Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
-
AccessGain access to MCP tool interface
-
DeliveryInvoke confluence_upload_attachment with traversal file_path
-
ExploitServer reads arbitrary host-readable file
-
ExecutionFile uploaded to Confluence as attachment
-
ImpactRead attachment back to exfiltrate contents
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V5 - File Handling Path canonicalization, traversal prevention
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Discovery, Collection The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Requires a caller able to invoke the confluence_upload_attachment MCP tool against an mcp-atlassian server older than 0.22.0, and the server process must run with credentials/permissions granting Confluence upload plus filesystem read access to the target files. The specific defective control is that confluence_upload_attachment applies no path restriction (unlike the download path fixed for CVE-2026-27825), so a relative/absolute traversal file_path escapes the workspace. Limiting factors: the attacker must already reach the tool (local user in default stdio transport, or a network client if the unauthenticated streamable-HTTP transport is enabled), exfiltration depends on the caller being able to read the uploaded attachment back, and impact is bounded to files readable by the server's OS user. This is not exploitable against a patched (>=0.22.0) instance. |
| Impact | The vendor CVSS of 8.6 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N) rates this a high-severity confidentiality-only flaw: an arbitrary file-read via path traversal in confluence_upload_attachment. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public POC accompany this record, so the exploitation signal is 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis' - the only exploit-relevant artifacts are the fix PR/commit and advisory, which describe the flaw but are not weaponized code. Two signals warrant caution against taking the raw 8.6 at face value: (1) the description repeatedly says 'a caller' and frames this as a caller-supplied file_path, which implies a permitted MCP caller must already reach the tool - that argues for PR:L rather than the vendor's PR:N, unless the server runs the unauthenticated HTTP transport (cf. the batch's root auth-bypass CVE-2026-77244), in which case PR:N is defensible; verify the deployment's transport/auth mode. (2) Scope-changed (S:C) is arguable for a same-process file read with no cross-system effect - sibling path-traversal CVEs in the same PR#1448 batch (CVE-2026-77258, CVE-2026-77270) were scored S:U/PR:L at 7.7/6.5, so this record's PR:N+S:C is inconsistent with its near-twins. Net: a real but gated confidentiality issue whose realistic priority is moderate - it depends on the caller already being able to invoke the tool and on the server holding broad Confluence credentials, and the affected product has a small real-world footprint. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An MCP caller permitted to invoke confluence_upload_attachment supplies a file_path such as '../../../../etc/passwd' or a path to app secrets/config; because the download-side path restriction (from CVE-2026-27825) was never applied to the upload path, the server reads the arbitrary host-readable file and uploads it as a Confluence attachment, which the caller then reads back to exfiltrate it. No public exploit code exists, but the flaw is trivially exploitable (AC:L) once tool access is obtained. |
Get an e-mail when this CVE is exploited, patched or re-scored. Free account.
Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Sep 22, 2026
Path traversal in MCP Atlassian releases prior to 0.22.0 lets a caller of the confluence_upload_attachment MCP tool read arbitrary files readable by the server's OS user and exfiltrate them by pushing them to Confluence as attachments. The upload code path converts a caller-supplied file_path to an absolute path without the workspace confinement that had already been added to the download path (CVE-2026-27825), so relative or absolute traversal sequences escape the intended workspace. The independent assessment scores the flaw CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N (confidentiality only, no integrity or availability impact), requiring an authenticated caller with access to the MCP tool; the vendor's advisory scored it 8.6 with PR:N and S:C. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and instances at 0.22.0 or later are not affected.
RemediationAI
Upgrade to mcp-atlassian 0.22.0 (release tag v0.22.0, fix commit b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460, PR https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448) - Vendor-released patch: 0.22.0 - which replaces the os.path.abspath handling in confluence_upload_attachment with validate_safe_path() so the upload source is confined to the workspace; verify the running build reports 0.22.0 or later rather than only updating a pinned lockfile, since this is a self-hosted MCP server. If immediate upgrade is not possible, confine the blast radius instead of relying on input filtering: run the MCP server as a dedicated unprivileged OS user with no read access to secrets, SSH keys, cloud credential files, or other tenants' data in its filesystem namespace (a container with a read-only root and a single writable workspace volume achieves this, at the cost of some operational flexibility), and drop the Confluence token's scope to attachment-create plus the minimum read permissions (this still permits exfiltration of any workspace-local file, so it is a partial control only). Limit who can reach the tool - if the optional streamable-HTTP transport is enabled, place it behind authentication and network allowlisting or disable it and use local stdio transport so only the local operator can invoke confluence_upload_attachment; disabling the upload tool entirely (or removing it from the advertised tool list) fully removes the vector but breaks legitimate attachment workflows. As defense in depth, review Confluence audit logs for unexpected attachment uploads from service accounts, and note that the same advisory release also fixes the Jira attachment download working-directory issue (GHSA-6vmq) and adds SSRF redirect/DNS-pinning protection, so the full 0.22.0 upgrade is preferable to cherry-picking. See the vendor advisory at https://github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-p6hp-93wp-fh6p for the authoritative fix guidance.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in pypi
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
MCP Atlassian (sooperset/mcp-atlassian) is a Python Model Context Protocol server that exposes Atlassian Confluence and Jira operations as tools to MCP clients, running either over local stdio transport or an optional streamable-HTTP transport. The defect is a classic CWE-22 improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory: in src/mcp_atlassian/confluence/attachments.py, upload_attachment previously only called os.path.abspath() on the caller-supplied file_path when it was relative, which normalizes traversal sequences such as ../../etc/passwd into a valid on-disk path instead of rejecting them. Because that resolved path is then opened and streamed into Confluence as an attachment, any file the server process can read becomes exportable through the Confluence API - an arbitrary file read combined with an outbound exfiltration channel. The fix in the referenced pull request replaces the abspath call with validate_safe_path(), confining the upload source to the workspace, and the underlying helper behavior is modeled on the earlier download-side fix tracked as CVE-2026-27825. The same change set also hardens adjacent controls, including ANDing the configured Confluence spaces allowlist so a caller-supplied spaces_filter can only narrow and never replace the operator's boundary, refusing Jira attachment downloads into the working-directory root (GHSA-6vmq, where a downloaded module could shadow an importable file and gain code execution), and mounting SSRF redirect validation plus DNS pinning on the Confluence session to close a validate-then-reconnect TOCTOU gap, indicating a broader security-hardening pass rather than an isolated patch.
