AiSOC EUVD-2026-89539

Exploitable only when the AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET environment variable is unset, which per the patch commit was the case in every shipped deployment because no docker-compose or make manifest ever passed the variable - so the realtime service fell back to the constant published in the repository. The attacker must be able to reach the realtime WebSocket/SSE endpoint and forge an HS256 ticket signed with that known constant. Fixed configurations that explicitly set a real AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET (v12.0.0 generates one via 'make up') are not vulnerable, and the ticket endpoint now fails closed (503) when the secret is empty. No user interaction or authentication is required against affected versions (7.5.0 before 12.0.0).

This is a genuine, high-confidence authentication bypass rather than an inflated high-CVSS finding, but its real-world priority is dampened by an extremely small deployment footprint. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N, VC:H) describes exactly what the source diff confirms: the realtime service verified HS256 ticket signatures against a fallback constant ('aisoc-dev-realtime-ticket-secret-not-for-production') that was committed to the public repository, and no deployment manifest ever supplied the real AISOC_REALTIME_JWT_SECRET - so that published constant was the effective key in every deployment. That makes unauthenticated cross-tenant forgery trivially reproducible for anyone who can read the repo. The 8.7 score is confidentiality-only (VI:N/VA:N); despite the 'RCE' tag, there is no code-execution or integrity/availability impact in the described vector. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no explicit public exploit are provided - exploitation status is 'no public exploit identified,' though the leaked constant lowers the barrier to weaponization considerably. Net: technically serious and easy to trigger, but the affected product is an obscure open-source project, so this is a targeted-risk item for the small population running it, not a widespread threat.

An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the AiSOC realtime WebSocket/SSE endpoint signs a subscription ticket using the well-known JWT secret hard-coded in the public repository, setting an arbitrary tenant_id. They connect to the realtime edge and receive another tenant's live security alerts, case data, agent events, and graph updates. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis, but the required signing key is published in the project's own git history, making forgery straightforward.