Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessJoin same WiFi/LAN as router
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DeliveryConnect to Telnet port 23
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ExploitAuthenticate with static credentials
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ExecutionObtain root shell
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ImpactFull device control
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A07:2025 - Authentication Failures
ASVS 5.0
V6 - Authentication Credential externalization
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Persistence, Credential Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Requires network adjacency - the attacker must already be connected to the same local network (WiFi or LAN) as the T-CPE301K router, and the Telnet service on port 23 must be reachable and enabled (the default per the description). No authentication challenge is meaningfully imposed because the credentials are predefined/static and shared across devices; knowledge of the fixed credential is the only prerequisite. Exploitation is limited to adjacent-network attackers rather than fully remote internet-based ones, which constrains realistic risk to guests, other WiFi clients, or an attacker on a compromised local segment. |
| Impact | The vendor CVSS 4.0 score of 8.6 (High) reflects total compromise - full root access with complete confidentiality, integrity, and availability loss (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H) via static Telnet credentials. However, the scoring signals conflict with the description and warrant scrutiny. The vendor vector uses AV:N (network) and PR:H (high privileges required), but the description states the attacker must be 'connected to the same network' and merely uses static/predefined credentials - which implies adjacent-network access (AV:A) and NO legitimate privilege (PR:N), since the whole point of hardcoded credentials is that no prior authorization is needed. The PR:H metric is almost certainly wrong for a CWE-798 hardcoded-credential flaw; anyone who knows the static credential can log in. There is no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit code identified in the provided data, so this is not confirmed to be under active exploitation. That said, hardcoded-credential Telnet backdoors in consumer routers are trivially exploitable once the credential is published and are historically attractive to IoT botnets. Real-world priority is bounded mainly by the product's narrow deployment footprint and the adjacent-network requirement, not by exploit difficulty. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker who has joined the router's WiFi or local LAN opens a Telnet session to port 23 and logs in with the device's built-in static credentials, obtaining a root shell with no further exploitation required. No public exploit code was identified in the provided data, but the attack requires only a Telnet client and knowledge of the fixed credential. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Sep 29, 2026
Static, predefined Telnet credentials in the Shenzhen Dbit T-CPE301K 4G WiFi mini-router allow any attacker already present on the same local network to log into the device's Telnet service on port 23 and obtain full root access. Because the credentials are fixed in firmware and shared across units, no brute-forcing or account setup is required - mere knowledge of the default password is enough to achieve complete confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H) on the router, which sits at a trust boundary for everything behind it. Exposure is constrained to adjacent-network attackers rather than the open internet, so realistic risk comes from other WiFi clients, guest users, or an attacker who has gained a foothold on the local segment; no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV. A vendor patch is available per the INCIBE advisory.
RemediationAI
Patch available per vendor advisory: apply the updated firmware referenced in the INCIBE-CERT notice at https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-t-cpe301k-4g-mini-wifi-router-shenzhen-dbit - no specific fixed version string is published in the available data, so confirm the build with the vendor rather than assuming an arbitrary release is clean. Where immediate flashing is not possible, the single highest-value compensating control is to disable the Telnet service or block inbound TCP/23 on the device and at the LAN boundary; if the router's management UI cannot disable Telnet, place it behind a NAT/firewall rule that drops port 23 from all client segments. Changing the default credential is worth doing but is only a partial mitigation because the same static password is reused across the product line and an attacker who knows it - or has captured it in cleartext from any other unit - can still authenticate; the trade-off is that changed credentials may be reset by a firmware upgrade or factory reset. Additionally, isolate the router's management plane on a dedicated VLAN or restrict which WiFi clients can reach the LAN-side management interface, accepting the operational cost of extra segmentation and limited guest access, and treat any unit that has been reachable by untrusted clients as potentially compromised at the root level, warranting a full configuration review and reflash rather than a simple password change.
Affected VersionsENISA
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Technical ContextAI · show details
The root cause is CWE-798 (Use of Hard-coded Credentials): the T-CPE301K 4G mini WiFi router ships a Telnet daemon listening on TCP port 23 that authenticates against an immutable, vendor-defined credential set rather than a per-device secret provisioned at manufacture or first boot. Telnet transmits credentials in cleartext, so even a non-invasive observer on the segment can recover them, and because the same credential is reused across the product line there is no device-specific entropy protecting any individual unit. The CPE record (cpe:2.3:a:shenzhen_dbit_network_equipment:t-cpe301k_4g_mini_wifi_router:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*) uses a wildcard version, indicating the flaw is treated as firmware-wide rather than tied to a single release. Note the scoring divergence between sources: the vendor-issued CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/PR:H) treats the attacker as highly privileged and network-reachable, while the independent assessment uses CVSS 3.1 AV:A/PR:N - the latter correctly captures that the only real prerequisite is adjacency (same WiFi/LAN) plus knowledge of the fixed credential, with no meaningful authentication challenge of its own. Under either reading the outcome is identical: root-level control of the device and its routing/DNS/NAT functions.
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Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Attacker must be on the same network (AV:A, not N), static credentials mean no privilege required (PR:N, not H), and root access yields full C/I/A loss.
Primary rating from Vendor (INCIBE).
CVSS VectorVendor: INCIBE
DescriptionCVE.org
A vulnerability relating to the use of predefined credentials in the Dbit T-CPE301K 4G WiFi mini-router allows an attacker connected to the same network to gain full root access to the device via the Telnet service (port 23) using static credentials.
Executive ViewAI
Shenzhen Dbit T-CPE301K 4G WiFi mini-routers ship with static, factory-set Telnet credentials that grant full root control of the device to anyone who can reach it from the same local network. Because the credentials are identical across every unit, the entire deployed fleet is exposed to guest WiFi users, compromised client devices, or any attacker who has already gained a foothold on the local segment, and each affected router sits at a trust boundary protecting everything connected behind it. Leadership should treat this as a fleet-wide remediation and asset-inventory issue rather than a one-off device fault.
Apply vendor patch.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
EUVD-2026-88757
GHSA-p9fj-gqf6-634v
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Vulnrichment
Exploit-DB