AstronRPA EUVD-2026-96343

The target must run the AstronRPA OpenResty/nginx gateway (as shipped in the project's docker nginx/lua configuration) with the vulnerable auth_handler.lua, and the attacker must have network access to that gateway and to the /api/resource/ or /api/rpa-ai-service/ routes. No special non-default configuration, credentials, or user interaction is required - the flaw is present in the default auth logic that validates no Bearer token. The practical limiting factor is network exposure: impact is confined to users who deploy the gateway reachable by the attacker (e.g. internet-exposed or attacker-accessible internal network), and scored impact is limited to those two API route families rather than full system compromise.

This is a genuine but moderate-severity authentication bypass. The provided CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N) describes network-reachable, low-complexity, unauthenticated exploitation requiring no user interaction - the worst-case exploitability profile - yet the base score is only 6.9 (Medium) because impact is capped at VC:L/VI:L/VA:L with no subsequent-system impact (SC:N/SI:N/SA:N). The description fully corroborates the vector: the OpenResty gateway's auth_handler.lua accepts ANY Bearer token, so no privileges are required (PR:N is accurate). No EPSS score, CISA KEV listing, or public POC flag was supplied, so there is no evidence of active or at-scale exploitation; the signals are therefore not conflicting - they consistently point to an easily-triggered flaw of limited blast radius. The limited impact rating is the main thing keeping this below High: an attacker can reach and act within /api/resource/ and /api/rpa-ai-service/ and impersonate arbitrary users, but the scored impact is Low across confidentiality/integrity/availability. Caveat: user-impersonation (spoofing X-User-Id/user_id to 'act as any user') could in some deployments yield higher integrity/confidentiality impact than VC:L/VI:L reflects - verify actual data exposure on those routes against your deployment before de-prioritizing.

An attacker with network reachability to the AstronRPA OpenResty gateway sends an HTTP request to /api/resource/ or /api/rpa-ai-service/ carrying an arbitrary 'Authorization: Bearer <anything>' header, which auth_handler.lua accepts without validation. The attacker then adds a spoofed X-User-Id or user_id header to impersonate any chosen user and act with that identity. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the flaw requires no authentication and only a crafted header, making it trivially reproducible.