Microsoft UFO EUVD-2026-93407

Exploitation requires authenticated access to the device registration endpoint (/api/devices) and the ability to supply an attacker-controlled WebSocket server_url that satisfies Galaxy's URL validation policy but then issues an HTTP redirect (301/302/303/307/308, including same-origin and relative) to an internal address. Affects versions prior to 3.0.9 only. Limiting factors that reduce real-world risk: valid credentials are needed (not unauthenticated); the initial endpoint must pass URL validation before redirecting; the attack is blind with no response body, arbitrary HTTP method, completed AIP session, or cloud-metadata access; and the confirmed effect is limited to opening an internal TCP connection and sending a WebSocket upgrade handshake to reachable internal hosts.

This is a medium-severity (CVSS 6.4) server-side request forgery whose real-world priority is modest rather than urgent. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N) indicates a network-reachable, low-complexity flaw, but PR:L means an attacker must first hold valid credentials for authenticated device registration - not an unauthenticated internet-facing bug. The scope change (S:C) reflects that the forged request crosses from the server into internal hosts, which is the genuinely concerning aspect, but the vendor explicitly bounds the confirmed impact to an internal TCP connection and WebSocket upgrade handshake: no arbitrary HTTP methods, no response-body disclosure, no completed AIP session, and no cloud metadata access. This makes it a blind SSRF usable primarily for internal host/port reachability discovery, which is why C and I are only Low and A is None. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or public POC was provided in the input: this is NOT in CISA KEV and no public exploit was identified at time of analysis. The combination of authentication requirement, blind/limited impact, and niche product footprint means this is a legitimate but lower-priority patch item, not an emergency - prioritize it where UFO/Galaxy is deployed with multiple semi-trusted registered users or internet-exposed registration.

An attacker with credentials to register a device submits a server_url that passes Galaxy's URL validation but, once connected, returns an HTTP redirect (301/302/303/307/308) pointing at an internal address. The pinned websockets.connect() client follows the cross-origin redirect and opens a new TCP connection, delivering a WebSocket upgrade handshake to the internal service before post-handshake peer-IP validation runs. The attack is blind - no response body is returned - and no public exploit was identified at time of analysis.