Know when Mcp Atlassian gets its next vulnerability
- Watch products and get an email when something new is published
- Check this CVE against your own stack and servers
- Exploit and PoC references, threat intelligence from 22 sources
No credit card · 7-day full trial
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
A permitted MCP caller must invoke the tool (PR:L, not PR:N); arbitrary file read gives C:H with no integrity/availability impact and no genuine cross-system scope change (S:U, though vendor used S:C).
Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).
CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, confluence_upload_attachment accepts an attacker-controlled file_path and does not apply the path restriction added for the earlier download vulnerability. A caller can traverse outside the workspace and upload arbitrary server-readable files to Confluence. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through confluence_upload_attachment, file_path, and CVE-2026-27825, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.
Technical POC Analysis
CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory).
Full technical POC analysis - root cause, step-by-step exploitation and patch breakdown - is part of the Pro and Business plans.
Executive ViewAI
MCP Atlassian deployments running versions prior to 0.22.0 expose a path-traversal weakness in the confluence_upload_attachment tool, letting a user with access to that tool pull files off the host and publish them into Confluence as attachments. Any credentials, configuration files, or secrets readable by the MCP server's operating-system account should be treated as potentially discoverable, and because the data lands inside Confluence, it can bypass controls teams normally apply to outbound data movement. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and no vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis; the independent assessment requires an authenticated caller with access to the MCP tool, while the vendor's advisory scored it as unauthenticated, so exposure depends on who can reach the integration.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: disable or blocklist the confluence_upload_attachment tool (or stop the MCP Atlassian server) on all instances prior to 0.22.0; run the server under a least-privilege OS account with filesystem access confined to the workspace so traversal reaches nothing sensitive; restrict service-account network egress and Confluence upload permissions; monitor MCP and Confluence logs for unexpected attachment uploads; and rotate any credentials readable by that account. The context also indicates instances at 0.22.0 or later are not affected, so upgrading is the durable path once rollout is approved.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Path traversal exploits occur when applications use user-controlled input to construct file system paths without proper validation.
More in Mcp Atlassian
View allServer-side request forgery in MCP Atlassian (the Model Context Protocol server for Confluence and Jira) prior to 0.22.0
MCP Atlassian (sooperset/mcp-atlassian) before 0.22.0 applies its ENABLED_TOOLS and TOOLSETS least-privilege filters onl
Unauthenticated arbitrary file read in MCP Atlassian (sooperset/mcp-atlassian) before 0.22.0 lets a remote network calle
Arbitrary local file read leading to data exfiltration affects sooperset's MCP Atlassian server (mcp-atlassian) prior to
Unauthenticated server-local file exfiltration in MCP Atlassian (sooperset/mcp-atlassian) before 0.22.0 allows a remote
Server-side request forgery in MCP Atlassian prior to 0.22.0 lets an attacker who controls or has already compromised th
MCP Atlassian (sooperset/mcp-atlassian) before 0.22.0 lets a low-privileged authenticated MCP caller write attacker-chos
Server-side request forgery in MCP Atlassian (sooperset/mcp-atlassian) before 0.22.0 allows a low-privileged authenticat
Arbitrary local file read in MCP Atlassian (mcp-atlassian) prior to 0.22.0 allows an authenticated MCP caller who can re
Arbitrary server-local file read and exfiltration in MCP Atlassian (sooperset/mcp-atlassian) prior to 0.22.0 lets an aut
Path traversal in the MCP Atlassian server (mcp-atlassian) prior to 0.22.0 allows an authenticated MCP client to read fi
Information disclosure in MCP Atlassian (sooperset/mcp-atlassian) before 0.22.0 allows an authenticated caller of the MC
EUVD-2026-84744
GHSA-p6hp-93wp-fh6p
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Exploit-DB