Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessGain control of a cluster worker node
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DeliverySend crafted file-sync message with trailing-slash basename
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ExploitBypass path validation and extra_valid enforcement
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ExecutionOverwrite master ossec.conf and agent.conf
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PersistConfigs executed as root on manager and agents
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ImpactRoot RCE across entire fleet
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V8 - Authorization Authorization checks on every request
MITRE ATT&CK
1 technique across 1 tactic: Privilege Escalation The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires the attacker to control a Wazuh cluster worker node (PR:H) that is already enrolled in and communicating with the master - this is the central limiting factor and rules out anonymous internet exploitation. Given that, the attack exploits MasterHandler.process_files_from_worker by sending a file name with a trailing-slash basename to defeat path validation combined with missing extra_valid enforcement, allowing overwrite of protected master files (ossec.conf, agent.conf). Deployment must be running Wazuh manager in a multi-node cluster configuration in the affected range 3.9.0 through before 4.14.8; standalone (non-clustered) managers with no workers do not expose the worker-to-master sync path. No user interaction is required (UI:N) and attack complexity is low (AC:L) once worker control is obtained. |
| Impact | This is a genuine high-priority vulnerability, though its exploitation is gated by a meaningful prerequisite. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N) with total impact on both the vulnerable system (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H) and subsequent systems (SC:H/SI:H/SA:H) accurately reflects the blast radius: an attacker who controls a single cluster worker can overwrite ossec.conf and agent.conf to gain root RCE across the manager and every connected agent. The critical limiting signal is PR:H - this is NOT a remote-unauthenticated flaw; it requires the attacker to already control a worker node participating in the Wazuh cluster, which substantially narrows the realistic attacker population to insiders or those who have already compromised a worker. The '9.4 CRITICAL' headline should therefore be read in that light: catastrophic impact once the precondition is met, but not trivially reachable from the open internet. No EPSS score, CISA KEV listing, or public POC is present in the provided data, so there is no evidence of active exploitation or mass-scanning pressure at this time; the vulnerability was reported by VulnCheck (a credible research source) and a vendor patch (v4.14.8) is confirmed available. The 'Authentication Bypass' tag is somewhat misleading - the root cause (CWE-862, plus a trailing-slash basename bypass and missing extra_valid enforcement) is an authorization/path-validation failure exercised by an already-privileged worker, not an authentication bypass. Priority: patch promptly given the root-RCE-everywhere impact and cluster centrality, but the PR:H gate means it ranks below internet-facing unauthenticated RCEs for emergency triage. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker who has compromised or maliciously operates a Wazuh cluster worker crafts file-sync messages to the master using a trailing-slash basename to bypass path validation and the missing extra_valid check, overwriting the master's protected ossec.conf and agent.conf. Because these configs are pushed to and executed by the manager and all agents as root, the attacker achieves remote code execution as root across the entire fleet. No public exploit code is identified at time of analysis, but the technique is described in detail in the VulnCheck advisory. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 13, 2026
Arbitrary file overwrite in Wazuh Manager (3.9.0 through versions prior to 4.14.8) lets an attacker who already controls an enrolled cluster worker node corrupt protected master-side files - including ossec.conf and agent.conf - by abusing a trailing-slash basename path-validation bypass and the lack of extra_valid enforcement in MasterHandler.process_files_from_worker. Because the manager runs as root and pushes configuration out to its fleet, the overwritten files escalate into root-level remote code execution on the manager and on every connected agent, which is why the vulnerability carries a CVSS 4.0 base score of 9.4 (independent CVSS 3.1 assessment: AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H). The PR:H prerequisite is the key limiter: the attacker must already control a worker node that is enrolled and syncing with the master, so this is not anonymously reachable from the internet, standalone (non-clustered) managers do not expose the vulnerable path, and no public exploit code had been identified at time of analysis.