an attacker who already holds a working credential. Restrict the deployment to a trusted network or place it behind a VPN or an authenticating reverse proxy so the login, jwt/apply and refresh paths are reachable only by vetted clients, understanding that this degrades legitimate remote usability. Reduce the privileges of accounts that must stay reachable, since the bypass grants exactly the rights of the compromised account and the disclosure confirms it extends to the master administrator, and avoid day-to-day use of the master administrator account. Detection can focus on JWT bearer sessions, token refreshes, or HTTP Basic logins to TOTP-protected accounts that never completed an MFA challenge; note that blocking HTTP Basic at a proxy closes only one of the three abuse paths (the bearer-JWT and refresh-token routes remain) and therefore cannot be relied on alone, and that method-detail for the technique is publicly described at https://hackmd.io/@1ExmmukzRMWN7B4gQ4W-4Q/ikaros-2fa-bypass-temp-token, which lowers the effort required for an attacker who already has a valid password.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
Ikaros is a Java/Spring Boot media server application whose authentication stack is implemented under server/src/main/java/run/ikaros/server/security/. The login design is staged: the security endpoint published in SecurityEndpoint.java (lines 80-118) validates a username and password and then issues an intermediate temporary token through the jwt/apply endpoint, which the client is expected to exchange for a full session after completing TOTP verification. The flaw, classified as CWE-287 (Improper Authentication), is that the downstream components - JwtAuthenticationFilter.java (lines 30-46) and JwtAuthenticationProvider.java (lines 57-112) - validate the token's signature and lifecycle but do not verify that the TOTP step was ever completed, so the pre-second-factor token is treated as a fully authenticated principal. Because the same token object is also accepted through the refresh path and through HTTP Basic login, there are three independent ways to convert a partially authenticated state into a complete session, and no claim or flag in the token distinguishes an MFA-completed session from an MFA-pending one. The root cause is a trust-boundary error in token issuance and consumption rather than a cryptographic weakness in JWT or TOTP: the credential is validly signed, but its assurance level is never bound to the authorisation decision.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Network-reachable low-complexity token replay; PR:L because a valid password is required but TOTP is bypassed; high confidentiality/integrity from full account/admin access, no availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (vulncheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: vulncheck
DescriptionCVE.org
Ikaros 1.2.0 through 1.2.5 contains an authentication bypass vulnerability that allows attackers with a valid password to skip TOTP verification by reusing the login temp token. Attackers can present the temp token from the jwt/apply endpoint as a bearer JWT, refresh it, or use HTTP Basic login to gain full account access, including the master administrator.
Executive ViewAI
A two-factor authentication bypass in Ikaros versions 1.2.0 through 1.2.5 allows anyone who already holds a valid user password to complete login without ever providing a TOTP code, turning what is meant to be two-factor protection into single-factor access. Because this includes the master administrator account, a single leaked or reused password could translate into full control of the Ikaros environment, its data, and any systems it governs. Leadership should treat this as a credential-resilience issue: the organization's secondary control against password compromise is not functioning for these versions, and there is no vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: restrict network access to the jwt/apply endpoint via reverse proxy, WAF, or firewall allowlisting so untrusted clients cannot obtain or exchange temporary login tokens; rotate passwords and invalidate sessions for all TOTP-protected accounts, prioritizing the master administrator; monitor authentication logs for sessions completed without a TOTP challenge or for repeated use of a single temporary token; limit account privileges so a compromised account cannot reach the master administrator level; and apply vendor guidance as soon as a fixed Ikaros version is published.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
EUVD-2026-98930
GHSA-hj5g-wfrp-6x6g
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Exploit-DB