Dockhand EUVD-2026-89409

Exploitable when a Dockhand instance (before 1.0.40) exposes its git webhook endpoints and a stack's webhook secret is unset/null - the guard condition fails open and accepts unsigned requests. The denial-of-service path needs only network reachability to the webhook endpoint and the ability to enumerate sequential stack IDs (no authentication, no user interaction). The escalation to container escape and full host compromise additionally REQUIRES the attacker to have write access to the tracked git branch so they can commit a malicious docker-compose.yml with privileged bind mounts - this is the primary limiting factor separating DoS from RCE. Fixed by upgrading to v1.0.40, which mandates a configured webhook secret.

This is a genuine high-priority issue, not a CVSS-inflated one. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N) confirms an unauthenticated, network-reachable flaw whose baseline impact - forcing arbitrary git clone and docker compose redeployments - is trivially reachable by any remote attacker who can enumerate sequential stack IDs. The vendor scores VI:H/VA:H with subsequent-system SC:H/SI:H/SA:H, reflecting that the worst case (container escape and full host compromise via an attacker-controlled docker-compose.yml with privileged bind mounts) crosses a scope boundary onto the host. The AT:P (attack requirements present) metric and the description's qualifier 'when combined with write access to the tracked git branch' are important: the guaranteed, condition-free outcome is denial of service via forced redeploys, while the RCE/container-escape path additionally requires the attacker to control the tracked git branch - a meaningful gate. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or public POC was provided in the input, so there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no evidence of active exploitation; the fix is confirmed available (v1.0.40 release notes: 'git stack webhooks now require a configured secret'). Note the vendor sets VC:N (no confidentiality impact) yet also asserts full host compromise via container escape, which is internally inconsistent - full host compromise would normally imply confidentiality loss; treat the DoS path as the reliable impact and the host-compromise path as conditional.

A remote attacker with no credentials enumerates sequential stack IDs on an internet-exposed Dockhand instance and sends unsigned POST requests to the git webhook endpoint, which are accepted because the null webhook-secret guard fails open. This forces repeated git clone and docker compose operations for denial of service; if the attacker also has write access to the tracked git branch, they push a malicious docker-compose.yml with privileged bind mounts to escape the container and compromise the host. No public exploit code was identified in the provided data.