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade Wazuh Manager to 4.14.8 or later - the fixed release is tagged at https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh/releases/tag/v4.14.8 and the issue is documented in GHSA-88p6-7cm8-xwj8; because workers and the master synchronize software and configuration, upgrade the master first and then every worker so that no unpatched node can keep submitting malicious merge-file requests to a patched master (and note that mixed-version clusters during rollout should be treated as still exposed until the last worker is updated). If immediate upgrade is not possible, the highest-value compensating control is to firewall the cluster synchronization channel so that only known, static worker-node addresses can reach the master's cluster daemon - this fully closes the path but breaks dynamic worker enrollment and any legitimate worker-to-master sync from unexpected addresses, so it must be paired with static worker IP allowlists; an even stronger but more disruptive option is to temporarily run managers standalone (no workers) to remove the attack path entirely, at the cost of clustering, HA, and centralized configuration distribution. Additionally, treat every cluster worker as a root-equivalent trust boundary: any compromise of a worker should be handled as a master compromise, which means rotating cluster keys and agent enrollment credentials, re-enrolling workers from clean images, and verifying the integrity of etc/ossec.conf and etc/shared/agent.conf on the master for tampering before it has been pushed to agents (config file integrity monitoring on those paths will also surface future attempts). Finally, given that 4.14.8 fixed several other worker/agent-supplied path validation issues, audit any custom integrations, CDB lists, rule/decoder sources, and upgrade commands that accept paths from worker or agent input, and remove or restrict them until the patched release is deployed.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
Wazuh is an open-source SIEM/XDR platform built on a manager/agent model; managers can be deployed in a cluster consisting of a master node and one or more worker nodes, coordinated by the cluster daemon (wazuh-clusterd). Workers push files to the master for synchronization, and MasterHandler.process_files_from_worker is the server-side routine that receives and applies those merge-file requests. The root cause is CWE-862 (Missing Authorization): the handler does not properly enforce the extra_valid restriction that should limit what a worker may submit, and its destination path validation can be defeated by supplying a file name whose basename ends in a trailing slash, so a crafted request resolves outside the worker-writable area and lands on master-protected paths such as etc/ossec.conf and etc/shared/agent.conf. This is a high-impact design-trust issue rather than a memory-safety bug: the master implicitly trusts worker-supplied paths, and because agents and the manager itself reload the pushed configuration, an attacker gains a configuration-injection primitive that converts directly into command execution with the manager's privileges (root) and propagates to every agent. The 4.14.8 release notes reflect a broader hardening sweep of exactly this class of worker/agent-supplied paths - destination path validation when deleting rule and decoder files, source and path validation for CDB list retrieval, listing and deletion, restricted upgrade commands accepted from the agent message channel, and SCA policy source validation - which corroborates that the fix addresses missing authorization on file-path inputs rather than a single isolated off-by-one.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Requires control of a cluster worker (PR:H) over the network (AV:N); overwriting master configs executed by separate agents/manager crosses a trust boundary (S:C) with full C/I/A impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck
DescriptionCVE.org
Wazuh versions from 3.9.0 before 4.14.8 contain an arbitrary file overwrite vulnerability in MasterHandler.process_files_from_worker allowing a cluster worker to overwrite protected master files. Attackers controlling a worker can use a trailing-slash basename bypass and missing extra_valid enforcement to overwrite ossec.conf and agent.conf, achieving root remote code execution across the manager and every agent.
Technical POC Analysis
The core defect is CWE-22 path traversal, combined with missing direction/authorization enforcement.
Full technical POC analysis - root cause, step-by-step exploitation and patch breakdown - is part of the Pro and Business plans.
Executive ViewAI
Wazuh Manager versions 3.9.0 through 4.14.8, when deployed in a clustered configuration, contain a critical flaw that allows an attacker who already controls an enrolled worker node to overwrite master-side configuration files and gain root-level remote code execution across the manager and every connected agent. This means a single compromised worker can cascade into a full fleet-wide breach of the security monitoring platform itself, potentially blinding an organization to other threats and corrupting the integrity of its detection and response capabilities. Leadership should prioritize remediation because this vulnerability actively undermines the trust and control plane used to protect the broader environment.
Apply vendor patch.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
Remote Code Execution represents the critical moment when an attacker successfully runs arbitrary code on a target system without physical access.
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EUVD-2026-98676
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
GitHub
Exploit-DB