Red Hat Quay EUVD-2026-97776

Exploitation requires the attacker to hold an authenticated repository administrator role in Quay (PR:L) and to use Quay's webhook notification feature, supplying a target URL specifically crafted to bypass the hostname blacklist control. Realistic impact further depends on reachable internal endpoints from the Quay application - e.g., an accessible cloud metadata service (such as IMDSv1) or other in-cluster services - so deployments that restrict egress from the Quay pod or enforce IMDSv2 significantly limit the disclosure impact. Limiting factors: requires a privileged in-application role (not anonymous/unauthenticated), requires the webhook feature to be used, and value is bounded by what internal services expose.

This is a moderate-severity SSRF (CWE-918) with CVSS 6.4. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N) indicates network-reachable, low-complexity exploitation, but it requires privileges (PR:L) - specifically, the attacker must already be an authenticated repository administrator, which materially narrows the threat population to users who already hold a trusted role within Quay. The scope-change (S:C) and CWE-918 are meaningful: a successful bypass lets Quay reach internal/cluster resources (e.g., cloud metadata endpoints), so the real impact depends on what those internal services expose. Confidentiality and integrity impacts are rated Low, with no availability impact. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or public POC was provided in the input, so there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no evidence of active exploitation. On balance this is a real but privilege-gated hardening issue rather than a mass-exploitation emergency; prioritize it in environments where many users can hold repo-admin roles or where cloud metadata services (e.g., IMDSv1) are reachable from the Quay pod. No conflicting signals were found, but the absence of EPSS/KEV/POC data means exploitation likelihood is inferred from the vector alone, not measured.

An authenticated repository administrator in Red Hat Quay configures a repository webhook notification whose target URL is crafted to evade the hostname blacklist, pointing at an internal address such as a cloud metadata endpoint or an in-cluster service. When the notification fires, Quay issues the server-side request on the attacker's behalf and returns or exposes the response, disclosing sensitive internal data (e.g., instance credentials or service details). No public exploit code was identified in the provided data.