Rundeck EUVD-2026-93378

Exploitation requires an authenticated account holding the project 'configure' ACL (PR:L) for at least one project; the attacker then abuses the file resource model source by setting resources.source.N.config.file to an arbitrary absolute path and retrieving it via the editProjectNodeSourceFile or apiSourceGetContent endpoint. The limiting factors are: valid credentials plus the configure permission (not available to anonymous or read-only users), and that pre-fix builds (before 6.2.0) perform no canonicalization/base-path check on the configured file path. There is no user-interaction requirement and no non-default configuration needed - the flaw is present in the default FileResourceModelSource behavior - so the main real-world constraint is how broadly the project-configure role is delegated.

This is a credible, moderately-serious information-disclosure flaw rather than a drop-everything emergency. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N) confirms a network-reachable, low-complexity attack but one that requires an authenticated principal already holding the project 'configure' ACL (PR:L) - not an anonymous internet attacker. Impact is scoped to confidentiality only (VC:H, VI:N/VA:N), consistent with arbitrary file read. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or public POC is present in the supplied intelligence, so there is no signal of active or widespread exploitation; the primary risk driver is the sensitivity of what a file read exposes (DB passwords, LDAP bind credentials, cross-project data) combined with the fact that the required privilege - project configure - is a role often delegated fairly broadly in Rundeck installations. Net priority: patch promptly where Rundeck is internet-exposed or where configure ACLs are widely granted, but treat it as a trusted-insider / privilege-boundary-escalation issue, not an unauthenticated RCE. Note: the reporter is VulnCheck and a vendor patch exists, but no independent confirmation of in-the-wild use is available.

A user who has been granted only the project 'configure' ACL (e.g. a team member allowed to edit node sources) edits the file resource model source and sets resources.source.N.config.file to an absolute path such as /etc/rundeck/rundeck-config.properties or another project's directory. They then call editProjectNodeSourceFile or the apiSourceGetContent endpoint to read the file back, harvesting database passwords, LDAP bind credentials, or other projects' data. No public exploit code is identified at time of analysis, but the technique is straightforward to reproduce from the description.