AiSOC CVE-2026-103054

Requires an authenticated AiSOC account (PR:L) that owns at least one portfolio in the MSSP (managed security service provider) module, and the target tenant must be 'unclaimed' - not already managed by another organisation (the code rejects already-managed tenants). Exploitation is limited to versions 10.0.0 through before 12.0.0 and to deployments that actually use the multi-tenant MSSP module; single-tenant installs are unaffected. No user interaction is needed (UI:N), and impact is confined to reading the victim tenant's alerts, incidents, and posture metrics. The fix (v12.0.0) additionally requires each tenant to opt in by setting settings["mssp_parent_invite"], making the invite single-use.

The signals point to a real but moderate, narrowly-scoped access-control flaw rather than a high-urgency emergency. The CVSS 4.0 base of 7.1 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N) is driven entirely by confidentiality (VC:H), with only VI:L and VA:N - consistent with CWE-639 (authorization bypass via user-controlled key/IDOR), where an authenticated MSSP user reads other tenants' data. PR:L is the key limiter: the attacker must already hold a valid account with a portfolio in the MSSP module, so this is not internet-wide spray-and-pray. There is no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit code identified at time of analysis, so exploitation status is 'no public exploit identified' - do not treat it as actively exploited. The source-code diff and VulnCheck advisory concretely confirm the mechanism (the pre-12.0.0 add_tenants_to_portfolio path let callers claim unclaimed tenants without a consent/invite check, fixed by requiring an mssp_parent_invite and by adding require_permission dependencies), which raises confidence in the vulnerability's reality even though real-world weaponization is unproven. Net: a genuine multi-tenant data-confidentiality issue worth prompt patching for MSSP operators, but not a CVSS-inflated false alarm nor a widespread-exploitation crisis.

An authenticated user of an AiSOC MSSP deployment (e.g. a low-privilege analyst at one managed-service tenant) enumerates or guesses tenant UUIDs and submits them to the add_tenants_to_portfolio endpoint, claiming tenants that have not yet been brought under management. Once the unclaimed tenant is attached to the attacker's portfolio, they read that tenant's security alerts, incidents, and posture metrics without the victim's consent. No public exploit code is available, but the vulnerable endpoint and fix are documented in the vendor GHSA advisory and commit diff.